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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

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March 16, 1984

MURRAY R. EDELMAN
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

RE: Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441
Design of Valve Coordination
for the HPCS System [RDC 96(84)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter serves as the interim report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the deficiencies concerning initiation of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System concurrent with operation of the suppression pool cleanup system. Mr. P. R. Pelke of your office was notified on February 16, 1984, by Mr. B. D. Walrath of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) that this problem was being evaluated. This discrepancy was identified during a safety system functional capability review being performed for CEI by GDS Associates.

This report contains a description of the deficiency, planned corrective action and the date for filing of the next report on this subject.

Description of Deficiency

FSAR Section 7.3.1.1.1.1b states that if the water level in the condensate storage tanks falls below a predetermined level, the suppression pool suction valve MOV E22-F015 automatically opens. When E22-F015 is fully open, the condensate storage tank suction valve MOV E22-F001 automatically closes. Two level transmitters are used to detect low water level in the condensate storage tank. Either transmitter can cause automatic suction transfer. The suppression pool suction valve also automatically opens if high water level is detected in the suppression pool. Two level transmitters monitor suppression pool water level and either transmitter can initiate opening of the suppression pool suction valve. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other closes.

As the system is designed, valve E22-F001 starts closing before valve E22-F015 is fully open. This could cause less than specified flow for the High Pressure Core Spray System and might possibly result in a trip of the HPCS main pump.

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Corrective Action

Gilbert Associates, Incorporated, our Architect/Engineer, is currently evaluating the as-designed condition of the identified valves and their associated logic to determine if design changes are necessary to effect safe system operation.

We will submit our next report on this subject by April 30, 1984.

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely,

Murray R. Edelman
Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:pab

cc: Mr. M. L. Gildner
NRC Site Office

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