

CONNELL HIGH SCHOOL/ROBERT OLDS JR. HIGH SCHOOL
1994 EMERGENCY WORKER ASSISTANCE CENTER DRILL
State of Washington

WNP-2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DRILL REPORT

Drill Date: June 25, 1994

PARTICIPANTS:

Franklin County Emergency Management
Benton-Franklin Counties Chapter of American Red Cross
Washington State Department of Health/Division of
Radiation Protection

CONNELL HIGH/ROBERT OLDS JR. HIGH School Officials

Organization of Radiation Protection Technicians

General Public - Evacuees and Emergency Workers

Prepared by

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Region X
Bothell, Washington

December 1994

9505050280 - XA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 25, 1994, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region X staff evaluated an Emergency Worker and Assistance Center (EWAC) Drill at the Connell High School/Robert Olds Jr. High School in Connell, Washington. Hereafter, in this report, referred to as Connell High School.

This drill was conducted in accordance with FEMA's regulations concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness contained in 44 CFR 350.9(a).

FEMA evaluated the following operations to demonstrate their capability to respond to a radiological incident at the WNP-2 nuclear facility which would require the activation of the designated EWAC:

Benton and Franklin (B/F) Counties: EWAC operations.

Washington State Department of Health (DOH): Personnel monitoring, vehicle monitoring, and decontamination process.

American Red Cross (ARC) (B/F Chapter): Shelter operations (limited).

The purpose of an Assistance Center (AC) is to provide a facility at which the following functions (services) are provided to the public:

1. Register evacuees (name, address, and status of monitoring). If contamination is found, document the monitoring results and decontamination efforts.
2. Receive assistance in contacting others and reuniting with others.
3. Receive referral and direction to Congregate Care Centers/Shelters.
4. Monitor and decontaminate persons and vehicles.

Previous EWAC drills held in B/F Counties were: January 13, 1985; August 12, 1985; January 22, 1986; May 16, 1987; April 9, 1988, May 19, 1990; and May 9, 1992.

The June 25, 1994, drill demonstrated that B/F Counties and the ARC are capable of activating and staffing the EWAC in accordance with their Procedures and the Extent of Play Agreement. B/F Counties demonstrated the capability to setup the EWAC and coordinate EWAC activities.

The ARC demonstrated the capability to staff a designated shelter and provide services to persons who need shelter and related assistance. Washington State monitoring personnel demonstrated adequate monitoring techniques for vehicles and individuals and the knowledge of proper decontamination procedures.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

FEMA Region X recommends corrective actions for the following drill findings. Participants have agreed to implement corrective actions and provide a time frame for completion. (See Section 3.0 for details.)

FEMA found that:

- The Shelter Manager needs to be more knowledgeable of the operational Plan and Procedures for the specific EWAC Congregate Care Center/Shelter.
- State and B/F County Plans do not specify what range of self-reading dosimeters are to be issued to Emergency Workers.
- One monitor needs additional training on the proper use of self-reading dosimetry.
- The outside Radiation Health Physicist (RHP) had an out-dated Plan.
- A survey instrument which was not operating correctly was used for initial monitoring.
- Information sheets were distributed to evacuees long after their arrival, which were at that point of little value.
- State and B/F County Plans are inconsistent in the personnel contamination forms specified.

VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

In addition to the pre-established exercise objectives, FEMA evaluated the implementation of corrective actions for the following outstanding issues identified in previous drills.

1. C90-7, ARCA - No periodic briefing at CCC - remains open.¹
2. C90-9, ARCA - No distribution of information sheets - closed.¹
3. B/F92-1, Planning Issue - Insufficient dosimetry kits - closed.
4. B/F92-2, ARCA - Improper use of self-reading dosimeters - closed.
5. B/F92-3, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance - closed.
6. B/F92-4, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance - closed.
7. B/F92-5, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance - closed.
8. B/F92-6, Planning Issue - Inadequate trigger levels - closed.
9. B/F92-7, Planning Issue - Incomplete Procedures - closed.
10. B/F92-8, ARCA - Inadequate survey in women's decontamination area - closed.
11. B/F92-9, ARCA - Inadequate documentation survey forms - closed.
12. B/F92-10, ARCA - Inadequate vehicle monitoring process - closed.
13. B/F92-11, Planning Issue - No Alerting Procedures for monitors - remains open.

¹ The "C" in ARCA C90-7 and C90-9 indicates B/F County. ARCA: Areas Requiring Corrective Action. CCC: Congregate Care Center. See Appendix B "Acronyms and Abbreviations" for more definitions.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Exercise Background

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for Fixed Nuclear Facilities (FNF) include the following:

1. Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans developed by State and local governments,
2. Determining whether such Plans can be implemented on the basis of the observation and evaluation of exercises of the Plans developed by State and local governments,
3. Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the June 17, 1993 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between NRC and FEMA relating to Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 44CFR Part 353 (September 14, 1993), and
4. Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Commerce
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
 - U.S. Department of Energy
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 - U.S. Department of Transportation
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture
 - U.S. Department of the Interior

Representatives of these agencies serve on the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA Region X.

The exercise participants employed their Plans of record. The following Plans and Procedures were used by FEMA in evaluating the performance of the participants:

1. B/F Counties Fixed Nuclear Facility Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures, Section IP-12 dated May 18, 1994.

2. Washington Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (DOH/DRP), Response Procedures for Radiation Emergencies, Section 9 EWACs, pages 9-0 through 9-27, dated May 1994.

This exercise was conducted in accordance with the Exercise Scenario and Extent of Play Agreements. The Scenario presented a hypothetical accident at WNP-2 that was to trigger offsite response activities as well as various offsite conditions and contingencies. The Extent of Play Agreements between FEMA and the emergency response organizations define the manner in which a particular response function will be demonstrated by the players. The agreements were designed to test the ability of the FNF Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures to be implemented under simulated emergency conditions. Where no Extent of Play Agreement existed, FEMA evaluated the observed activities as if the Plans and Procedures were to be followed in their entirety.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980); FEMA-REP-14, Exercise Manual; FEMA-REP-15, Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM) (September 1991) effective January 1, 1992; and those expected actions called for by the participants' Plans and Procedures.

