

50-285/76-19 Supplement No. 1

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	STATUS
1. Registration	10/10/2023	08:00	Room 101	Completed
2. Welcome Address	10/10/2023	08:30	Room 101	Completed
3. Keynote Speech	10/10/2023	09:00	Room 101	Completed
4. Panel Discussion	10/10/2023	09:30	Room 101	Completed
5. Lunch Break	10/10/2023	12:00	Room 101	Completed
6. Workshop	10/10/2023	13:00	Room 101	Completed
7. Q&A Session	10/10/2023	14:00	Room 101	Completed
8. Networking	10/10/2023	15:00	Room 101	Completed
9. Closing Remarks	10/10/2023	16:00	Room 101	Completed
10. Event Summary	10/10/2023	16:30	Room 101	Completed

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION				
0	7	H	B	E	V	A	L	V	E	X	A	0	2	4	3	Y	
7	8	9	10	11	12					17	43	44				47	48

08 Valve relief pressure drifted due to possible change in environmental condition from
7 8 9
09 the setting temperature. Engineering Evaluation/Assistance Request Number 76-49 has
7 8 9
10 been written to investigate the problem.
7 8 9

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

PERSONNEL INJURIES

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

PUBLICITY

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

19
7 8 9

PHONE: 402-426-4011

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

Technical Specification Section 2.1.6(3) requires eight of ten safety valves to be operable with the lift settings between 1000 psia and 1050 psia with a tolerance of $\pm 1.0\%$ of the nominal nameplate setpoint.

The as found settings showed nine of ten safety valves to be operable with lift settings between 1000 psia and 1050 psia. However, five safety valves were found to have drifted more than the $\pm 1.0\%$ of nominal nameplate, as tabulated below:

<u>Safety Valve</u>	<u>Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>
MS-275	1050 psia	1042
MS-276	1040 psia	1065
MS-277	1025 psia	1040
MS-278	1015 psia	1020
MS-279	1050 psia	1048
MS-280	1040 psia	1038
MS-281	1025 psia	1040
MS-282	1015 psia	1013
MS-291	1000 psia	1022
MS-292	1000 psia	1028

The basis for the safety analysis is that the valve relief capacity be greater than 4.7×10^6 b/hr to prevent overpressurization of the steam system at loss of load conditions from rated power condition of 1420 MWT although 5 of 10 safety valves drifted greater than $\pm 1.0\%$, 9 safety valves were available to provide the required flow between 1000 psia and 1050 psia.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

The safety valve drift was found during unit shutdown for refueling. The valves will be inspected during the outage and will be reset prior to unit power operation. In addition, Engineering Evaluation/Assistance Request Number 76-49 has been written to further investigate the problem.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

This is the second failure of the main steam safety valves - the first failure was reported in LER 50-285/76-19.




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Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY * OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 * TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402

October 20, 1976

FC-304-76



Mr. E. Morris Howard
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

Dear Mr. Howard:

Reference: Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-285

In accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station's Technical Specifications, the Omaha Public Power District, as holder of facility operating license DPR-40, submits three copies of the following licensee event supplement report for 50-285/76-19 to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones
Section Manager
Operations

WCJ/WDD:rge

Enclosure

cc: Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (3)

Director, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (30)

Mr. L. C. Shalla
SARC Chairman
PRC Chairman
Fort Calhoun File (2)

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