



NARRATIVE REPORT  
FOR LER 50-366/1982-123, Rev. 1  
UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 11/23/82

LICENSEE : GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
FACILITY NAME : EDWIN I. HATCH  
DOCKET NUMBER : 50-366

Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:

This 30-day LER is required by Tech. Specs. section 6.9.1.9.b, because it showed that the unit did not meet the requirements of Tech. Specs. section 3.1.3.7.

Plant conditions at the time of the event(s):

The unit was in power descent at 535 MWT (approximately 21% power) when these events occurred.

Detailed description of the event(s):

1. On 10/30/82 at approximately 0230 CST, control rod 2C11-34-43 was inserted, but operating personnel received no indication at positions 30, 20, 10, or 00 (refer to deviation 2-82-282).
2. At approximately the same time, control rod 2C11-14-07 was also inserted, but operating personnel did not receive an indication at the position which should have been number 36 (refer to deviation 2-82-283). These events are contrary to Tech. Specs. section 3.1.3.7.

Consequences of the event(s):

These events did not affect plant operation. The health and safety of the public were not affected by these events.

Status of redundant or backup subsystems and/or systems:

There is no redundant or backup systems for these control rods.

Justification for continued operation:

Both control rods were fully inserted, and their positions were determined within one hour by use of the "full in" position indicators. Thus continued operation was permitted per Tech. Specs. section 3.1.3.7, ACTION a.

If repetitive, number of previous LER:

This event is repetitive as last reported on LER 50-366/1982-088.

Impact to other systems and/or Unit:

These events had no impact upon any other system in Unit 2, or Unit 1.

Cause(s) of the event(s):

These events were caused by component failure.

Immediate Corrective Action:

Both control rods were fully inserted, and their positions were determined within one hour by use of the "full in" position indicators; hence, the requirement of Tech. Specs. section 3.1.3.7, ACTION a was satisfied. The reed switch position indicators will be repaired during the 1983 refueling outage.

Supplemental Corrective Action:

1. After an investigation it was determined that CRD 2C11-14-07 position indicator probe reed switches had failed. The position indicator probe was replaced, and CRD 2C11-14-07 was satisfactorily functionally tested per the "RPIS PROBE PREINSTALLATION FUNCTIONAL TEST AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION" procedure (HNP-6985), and returned to service on 05/09/83.
2. After an investigation, it was determined that the cause of this event was not a failed position indicator probe in control rod 2C11-34-43; but a failed display memory card in control room panel 2H11-P615. The memory card was replaced. The CRD was then satisfactorily moved and correct position indication was displayed on 10/30/83.

Scheduled (future) corrective action:

No future corrective action is required.

Action to prevent recurrence (if different from corrective actions):

N/A

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Georgia Power

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant


March 19, 1984  
GM-84-181

PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1982-123, Rev. 1.  
This report is required by Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications  
Section 6.9.1.9.b.

  
H. C. Nix  
General Manager

HCN/GBT/djs

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