FEMA's EEMs provide a standard set of objectives for use in evaluating exercises pursuant to 44 CFR 350 and 10 CFR 50 (NRC). The EEM is structured so that any given objective can be addressed for any relevant activity, whether facility- or field-based. Therefore, the objectives are evaluated based on the organization of activities regardless of whether these activities are demonstrated at one level/one location or multiple levels/multiple locations.

Section 2.0 of this report contains the exercise evaluation. Each objective contains a statement of the objective, the outcome of the evaluation (met/not met), and a narrative summary of our observations which served as the basis for our evaluation. Where applicable, the narrative is followed by one or more exercise **issues** classified as Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA), Plan Issues, or Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFI). Each of these categories is defined below:

Deficiencies: Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant in the event of a radiological emergency. This inadequacy could be an exercise related issue regarding inadequate Plans and Procedures or the ability to implement Plans. Because of the potential

impact of Deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be corrected within 120 days through appropriate remedial actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action: ARCAs are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance. Although correction is required by the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered in and of themselves to adversely impact public health and safety.

Plan Issues: Plan Issues are observed or identified issues during an exercise which do not involve participant or organizational performance, but rather involve inadequacies in an organization's existing Plan and/or Procedures. Plan Issues are required to be corrected through the revision and update of the appropriate state and local radiological emergency response Plans and/or Procedures during the annual plan review and update and reported in the Annual Letter of Certification.

Areas Recommended for Improvement: ARFIs are observed issues that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, improvements in these areas would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

When Exercise or Plan Issues are identified in this report, they are listed with a brief description of the issue, a reference to the applicable NUREG-0654 element, and the type of issue. If the issue is a Deficiency, ARCA, or Plan Issue, a tracking number is assigned to identify the issue. Section 3.0 gives a summary of all identified Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan Issues.

Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFIs) were discussed at the evaluators' out-briefings with participants and are included in the narrative summaries. However, ARFIs have not been specifically identified and listed in this report.

1.2 FEMA Evaluators

The 1994 Connell High School EWAC drill was evaluated by the RAC Chairman and evaluators drawn from FEMA, ARC, Argonne National Laboratory, and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL).

EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENT LIST - CONNELL HIGH SCHOOL EWAC DRILL JUNE 25, 1994

Larry E. Moore, RAC Chairman and
Manager of the Evaluation Team

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Parking Lot	Melissa Coon	INEL/WINCO
Vehicle Monitoring	Jill Cox	INEL/WINCO
Coordinator's Office	Gerry Gibeault	INEL/WINCO
Emergency Worker/ Evacuee Monitoring	Joe Keller	INEL/WINCO
Vehicle Monitoring	Brad Salmonson	INEL/WINCO
Decontamination Monitoring	Frank Bold	ARGONNE
ARC Shelter	Maria Plancich	ARGONNE
ARC Shelter	Martha Gebhardt	ARC
Registration	Eleanor Castle	FEMA

1.3 Summary of Exercise Scenario

INTRODUCTIONS

This Emergency Worker Assistance Center (EWAC) drill involved a simulated accident at WNP-2. As a result of the accident, evacuation of Section 1 from 2-10 miles was initiated and the EWAC at Connell High School activated. Volunteers from the community were processed through the EWAC to test the various capabilities including personnel and vehicle simulated decontamination, traffic control and congregate care (American Red Cross).

SCENARIO

At 0755, on June 25, the WNP-2 Control Room receives a turbine trip and numerous fire alarms from the 501' elevation of the Turbine Generator (TG) building. The reactor automatically scrams due to the turbine trip, and the Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRV) opens to control reactor pressure. A declaration of ALERT is declared at 0800. The Control Room notifies the Emergency Dispatch Center (EDC) of the ALERT classification via CRASH call and faxes a copy of the Classification Notification Form (CNF) as required. Through the appropriate call tree emergency notifications, the EWAC Coordinator is advised to put the necessary EWAC staff on stand by.

During reactor cool down, problems are experienced with the feedwater pumps providing coolant to the reactor. At the same time, there is indication that several of the MSRVs are stuck open allowing steam to flow to the Suppression Pool. Consequently, reactor water level is slowly dropping. At 0820, feedwater is lost entirely, and reactor water level drops below the Top of Active Fuel. A declaration of Site Area Emergency (SAE) is declared due to anticipated fuel failure. In addition to the automatic Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) the Supply System recommends sheltering to 10 miles in Section 1 due to the current wind conditions. Because of this, the B/F County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) notifies the Connell EWAC Coordinator to activate the EWAC.

Due to workers failing to properly secure equipment when evacuating the reactor building, a pipe is sheared and reactor coolant water is released into the reactor building at a high rate. The reactor building HVAC Exhaust Plenum Monitors immediately activate causing the building exhaust system to isolate and at the same time activating the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system. Down stream monitors indicate that noble gases are being released out of the plant. (No iodine since the SGT is operating.)

As the accident and offsite release progress, the Meteorological and Unified Dose Assessment Center staff at the Supply System's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) performs dose projections, indicating that

an estimated 1 REM total effective dose equivalent exposure at the 1.2 mile site boundary will be exceeded. The Supply System declares a General Emergency at 0845. An additional PAR is issued recommending evacuation of Section 1 to 10 miles. The bi-county EOC then implements the Protective Action Decision to evacuate the general public in Section 1, and directs them to go to the Connell High School EWAC. The EWAC Coordinator prepares to deal with the anticipated evacuees.

The release from WNP-2 continues until 1000, when emergency crews restore feedwater flow to the reactor and recover the fuel. The offsite release is terminated when the ruptured pipe is secured shortly thereafter. The Emergency Classification is downgraded to an ALERT at 1010. Contaminated vehicles and evacuees will be directed to the Decontamination Area. One female and one male evacuee will be decontaminated (simulated). Documentation will be on appropriate forms as per Procedures. All other evacuees will be directed to the ARC Shelter to register after monitoring has determined there is not significant contamination. Evacuees will be registered and shelter and food (snacks) will be provided.

