

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)															
Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1			Page (3) 1 of 0 3		
Title (4) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION RESULTING FROM A WET POST ACCIDENT CLEANUP UNIT FILTER															
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)					
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)		
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 0 2 0 7 9 5 9 5 OPERATING MODE (9) 1 POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 8 ////////////////////////////////////// ////////////////////////////////////// ////////////////////////////////////// ////////////////////////////////////// </div> <div> THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11) <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) </div> <div> 20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) x 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) </div> <div> 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) </div> <div> 73.71(b) 73.71(c) Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text) </div> </div> </div> </div>															
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////				
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO															
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)															

On 6/12/95, during a routine 18-month spray/sprinkler system inspection, Edison discovered water in the bottom of the charcoal filter in the Train B Post Accident Cleanup Unit (PACU), E-371. The charcoal filter was inadvertently wetted on 1/31/95, rendering the PACU inoperable. On 7/18/95, Edison recognized that the spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) had been operated over the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) on 2/7/95. Although no fuel was moved, the SFHM was operated over the SFP without the Train A PACU in operation contrary to Technical Specification 3.9.12. Therefore, Edison is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

The wetted charcoal filter for PACU E-371 was caused by leakage past isolation valve SA2301MU233 during the annual surveillance test of the upstream deluge valve performed on 1/31/95. Leakage appears likely due to corrosion buildup discovered in the valve body and in the system piping.

On 2/17/95, Edison had performed the required monthly 10-hour operation for PACU E-371. As this surveillance requires heater operation, Edison believes the charcoal filter in the airflow path was sufficiently dried at that time and restored unit operability. Edison replaced valve SA2301MU233 on 8/2/95. Edison inspected all other PACU units with no evidence discovered of fire water leakage into the charcoal filters. To prevent recurrence, Edison will evaluate appropriate revisions to surveillance procedures to allow plant personnel to more readily detect and prevent water leakage into the PACU charcoal filters.

The Unit 2 Train A PACU, E-370, was capable of proper operation during operation of the SFHM on 2/7/95; therefore, there is no safety significance to this event.

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DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS:

Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2
 Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
 Event Date: February 7, 1995
 Date of Discovery: July 18, 1995
 Mode: Mode 1, approximately 98% reactor power

Background:

The fuel handling building is provided with two Post Accident Cleanup Units (PACU) [VG]. Each PACU unit is provided with a fire protection spray/sprinkler system over its charcoal filter. Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.8.2.c requires each testable valve in the fire water flow path to be tested annually. The last test for the Unit 2 PACUs occurred on 1/31/95. In order to perform this surveillance, the isolation valve downstream of the fire water deluge valve must be closed to isolate the PACU unit during the surveillance.

TS 3.9.12 requires that with one PACU inoperable, the other PACU must be capable of being powered from an operable emergency power source and must be in operation for fuel movement within the spent fuel storage pool (SFP) or operation of the spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) over the SFP to occur.

Event Description:

On 6/12/95, during a routine 18-month spray/sprinkler system inspection, Edison discovered water in the bottom of the charcoal filter [FLT] (below the airflow area) in the Train B PACU, E-371. Based on conditions discovered during the valve replacement discussed below, Edison determined the charcoal filter was inadvertently wetted on 1/31/95 during the TS 4.7.8.2.c surveillance rendering the Train B PACU inoperable. On 7/18/95, Edison recognized that the SFHM had been operated over the Unit 2 SFP on 2/7/95. Although no fuel was moved, the SFHM was operated over the SFP without the Train A PACU in operation. Therefore, Edison is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(I).

Cause of the event:

The wetted charcoal filter for PACU E-371 was caused by leakage past isolation valve SA2301MU233 [V,KP], during the annual TS 4.7.8.2.c surveillance performed on 1/31/95. Leakage appears likely due to corrosion buildup discovered in the valve body and in the system piping.

Corrective Actions:

On 2/17/95, Edison had performed the required monthly 10-hour operation for PACU E-371. As this surveillance requires heater operation, Edison believes the charcoal filter in the airflow path was sufficiently dried at that time and restored unit operability. A subsequent laboratory test of the charcoal that had been wetted confirmed that the charcoal efficiency is acceptable.

Edison replaced valve SA2301MU233 on 8/2/95. Edison inspected all other PACU units with no evidence discovered of fire water leakage into the charcoal filters. To prevent recurrence, Edison will evaluate appropriate revisions to surveillance procedures to allow plant personnel to more readily detect and prevent water leakage into the PACU charcoal filters.

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Safety Significance:

The Unit 2 Train A PACU, E-370, was capable of proper operation and could have been powered from an operable emergency power source if it had been required during operation of the SFHM on 2/7/95; therefore, there is no safety significance to this event.

Additional Information:

There have been no similar LER occurrences involving PACU charcoal filters in the previous three years.