

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

50-285/76-19

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 N E F C S 1	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0	4 2 1 1 1 1	0 1
7 8 9 14	15 25	26 30	31 32

CONT	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CONT	57 58	T	L	0 5 0 - 0 2 8 5	0 5 2 8 7 6	0 6 0 8 7 6
7 8	57 58	59	60	61 68	69 74	75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">02</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">03</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">04</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">05</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">06</div>	<p>As a result of a plant trip, two main steam safety valves relieved. However, a review of the actual plant parameters during the trip indicated that the pressure did not reach the valve set pressure. As a result of this discovery all valves relief set-points were checked and six of the ten valves showed that their relief setpoint had drifted below Technical Specification tolerance. (LER 50-285/76-19)</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07 H B	E	V A L V E X	A	D 2 4 3	Y
7 8 9 10	11	12 17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">08</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">09</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">10</div>	<p>Safety valves are Dresser 6" Maxiflow Type 3707 RAXI-RT. Valves popped light due to possible environmental temperature conditions which were higher than original temperatures.</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11 G	0 0 0	NA	A	Observation following trip
7 8 9	10 12 13		44 45 46	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12 Z	Z	NA	NA
7 8 9	10 11	44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13 0 0 0	Z	NA
7 8 9 11	12	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14 0 0 0	NA
7 8 9 11 12	80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">15</div>	<p>NA</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16 Z	NA
7 8 9 10	80

PUBLICITY

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">17</div>	<p>NA</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">18</div>	<p>See attachments 1, 2 and 3.</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">19</div>	<p></p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">80</div>
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8403230239 761014
PDR ADCK 05000285
S PDR

NAME: Steven M. Moyers PHONE: 402-426-4011

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

Technical Specification 2.1.6 which pertains to the Pressurizer and Steam System Safety Valves relates the minimum requirements for these valves. It states in 2.1.6(3) that

"Whenever the reactor is in power operation, eight of the ten steam safety valves shall be operable with their lift settings between 1000 psia and 1050 psia with a tolerance of $\pm 1\%$ of the nominal nameplate set point value."

In this particular case seven of the ten valves were operable with the actual lift settings between 1000 psia and 1050 psia. However, after checking the lift setting of each of the valves, six of the valves indicated lift settings more than 1% below their nominal set point value.

The as found and as left condition of these valves are tabulated below:

	<u>REQUIRED SETPOINT</u>	<u>AS FOUND</u>	<u>AS LEFT</u>
MS-275	1050 psia	1030 psia	1046 psia
MS-276	1040 psia	1021 psia	1045 psia
MS-277	1025 psia	950 psia	1020 psia
MS-278	1015 psia	955 psia	1015 psia
MS-279	1050 psia	1021 psia	1041 psia
MS-280	1040 psia	1041 psia	
MS-281	1025 psia	1021 psia	
MS-282	1015 psia	961 psia	1016 psia
MS-291	1000 psia	1000 psia	
MS-292	1000 psia	1000 psia	

The basis for the safety analysis is that the valves relief capacity be greater than 4.7×10^6 lb/hr to prevent overpressurization of the steam system at loss of load conditions from a rated power condition of 1420 MWt. Because the setpoint drift was in a conservative direction, the safety valves were always capable of discharging their design flow.

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

These valves were immediately reset and the setpoint was returned to
+ 1% of their nominal setpoint value.

ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

This is the first incident found at Fort Calhoun in which the safety valve setpoint was found out of tolerance. The vendor service engineers were contacted as to possible reasons. It was pointed out that some experience of this nature has occurred if the hydro-setting of the setpoints is done too soon after a startup and the valves are not at a stable temperature when initially set. As a result, these valves will be checked at the refueling outage in the fall of 1976 and again checked and reset as necessary after startup. Special care will be taken to observe temperature conditions on these valves.

Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY • OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 • TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402



June 8, 1976
FC-191-76



Mr. E. Morris Howard
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

Dear Mr. Howard:

Reference: Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-285

In accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station's Technical Specifications, the Omaha Public Power District, as holder of facility operating license DPR-40, submits three copies of the following licensee event report 50-285/76-19 to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones
Section Manager
Operations


WCJ/WDD:rge

Enclosure

cc: Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (3)

Director, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (30)

Mr. L. C. Shalla
SARC Chairman
PRC Chairman
Fort Calhoun File (2)

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