1.4 Extent of Play Agreements

GENERAL EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS:

1. Evacuation of Section 1, 2-10 miles will activate only the Connell High School EWAC. Notification and development of staffing rosters for the other two EWAC's will not be exercised in this drill.
2. The drill will be exercised in real time. Connell High School will not be in session on this date. School staff involvement will be limited to an EWAC Facility Manager.
3. The radiological release will not contain radioactive iodine.
4. Public concern/disaster welfare inquiry phone teams will be simulated.
5. A larger number of evacuees will be portrayed by a few controllers, each portraying several evacuees.
6. Emergency Broadcast System will not be activated.
7. Post-decontamination clothing, cots and bedding will not be sent to the EWAC, but provisions for it will be available.
8. The American Red Cross will not fully staff the shelter.
9. Decontamination of people, belongings, vehicles and facility will be simulated.
10. Some volunteers will portray both evacuees and Emergency Workers during the drill.
11. Snacks will be provided by a food service vendor.
12. Traffic control demonstration will be confined to the school property. No traffic control measures will be demonstrated on routes leading to the EWAC.
13. The EWAC will be set for full operation. Each designated initial monitor will consecutively monitor six evacuees.
14. EWAC staff are not considered Emergency Workers.
15. The B/F County EOC will not be activated. Communication to the EOC will be through the Control Cell.

16. EWAC personnel will be prepositioned. Response time will be waived for the purpose of the exercise.
17. Individuals with contamination levels above the action levels will not be transported to a medical facility.

SPECIFIC EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENTS BY OBJECTIVE:

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 5 - Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to Emergency Workers.

1. The Offsite Response Organization (ORO) utilizes appropriate dosimetry for Emergency Worker radiation exposure control.
4. All activities described in the demonstration criteria for this objective are carried out in accordance with the Plan, unless deviations are provided for in the Extent of Play Agreement.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 18 - Reception Center - Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration:

Demonstrate the adequacy of Procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

1. The reception center has adequate space available for the monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees and is activated and operational in a timely manner.
2. The reception center has adequate and appropriate resources, is set up in logical order for its operation and control of contamination, and has trained staff and Procedures sufficient to accomplish monitoring of evacuees within the time frames established in the organization's Plan.
3. Procedures and equipment for monitoring and decontamination of evacuees are adequate.
4. Evacuees are properly registered.
5. Vehicles and evacuee's possessions, arriving at reception centers, are monitored for contamination and decontaminated, if necessary.

6. All activities described in the demonstration criteria for this objective are carried out in accordance with the Plan, unless deviations are provided for in the Extent of Play Agreement.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 19 - Congregate Care:

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and Procedures for congregate care of evacuees.

2. Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the Procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and are uncontaminated prior to entering congregate care facilities.
3. All activities described in the demonstration criteria for this objective are carried out in accordance with the Plan, unless deviations are provided for in the Extent of Play Agreement.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 22 - Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicle Monitoring and Decontamination:

Demonstrate the adequacy of Procedures for the monitoring and decontamination of Emergency Workers, equipment, and vehicles.

1. Resources and facilities for monitoring Emergency Workers and equipment (including vehicles) and for contamination control are adequate and appropriate.
2. Emergency Workers are monitored for radioactive contamination and decontaminated as appropriate.
3. Vehicles and equipment are monitored and decontaminated as appropriate.
4. All activities described in the demonstration criteria for this objective are carried out in accordance with the Plan, unless deviations are provided for in the Extent of Play Agreement.

Appendix A of this report contains copies of pre-drill correspondence including those related to establishing the objectives and Extent of Play for the drill.

1.5 Significant Events Log

Connell High School EWAC Drill, June 25, 1994

TIME	EXERCISE EVENT OR LOCATION	EVENT DESCRIPTION
0745		Evaluators begin to arrive at Connell EWAC.
0810	ALERT	Franklin County Emergency Management Director (EMD)/Controller notifies Connell EWAC Coordinator of ALERT. (Coordinator's calls to place EWAC staff on alert are simulated.)
0830	SAE	County EMD/Controller notifies EWAC Coordinator of SAE and instructs that EWAC be opened. (Coordinator's calls to activate staff are simulated.)
0846	Staff Arrive	Staff begin arriving at EWAC.
0855- 0902	General Emergency Notification (GE)	County EMD/Controller tries unsuccessfully to notify EWAC Coordinator of GE and evacuation order.
0905	Supplies Arrive	Supplies for EWAC operation begin to arrive.
0933		Staff begin setting up male and female decontamination areas.
0950	Shelter Activated	Congregate care center/shelter activated.
0958	EWAC Activated	EWAC, including shelter, declared activated. Minimum required staff are present.
1001		Shelter Manager receives copy of first EBS message (precautionary evacuations).
1015		First vehicle arrives to be monitored. (Found to be contaminated.)
1020		Male and female decontamination areas operational.

EXERCISE		
TIME	EVENT OR LOCATION	EVENT DESCRIPTION
1024		Shelter Manager receives copy of second EBS message. (Evacuation of Section 1.)
1028	Monitor Area Set Up	Crews complete set up of the initial monitoring area including instrument checks.
1035	EWAC Operational	EWAC, including shelter, declared operational.
1040	Initial Monitoring Begins	The first group of evacuees arrive at the initial monitoring area. (Passengers of contaminated vehicle.)
1043		Second vehicle monitored. (Found to be clean.)
1050	Registration Begins	The first group of evacuees arrive at the shelter for registration. All have green "monitored" stickers on.
1053		Third vehicle monitored. (Found to be clean.)
1055		Fourth vehicle monitored. (Found to be clean.)
1059	Female Decontamination	First female arrives for decontamination.
1105	GE Notification	Shelter Manager receives reply from EWAC Coordinator that a GE had been declared at 0855 and an evacuation was in progress.
1132	Male Decontamination	First (and only) male arrives for decontamination.
1132	DWI	Shelter receives a Disaster Welfare Inquiry (DWI).
1150- 1155	Monitor Shift Change	Decontamination monitors brief and monitor incoming staff.
1158	Drill Terminated	

2.0 EXERCISE EVALUATION

2.1 Connell Emergency Worker/Assistance Center

Objective 5: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to Emergency Workers.

