



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY

231 WEST MICHIGAN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201

April 28, 1975

Mr. Benard C. Rusche, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C. 20555

MAY 6, 1975

Dear Mr. Rusche:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
INFORMATION REPORT ON FAILURE OF DIESEL RELAY
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT

The event recorded below does not constitute an abnormal occurrence as described in Section 15.1.a of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications, nor is it a 30-day reportable item as described by Section 15.6.6.3 of the Technical Specifications. This report is filed for informational purposes.

On April 9, 1975, during the annual 3D emergency diesel inspection, a start failure delay relay, SFD-2, failed to operate within its required time period when tested. The relay operated in approximately one minute thirty-nine seconds versus the normal time of approximately four seconds. The relay operated satisfactorily upon immediate retest, was cleaned, and again satisfactorily retested.

The function of the diesel start circuit start failure delay relays is to time out after four seconds, and if the primary diesel starting circuit has failed to bring the diesel speed to over 100 rpm within the four-second period, it shuts down the primary starting circuit and shifts to the secondary starting circuit.

Full details of pneumatic relay and the diesel starting logic can be found in the manuals of the Square "D" Company, Class 9050 Series pneumatic relays and the Electro-Motive Division (General Motors) electrical drawing 8413730, respectively.

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
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April 28, 1975

Since the test of the No. 1 starting circuit start failure delay relay, SPF-1, performed just prior to SFD-2 test was satisfactory and since all previous tests of these relays have been satisfactory, the SFD-2 relay failure is not considered to be generic in nature. As a precautionary measure, however, a schedule will be developed to exercise and check the relays for reliable operation on a semi-annual basis rather than the present annual schedule.

Since the inability of the start failure delay relays to shift to the redundant start circuit presumes a double failure (and more so as the diesel is itself redundant), and since as an additional back-up manual start of the diesel was available, the failure of the SFD-2 start failure delay relay to operate within the required interval posed no health or safety hazard to the public.

Very truly yours,



Executive Vice President

Sol Burstein

Copy to Mr. James G. Keppler - Region III