

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

50-285/76-21

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME [01] N E F C S 1														LICENSE NUMBER 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0										LICENSE TYPE 4 1 1 1 1					EVENT TYPE 0 3	
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32																					
[01] CONT			CATEGORY 57 58		REPORT TYPE 59 L	REPORT SOURCE 60 L	DOCKET NUMBER 0 5 0 - 0 2 8 5					EVENT DATE 0 6 2 9 7 6					REPORT DATE 0 7 1 3 7 6													
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80																			

EVENT DESCRIPTION

[02] While performing Surveillance Test ST-ESF-5, timer relays for charging pump CH-1A and																																																																															
[03] safety injection pump SI-3A on Sequencer S1-2 and safety injection pump SI-3B and																																																																															
[04] component cooling water pump AC-3B on Sequencer S2-2 failed to time out at their set																																																																															
[05] times. (LER 50-285/76-21)																																																																															
[06]																																																																															

SYSTEM CODE [07] S F		CAUSE CODE [07] E		COMPONENT CODE C K T B K R				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER [07] A		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER E 0 2 0				VIOLATION [07] N	
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

[08] The Bliss Eagle Signal timer relays model No. HA-41A6-L-08 had binding operating																																																																															
[09] mechanisms which retarded the timer relay after it had received its initiating signal.																																																																															
[10] The timers were satisfactorily retested to prove operability.																																																																															

FACILITY STATUS [11] E		% POWER 0 8 0		OTHER STATUS NA		METHOD OF DISCOVERY [11] B		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION NA	
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED [12] Z		CONTENT OF RELEASE [12] Z		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA		LOCATION OF RELEASE NA			
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80		

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER [13] 0 0 0		TYPE [13] Z		DESCRIPTION NA	
7	8	9	11	12	13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER [14] 0 0 0		DESCRIPTION NA	
7	8	9	11 12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

[15] NA																																																																															
7	8	9																																																																													

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE [16] Z		DESCRIPTION NA	
7	8	9	10

PUBLICITY

[17] NA																																																																															
7	8	9																																																																													

B403730227 760809
PDR ADCK 05000285
S PDR

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

[18] See Attachments No. 1, 2 and 3																																																																															
7	8	9																																																																													

[19]																																																																															
7	8	9																																																																													

NAME: J. M. Nagl/J. L. Connolley

PHONE: 402-426-4011 Ext. 8722

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Safety Analysis

The plant electrical system is so designed that no single failure can jeopardize enough engineered safeguard equipment to prevent the safe shutdown of the plant. The failure of timer relays for CH-1A, SI-3A, AC-3B and SI-3B would not have prevented the complete and proper sequential loading of the above equipment had it been required.

Prior to starting ST-ESF-5, prime signal sequencers SI-1 and S2-1 were operable and in auto standby. The derived signal sequencers SI-2 and S2-2 were then separately bypassed as per ST-ESF-5 to test their "Bliss Eagle" timing relays. In the event the derived signal sequencers (SI-2 and S2-2) had been called upon to load the above equipment during the performance of ST-ESF-5, the respective prime signal sequencers (SI-1 and S2-1) would have loaded CH-1A, SI-3A, AC-3B and SI-3B at their prescribed times.

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

Corrective Action

The timer relays for the derived signal sequencers SI-2 and S2-2 are being tested twice weekly to prove their operability. This testing will continue until direct replacement timers for CH-1A, SI-3A, AC-3B and SI-3B are received from the Eagle Signal Company and can be installed.

ATTACHMENT NO. 3

Failure Data

This is the fourth event involving the failure of Bliss Eagle Signal timing relays. See Abnormal Occurrence Reports 50-285/75-1, 75-13 and 75-16.



Omaha Public Power District

1623 HARNEY ■ OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 ■ TELEPHONE 536-4000 AREA CODE 402

July 13, 1976
FC-223-76

TE FILE COPY

Mr. E. Morris Howard
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76012

Dear Mr. Howard:

Reference: Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-285

In accordance with the Fort Calhoun Station's Technical Specifications, the Omaha Public Power District, as holder of facility operating license DPR-40, submits three copies of the following licensee event report 50-285/76-21 to satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

W. C. Jones
Section Manager
Operations

WCJ/WDD:rge

Enclosure

cc: Director, Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (3)

Director, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 (30)

Mr. L. C. Shalla
SARC Chairman
PRC Chairman
Fort Calhoun File (2)

COPY SENT REGION IV

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