Evaluation: Met

Narrative

Summary:

Emergency Workers assigned to the EWAC were required to sign in on a status board and were then given position specific binders consisting of job instructions, forms, and an Emergency Worker Kit. The Emergency Worker Kit contained a TLD, a self-reading dosimeter (0-20 R), a bottle of potassium iodide (KI), and KI instructions. Neither Section 9 of the State Plan nor Implementing Procedure (IP)-12 of the B/F County Plan specifies the range of the self-reading dosimeter to be issued. Workers were observed to properly check the reading on the self-reading dosimeter and to record the appropriate dosimeter information and readings on the forms supplied. Several workers were asked to explain the action they would take if a dosimeter was found to read 1/3 or 1/2 scale at the time it was first removed from the Emergency Worker Kit. All asked said that they would re-zero the instrument. No one suggested that the dosimeter might be bad or that another dosimeter should be used. There was no physical evidence that the dosimeters were calibrated or leak checked. Franklin County staff later provided a record of the inspection and electrical leak check of the dosimeters, by serial number, that had been accomplished the month prior to the Drill. However, it is recommended that a copy of this record be placed in the EWAC Kit or in some way provide evidence of the most recent inspection and electrical leak check on or with the dosimeters. Field staff should not have to assume that since the TLD and survey instruments in the kit are within the current inspection period that so are the dosimeters. Dosimeter chargers were provided as part of the initial supplies used to activate the EWAC. The chargers were used as necessary to zero the self-reading dosimeters. In addition to the Emergency Worker Kits contained in each position binder, 15 additional emergency kits

were available at the Connell EWAC. If more than the 15 kits would be required, the EWAC Coordinator stated that he would obtain the required kits from the B/F EOC. The availability of required Emergency Worker Kits closes a previous planning issue B/F 92-1.

Emergency Workers were provided with written instructions to check their self-reading dosimeters at 1/2 hour intervals or as directed by a Radiation Health Physicist (RHP). Additionally, the Public Information Officer made announcements each half hour to "check and record your documentation." This announcement was intended to make the emergency workers read the self-reading dosimeters. Several Emergency Workers did not understand this announcement and failed to properly check their self-reading dosimeters and record the readings. With the exception of one Emergency Worker in vehicle monitoring area, all remaining Emergency Workers demonstrated the ability to properly read their self-reading dosimeters. They were aware of the requirement to report doses of 2.5 R and were aware of the 5 R turnback limit. The demonstrated Emergency Worker knowledge closes a previous ARCA, B/F 92-2. The one worker in the vehicle monitoring area removed his self-reading dosimeter and placed it on a table. He also wore his TLD on an inappropriate portion of his body (well below his waist).

At the end of the exercise, Emergency Workers were required to return their dosimeters to the Dose Tracker in accordance with Plan requirements. With the exception of the one Emergency Worker discussed above, all observed actions were performed in accordance with Plan requirements outlined in the State of Washington and B/F Emergency Plans.

Issue 1: (B/F94-3)	Dosimeter Range Not Specified. Planning Issue. (K.3.a.)
Discussion:	Neither Section 9 of the State Plan nor IP-12 of the B/F County Plan specifies the range of the self-reading dosimeter to be issued.
Recommendation:	Revise both portions of the Plan (State Section 9 and B/F IP-12) to specify what range of self-reading dosimeter(s) are to be issued to the Emergency Workers at the Connell EWAC.

Issue 2: Improper use of dosimetry. ARCA.
(B/F94-4) (K.3.a.)

Discussion: One worker in the vehicle monitoring area removed his self-reading dosimeter and placed it on a table. He also wore his TLD incorrectly. (Below the waist.)

Recommendation: Provide additional training to the specific individual who did not follow appropriate Procedures.

Objective 18: Demonstrate the adequacy of Procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

Evaluation: Met

Narrative
Summary:

Activation:

The EWAC Coordinator received notification of the SAE from the B/F EOC (simulated by controller) at 0830 and notified staff to report to the EWAC. All staff were prepositioned in accordance with the Extent of Play Agreement. The first staff arrived at the Connell EWAC at 0846 and immediately started preparations for receiving evacuees. Necessary supplies for facility setup began arriving at 0905. The EWAC was activated at 0958, after the minimum required staff had arrived. The facility was declared operational at 1035 when radiological monitoring capabilities were established.

Vehicle Monitoring:

The vehicle monitoring area was staffed by four monitoring personnel, an RHP supervisor, a recorder and two vehicle parking attendants. Additionally, one fire department staff member and fire truck were available to assist in vehicle decontamination. The vehicle monitoring RHP reported to the EWAC Coordinator's area at 0935, signed in, picked up Procedures and an Emergency Worker Kit, and proceeded to the vehicle monitoring and decontamination area where he inventoried the contents of a monitoring supply trunk which had been delivered to the area. No survey instruments were in the supply trunk. The vehicle monitoring RHP radioed a request to the personnel monitoring RHP to send survey instruments to the vehicle monitoring area with a vehicle monitor or a runner. Four CDV-700s

were promptly delivered and instrument checks were performed. Batteries were installed, the calibration date was checked (May 8, 1994), and instruments were checked for proper operations by comparing check source readings on the X10 scale taken with the beta shield fully open to the range of readings posted on the instrument label. For contamination control, the instrument probes were wrapped in thin plastic bags and, after having been told by the RHP, the vehicle monitors wore gloves. The CDV-700s were equipped with earphones. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination area was set up with a table to hold checklists and supplies and traffic cones for traffic control. The vehicle monitoring staff utilized the CDV-700 instruments for initial vehicle monitoring. A Ludlum Model 12 survey meter was available and used for vehicle surveys in the decontamination area. The Ludlum Model 12 was within its calibration time and the RHP checked the instrument's response to a CDV-700 check source. The Ludlum instrument did not have a check source response range posted on the instrument. The Procedures (IP-12 and Section 9 of the State Plan) do not mention the use of the Ludlum Model 12 instrument for vehicle monitoring.

The vehicle monitoring personnel followed their checklists for activating the vehicle monitoring area. The proper use of these checklists corrected a planning issue from a previous exercise (B/F 92-7). Initially, the RHP was using draft Procedures, which were different from the Procedures the vehicle monitors were using. The controller provided a correct version of the Procedures to the RHP.

