Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 WEST MICHIGAN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201

March 18, 1975

Mr. Edson G. Case, Acting Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

DOCKET NO. 50-266
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 50-266/75-5
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
LOW LEVEL RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE
VIA MAIN FEED PUMP SEALS

This letter reports the details of an abnormal occurrence at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Facility Operating License No. DPR-24, as defined by Section 15.1.a.C of the Technical Specifications. This written report, filed in accordance with Section 15.6.6.A.2 of the Technical Specifications, follows a verbal notification of the event to Mr. Dwane Boyd, Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on March 10, 1975, per Section 15.6.A.1 of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications.

At 9:15 a.m. on March 9, 1975, with Unit 1 in the cold shutdown condition for an extended outage for steam generator testing, cleaning, and repair following tube failure, a Supervisor, while verifying that a service water valve had been properly identified for a maintenance repair unrelated to this event, observed a small flow of water into the Unit 1 turbine hall floor drain. An investigation determined that the steam generator main feed pump seals were leaking at a rate later determined to be 0.3 gpm. Immediately after the taking of a sample for radiochemical analysis at 9:30 a.m., March 9, 1975, the leakage was stopped when the "A" main feed regulating valve bypass valve and the main feed pump casing warm-up lines were isolated.

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Previous to this event, at 9:55 p.m. on March 7, 1975, the "A" steam generator was filled via the auxiliary feed line for the purpose of performing an 800 psi leak test of the steam generator. Following completion of this test, the pressure was reduced slowly over a period of approximately ten hours. It is presumed that when the pressure eventually equalized with the atmosphere, a minor backleakage developed across the disc and seat of the 16-inch main feed check valves, this leakage gradually filling the pipe over the next several hours. When the filled pipe developed sufficient pressure due to the head of water in the "A" steam generator, leakage occurred across the disc and seat of the main feed regulating valve bypass valve, to and out of the seals of the main feed pumps. The backleakage through the 16-inch check valves is attributable to the essentially zero differential at shutdown, the valves being tight under operating conditions. The minor leakage at the main feed regulating valve bypass valve is not abnormal as this type of valve, designed for regulating service, is not expected to be capable of tight shutoff.

Because of the previous tube failure incident, the secondary systems' fluids have become slightly radioactive. Therefore, this leakage constituted an unscheduled, unmonitored release via the floor drain, sewage plant sump, and ultimately to the retention pond, a restricted area.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the leakage began some time after 10:30 p.m. on March 8, 1975, at which time the Shift Supervisor inspected the main feed pumps and observed no leakage. Conservatively assuming that the leakage at the seals began immediately after the above inspection, the total leakage is calculated to have been 198 gallons which, prior to discharge to the retention pond, was diluted with an estimated 18,000 gallons of water in the sewage treatment plant sump. The radiochemical analysis produced the following results:

Isotope	Concentration Before Dilution µCi/ml	Concentration in Discharge to the Retention Pond µCi/ml	% MPC for Discharge to a Restricted Area
Xe-133	2.27×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-6}	25
Cs-137	3.45×10^{-7}	3.79×10^{-9}	< 0.001
H-3	1.34×10^{-2}	1.47×10^{-4}	0.0147

It is concluded that the unscheduled discharge to the retention pond, being well below MPC for a restricted area, did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public. To prevent a recurrence of this or similar events, a Manager's Supervisory Staff task force has been established to identify all possible secondary plant leakage sources and institute control of them until the secondary systems are again uncontaminated.

Very truly yours,

Sol Burstein

Executive Vice President

Sol Burstein

cc: Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Director - Region III