The first vehicle arrived at 1015. Although the vehicle monitoring and decontamination area was prepared to receive vehicles, the EWAC had not been declared operational. After contacting the EWAC Coordinator, the RHP was informed by radio that vehicle monitoring could begin because the remainder of the EWAC would be operational by the time evacuees arrived at the personnel monitoring area. Vehicle information, including the owner's name, vehicle license number, state, year, make, model, number of persons in the vehicle and whether decontamination was required, was recorded for all vehicles by a monitor assistant. Two to four vehicle monitors checked each of the four vehicles processed during the drill. The exterior of each vehicle was monitored, including the grill, wheel

areas and tires, bumpers, door handles, the hood, and the windshield. A green vehicle tag was issued to the drivers of uncontaminated vehicles when monitoring was complete. Contamination above the action level was detected on one vehicle and the driver was directed to "contaminated parking" where the vehicle was left for subsequent processing. The vehicle monitors each demonstrated a slightly different monitoring technique.

The monitoring techniques ranged from good to needing improvement, i.e., moving the detector too fast or having the detector too close or too far from the monitored surface. The RHP, however, was always alert and caught most of these survey problems. Any time the RHP noted the detectors coming into contact with the vehicle surface, he had the monitors check to see if the instrument's background had changed or had them replace the plastic covering on the detector. The use of appropriate monitoring techniques corrected an issue from a previous exercise (ARCA B/F 92-10).

All of the vehicle monitoring personnel were knowledgeable of the contamination limit of 60 counts per minute (cpm). The addition of this contamination limit to the Plan corrected a planning issue from a previous exercise (B/F 92-6). However, the RHP used a limit of 100 cpm for the Ludlum instrument in the vehicle decontamination area. This was not consistent with the vehicle decontamination sections of the Plan (it was appropriate for the evacuee decontamination areas). If the Ludlum instrument is to be used in the vehicle decontamination area, it is recommended that the Plans and Procedures be changed to reflect this and specify the appropriate contamination limit in cpm to use with the Ludlum instrument.

All arriving vehicles were promptly monitored. In the event of a backlog of vehicles, a parking area for unmonitored vehicles was available adjacent to the vehicle monitoring station. Clean vehicles were issued stickers indicating they had been monitored and were allowed to continue to a parking area in front of the school while contaminated vehicles were directed to a parking area on the west side of the school complex for decontamination at a later time. Evacuees were given instructions on how to get to the reception area from the various parking areas by two parking attendants located

near the vehicle monitoring station. However, the personnel traffic paths were not well marked. One of the two parking attendants would better be utilized in the contaminated parking area to give further instructions to the evacuees. Due to the temporary relocation of the vehicle monitoring area, the Extent of Play Agreement excluded this portion of the drill from evaluation.

Initial Evacuee Monitoring:

The initial monitoring area was set up in a hallway in accordance with the Plans and Procedures. The inside RHP arrived at 0938 and began checking supplies which had been delivered previously. Monitoring staff picked up a position specific binder which contained among other items, checklists for their assignments. The use of these checklists corrects a planning issue from a previous exercise (B/F 92-7). Monitoring staff began checking monitoring instruments and setting up the monitoring area at 1000. Paper was placed on the floor to allow for easier decontamination and a step-off pad was established. Radiation ribbon was strung to separate clean and potentially contaminated areas. Several CDV-700 instruments were available for use in this area of the EWAC. All instruments were within calibration dates. Batteries were installed and operational checks were performed. During performance checks, one instrument was determined to be outside the response range specified on the instrument label. The monitor correctly made the decision that a particular instrument should not be used. The Dose Tracker overruled the monitor and issued an instruction that the instrument was acceptable for use. The Dose Tracker did not explain to the evaluators how this determination was made. The probes on all instruments were encased in thin plastic and all instruments were used with earphones. A table was set up to hold hand carried possessions during monitoring. The inside RHP briefed the staff on trigger levels which would require decontamination. All staff were aware of the trigger level of 60 cpm which is contained in the current Plan. This corrects an issue from a previous exercise (ARCA B/F 92-5).

Initially, one monitoring lane was established by two monitors who scanned each evacuee simultaneously. Three evacuees were processed in an

average of 94 seconds each. As additional evacuees arrived, a second monitoring lane was established by the other two monitors. Processing of evacuees required 67 seconds and 69 seconds respectively. The time demonstrated was in excess of that specified in the Plan; however, there was sufficient staff available to monitor the required planning basis for this facility within the 12 hour requirement. The demonstrated monitoring rate corrects an issue from a previous exercise (ARCA B/F 92-3). When the two monitoring lanes were in use a potential cross-contamination problem was created with the process demonstrated. When an individual was monitored and found to be above the trigger level, they were sent straight ahead to the decontamination areas (male or female). If an individual was clean (below the trigger level) they were instructed to turn to the right to proceed to the registration area. With only one monitoring lane, the demonstrated process is acceptable; however, with two lanes operating, clean individuals from the left lane would have to cross the potentially contaminated path created by contaminated individuals from the right lane. The Plan is not specific with regard to the traffic pattern in the initial monitoring area. Hand-held possessions carried by either evacuees or Emergency Workers were monitored either as they were held or by placing the possession on the table adjacent to the step-off pad. This consistent monitoring of possessions corrects an issue from a previous exercise (ARCA B/F 92-4). Possessions found to be contaminated were bagged for later decontamination and a receipt was given to the owner.

If an evacuee was found to be clean; i.e., below the trigger level, the individual was given a green tag with the word "monitored" and was allowed to enter the clean area of the EWAC. Individuals found to be contaminated were directed to the decontamination area for a more extensive survey and decontamination. Clean evacuees were given an information sheet after being allowed to proceed toward the registration area of the EWAC. This sheet provides an explanation of the monitoring and decontamination process at the EWAC. Providing this information corrects an issue from a previous exercise (ARCA C-90-9); however, issuance after the evacuees had been processed in the vehicle monitoring area and in the initial monitoring area is of little value.

The Dose Tracker was located in the initial monitoring area as recommended in the Plan. However, the single Emergency Worker who was processed during the monitoring process was not immediately identified. The worker did seek out the Dose Tracker after having been cleared by the decontamination area of the EWAC. All Emergency Workers assigned to the EWAC were correctly processed through the Dose Tracker during the close out of the EWAC. It is recommended that Emergency Workers be reminded to check in with the Dose Tracker at the time of initial monitoring. The Dose Tracker also needs to be more aware of the need to identify Emergency Workers as they are processed through the initial monitoring area.

Decontamination Area:

The decontamination area staff demonstrated the ability to perform decontamination of evacuees and Emergency Workers in accordance with their Procedures. The staff consisted of three monitors and two assistant monitors in the female decontamination area and three monitors and one assistant monitor in the male decontamination area. Separate male and female locker rooms with showers are utilized for the decontamination areas.

Contamination control measures utilized included wearing gloves and booties, covering the instrument probes with thin plastic, and covering the walkways from the initial monitoring area into the decontamination area with paper. Prior to beginning decontamination monitoring, the Ludlum Model 12 count rate meters with 44-9 GM pancake probes were checked for proper operation and for response to a check source. The "EWAC Decontamination Monitor Checklist" was completed by all monitors which closes planning issue B/F 92-7.

Evacuees and Emergency Workers were monitored upon arrival in the decontamination area by the monitor while the assistant monitor recorded the required information on the "Personnel Contamination Charting Worksheet." Correct monitoring procedures and completion of the chart were adequately demonstrated thus closing previous issues ARCA B/F 92-8 and ARCA B/F 92-9.

Inconsistencies between Section 9 of the State Plan and IP-12 of the B/F County Plan, regarding the

"Personnel Contamination Charting Worksheets," was noted. This could cause confusion and failure to record all necessary information if it is not resolved.

Decontaminated personnel were provided with temporary clothing, if necessary, given a green "monitored" tag, a copy of the monitoring information, and sent to the registration area of the EWAC. Contaminated possessions were either decontaminated immediately or placed in a plastic bag, the bag sealed and tagged, and a "claim" slip given to the owner. Monitors verbalized the correct procedure for referring an individual to a medical facility if the third decontamination effort failed to lower contamination levels below the trigger point. The decontamination areas had clearly defined contaminated waste receptacles, appropriate cleaning agents, showers and sinks.

Registration and Referral to Congregate Care Area:

The Red Cross Area and Registration Desk were well marked and comfortable for evacuees to register. All individuals entering the area were checked for the green "monitored" labels on their chests. Evacuees were registered quickly and efficiently on an ARC form in triplicate. All questions were answered or listed on a sheet of paper for the Shelter Manager to answer. All messages were listed on a sheet which would then be given to a relative or friend when they came through the registration process. Consideration was given to the frail or elderly who needed assistance getting to the First Aid Area. An original registration form marked "Shelter Master File" was retained at the Registration Desk in an Alphabetical File. The form contained the name, address, telephone number, and complete documentation of evacuee, family, and medical problem, if any. Information left by evacuees at the Registration Desk was available for use in locating and reuniting families.

Issue 1:
(B/F94-5)

Use of Outdated Procedures. ARCA (J.12.)

Discussion:

Initially, the RHP in the vehicle monitoring area, was using draft Procedures which were different from the Procedures the vehicle monitors were using. The controller provided a correct version of the Procedures to the RHP.

Recommendation: Train staff responsible for maintaining position specific binders to ensure that current Procedures are contained in the binders at all times.

Issue 2: Use of Out of Specification Instrumentation. ARCA.
(B/F94-6) (H.10., J.12.)

Discussion: During performance checks, one instrument was determined to be outside the response range specified on the instrument label. The monitor correctly made the decision that a particular instrument should not be used. The Dose Tracker overruled the monitor and issued an instruction that the instrument was acceptable for use.

Recommendation: Emphasize in training the importance of using only instruments which are operating within the parameters specified during calibration so that incorrectly operating instruments are not used.

Issue 3: Provision of Informational Material. Plan Issue.
(B/F94-7) (J.10.h., J.12.)

Discussion: The informational sheet, which includes general descriptions of the Monitoring and Decontamination Procedures for vehicles and individuals, was provided to evacuees after they had been processed in the vehicle monitoring area and in the initial monitoring area. The information was of little use at that point.

Recommendation: Revise the Plan to require the information to be provided in the vehicle monitoring area when evacuees first arrive at the EWAC.

Issue 4: Plan Inconsistency. Plan Issue. (J.12)
(B/F94-8)

Discussion: The various parts of the Plan (State Section 9 and B/F IP-12) are not consistent. The State Plan specifies the use of Figure 9.6a, page 9-25, to record data obtained in the decontamination area of the EWAC. The use of Figure 9.6b, page 9-26, is not referenced. B/F IP-12, Checklist 15, specifies the use of Attachment X which is identical to Figure 9.6b for the same purpose. Also, B/F IP-12, Attachment O. states that survey results are recorded on a form which is not in the County Plan but which has the same title as Figure 9.6a of the Section 9 of the State Plan.

Recommendation: Review forms and determine if both forms are needed or if the two forms can be combined into one. Modify all portions of the Plan accordingly. In any event, ensure that the various parts of the response Plan are consistent.

Objective 19: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and Procedures for congregate care of evacuees.

Evaluation: Met

Narrative
Summary:

The EWAC at Connell successfully demonstrated the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and Procedures for congregate care of evacuees.

The responsible agency for managing the CCC/Shelter was the ARC. Other agencies (simulated) who assisted the ARC included the Salvation Army (feeding) and Carondelet (mental health). All other services were provided in house by ARC.

The shelter was activated at 0950, and operational at 1035, after receiving a request from the Radiation Monitors (immediately prior to 1035) to rearrange the tables in order to accommodate Monitored Evacuees and Decontaminated Evacuees.

At 1001, the Shelter Manager received a copy of the first EBS message (Tape A-1 Orange) which recommends precautionary evacuation of three schools and certain recreation areas. At 1024 he received a copy of the second EBS message (Tape E-1 Orange) which recommends evacuation of Section 1. He had not received any information regarding the event status. Therefore, when asked questions regarding the Emergency Classification Level (ECL), he had no answers. At 1157, still having not received any information regarding the ECL, he sent a written message, via runner, to the EWAC Coordinator asking the ECL status and the number of evacuees to be expected. At 1105 the Shelter Manager received a notice, via runner, stating that the EWAC was activated at 0835 and operational at 1035. He received a second message, a partial answer to his previous message. The message stated that at 0855 they were at a General Emergency, a release was in

progress, and the section was being evacuated (did not state which section).

According to the Shelter Manager the capacity of the shelter was approximately 400 persons. They were expecting approximately 300 evacuees (this information was received later). The facility had the capability to accommodate disabled evacuees. There were other shelters available in the area, in case this facility exceeded its capacity.

Essential services (Shelter; Food; Sanitation Services; Family Assistance; Child Care; Medical Care; First Aid) were available for evacuees. Staff available for these services were simulated, except for managerial personnel, nurses, and registration clerks. The center had allocated space for essential support services (i.e. emergency medical care, storage of food, etc.). All services and resources were available for the center according to the ARC planning guidelines (per interview with the Shelter Manager). Necessary supplies were available including paper products, heaters and fans. Registration supplies were utilized in the drill.

The shelter was supplied with hand-held radios for communication. At 1045 the portable radios were removed and replaced with a runner system. The runner system was not accommodating. The runners were not consistently present/available when necessary. The Procedures state that the shelter will use ham radios and CB radios. However, the Extent of Play Agreement allowed this to be simulated.

The Shelter Manager needed the assistance of other staff to demonstrate that the center had the resources to provide the services and accommodations consistent with ARC planning guidelines. Because of the Shelter Manager's lack of knowledge of Procedures and lack of information, ARCA C90-7 could not be recommended for closure. Staff demonstrated the procedures to ensure that evacuees had been monitored for contamination and were decontaminated prior to entering the shelter. They registered and tracked the evacuees entering the facility. All activities described in the demonstration criteria for this objective were carried out in accordance with the Plan, unless deviations were provided for in the Extent of Play Agreement.

No new issues identified.

Objective 22: Demonstrate the adequacy of Procedures, for the monitoring and decontamination of Emergency Workers, equipment, and vehicles.

Evaluation: Met

Narrative
Summary: The Evaluation, Narrative Summary, and Issues reported on Objective 18 also encompass/pertain to Objective 22.

3.0 SUMMARY OF DRILL INADEQUACIES

Connell EWAC Drill (6/25/94)

Issue No.	Type	Description	Recommendation	Milestone Date
C90-7	ARCA	No periodic briefing at CCC/Shelter. (A.1.d.)	Train staff to conduct periodic briefings.	1996
B/F92-11	Plan Issue	No Alerting Procedures for monitors. (E.2.)	Develop Alerting Procedures, revise the Plan and train the staff.	May 1995
B/F94-3	Plan Issue	Dosimeter range not specified. (K.3.a.)	Revise both portions of the Plan (State Section 9 and B/F IP-12) to specify what range of self-reading dosimeter(s) are to be issued to the Emergency Workers at EWACs.	May 1995
B/F94-4	ARCA	Improper use of dosimetry. (K.3.a.)	Provide additional training to the specific individual who did not follow appropriate procedures.	1996
B/F94-5	ARCA	Use of outdated procedures. (J.12.)	Train staff responsible for maintaining position specific binders to assure that current Procedures are contained in the binders at all times.	1996

3.0 SUMMARY OF DRILL INADEQUACIES


Connell EWAC Drill (6/25/94) - Cont.

Issue No.	Type	Description	Recommendation	Milestone Date
B/F94-6	ARCA	Use of out-of-specification instrumentation. (H.10., J.12.)	Emphasize in training the importance of using only instruments which are operating within the parameters specified during calibration, so that incorrectly operating instruments are not used.	1996
B/F94-7	Plan Issue	Provision of informational material. (J.10.h., J.12.)	Revise the Plan to require the information to be distributed in the vehicle monitoring area when evacuees first arrive at the EWAC.	May 1995
B/F94-8	Plan Issue	Plan inconsistency. (J.12.)	Review forms and determine if both forms are needed or if the two forms can be combined into one. Modify all portions of the Plan accordingly. In any event, ensure that the various parts of the response Plan are consistent.	May 1995

APPENDIX A

PRE-EXERCISE CORRESPONDENCE

December 7, 1993 letter from Franklin County Emergency Management to FEMA RX.



OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

FRANKLIN COUNTY

1016 North Fourth Avenue
Pasco, Washington 99301-3776
(509) 545-3546 Fax (509) 545-2130

December 7, 1993

Larry E. Moore, Chief
Technological Hazards Branch
FEMA Region X, Federal Regional Center
130 - 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

SUBJECT: Graded Exercise for Connell EWAC

Dear Mr. Moore:

Congratulations on your new assignment with FEMA Region X! I look forward to meeting you, as does our entire staff here at the Office of Emergency Management in Franklin County. We hope your transition will be an easy one for you. We anticipate building a strong working relationship with you and hope to continue the spirit of cooperation and support we have heretofore enjoyed with Mr. Richard Donovan.

In this spirit of cooperation, I would like to submit to you for your approval the date of June 25, 1994 for our graded exercise for the Connell EWAC. This date has been submitted and approved by the school principal and verified with Department of Health. If a conflict exists, please notify me as soon as possible so we may work towards a more acceptable date. We will be conducting a preliminary walk through exercise on April 23, 1994 in order to provide an added opportunity for some hands on training and to smooth out any rough edges.

Once again, congratulations on your appointment and we look forward to working with you in the future.

SINCERELY,

PEGGY BENNETT
REP PLANNER-FNF LEAD

February 14, 1994 letter from FEMA RX to Franklin County
Emergency Management.



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region X
Federal Regional Center
130 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

February 14, 1994

Ms. Peggy Bennett
REP Planner-FNF Lead
Franklin County OEM
Bldg. 57 Airport Industrial Park
Pasco, Washington 99301

Dear Ms. Bennett:

Thank you for your letter of December 7, 1993, and the kind words expressed. I look forward to working with you and all the Franklin County Emergency Management staff.

We have approved and scheduled the June 25, 1994, date for the graded drill at the Connell Emergency Worker/Assistance Center (EWAC).

Please meet the milestones required for our REP Exercise Process so we can complete our assigned pre-drill tasks on schedule.

Feel free to call if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Larry E. Moore
Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairman

cc: Diane Offord, WA EM
Bob Mooney, WA DOH
Robert J. Pate, NRC
Bob Martin, Benton County
Don Larson, SS
Jason Zeller, EFSEC

Objectives and Limitations, submitted March 25, 1994,
by Franklin County Emergency Management.

WNP-2
EMERGENCY WORKER AND ASSISTANCE CENTER
OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
1994

RECEIVED

MAR 25 1994

FEMA-REGION X

Objective 1 - Mobilization of Emergency Personnel

Demonstrate the capability to alert and fully mobilize personnel for both emergency facilities and field operations. Demonstrate the capability to activate and staff emergency facilities for emergency operations.

Limitation: EWAC personnel will be prepositioned. Response time will be waived for the purpose of the exercise.

Open Planning Issue: B/F92-11 Planning Issue - No alerting procedures for monitors.

Objective 4 - Communications

Demonstrate the capability to communicate with all appropriate emergency personnel at facilities and in the field.

Open ARCA: C90-7 ARCA - No periodic briefing at CCC. (A.1.d)
C90-9 ARCA - No distribution of information sheets - AC (J.12)

Objective 5 - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Demonstrate the capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.

Open ARCA: B/F92-2 ARCA - Proper use of self-reading dosimeters. (K.3.b)
Open Planning Issue: B/F92-1 - Insufficient quantity of dosimetry kits. (K.3.a)

Objective 18 - Reception Center-Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

Open ARCA: B/F92-3 ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance. (J.12)
Open ARCA: B/F92-4 ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance. (J.12)
Open ARCA: B/F92-5 ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance. (J.12)
Open Planning Issue: B/F92-6 - Inadequate trigger levels. (J.9)
Open ARCA: B/F92-8 ARCA - Inadequate survey - women's decontamination area survey techniques. (J.12)
Open ARCA: Inadequate vehicle monitoring process. (J.12)

Objective 19 - Congregate Care

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and procedures for congregate care of evacuees.

Objective 22 - Emergency Workers, Equipment and Vehicles-Monitoring and Decontamination

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.

Limitation: Actual decontamination will not be demonstrated procedural knowledge will be simulated by instructions to evacuees and answering evaluation questions.

Open Planning Issue: B/F92-7 Planning Issue - Incomplete procedures (J.12)

Open ARCA: B/F92-9 ARCA - Inadequate documentation survey forms. (J.12)

Open Planning Issue: B/F92-1 Planning Issue - Insufficient quantity of dosimetry kits. (K.3.b)

EXTENT OF PLAY:

1. Traffic control demonstration will be confined to the school property. No traffic control measures will be demonstrated on routes leading to the EWAC.
2. The EWAC will be set up for full operation. Each designated initial monitor will consecutively monitor six evacuees.
3. Actual decontamination of evacuees will not be demonstrated, but the procedural knowledge to do so will be demonstrated by instructions to evacuees and by answering evaluator questions.
4. Demonstration of registration of evacuees will be limited to 50 percent of full staffing.
5. Evacuee's possessions will be monitored for contamination and either decontaminated or retained for further action as outlined in the procedures.
6. Benton-Franklin EOC will not be activated. Communication to EOC will be through the Control Cell.
7. EWAC personnel will be prepositioned. Response time will be waived for the purpose of the exercise.
8. Individuals with fixed contamination levels above the action levels will not be transported to a medical facility.
9. Actual decontamination of vehicles will not be demonstrated, but the procedural knowledge to do so will be demonstrated by answering evaluators' questions.

April 6, 1994, letter from FEMA RX to Franklin County
Emergency Management.



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region X
Federal Regional Center
130 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

April 6, 1994

Mr. Andrew Dixon, Director
Franklin County Emergency Management
Bldg. 57 Airport Industrial Park
Pasco, WA 99301

Subject: WNP-2 EWAC Drill, June 25, 1994

Dear Mr. Dixon:

I have reviewed the proposed objectives and limitations for the Connell EWAC drill that Peggy Bennett submitted to us on March 25, 1994. I agree with the general scope and extent of play as proposed. I believe the following objectives and points of review to be evaluated at the June drill are consistent with your proposal.

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Points of Review</u>	(Ref: REP-15, 9/91)
5	1-7, 14.1	
18	2-11, 15-39	
19	1, 2, 4-16, 17.2, 17.3	
22	1-6, 8-33	

In addition to the above points of review, FEMA will evaluate the implementation of corrective actions for the following outstanding issues identified in previous drills.

- C90-7, ARCA - No periodic briefing at CCC.
- C90-9, ARCA - No distribution of information sheets.
- B/F92-1, Planning Issue - Insufficient dosimetry kits.
- B/F92-2, ARCA - Improper use of self-reading dosimeters.
- B/F92-3, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance.
- B/F92-4, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance.
- B/F92-5, ARCA - Inadequate monitoring performance.
- B/F92-6, Planning Issue - Inadequate trigger levels.
- B/F92-7, Planning Issue - Incomplete procedures.
- B/F92-8, ARCA - Inadequate survey in women's decon. area.
- B/F92-9, ARCA - Inadequate documentation survey forms.
- B/F92-10, ARCA - Inadequate vehicle monitoring process.
- B/F92-11, Planning Issue - No alerting procedures for monitors.

I am also pleased to inform you that, as requested, your March 25, 1994 draft EWAC procedures will be considered "the plan of record" for the June 25 drill. Our preliminary review of this revision to section IP-12 of the Benton and Franklin Counties Emergency Response Plan indicates a vast improvement over the previous version. It is obvious that a great deal of time and effort went into this revision. We will provide our comments on the plan revision as soon as possible following the June drill in an effort to expedite it's approval.

Since the Benton-Franklin EOC will not be activated and response teams will not be dispatched during the June EWAC drill, the extent of play for the September WNP-2 full scale exercise should include demonstration of the following objectives and points of review.

<u>Objective</u>	<u>Points of Review</u>	(Ref: REP-15, 9/91)
5	8-14	
18	1	
19	3, 17.1	

If you have any questions call me at (206) 487-4743. I look forward to working with you and your staff at the practices, drills, and exercise this year.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Larry E. Moore

Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairman

cc: Bob Martin, Benton County EM
Diane Offord, WA EM
Bob Mooney, WA DOH
Don Larson, SS

April 30, 1994, letter from Franklin County Emergency Management to FEMA RX.



OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

FRANKLIN COUNTY

1016 North Fourth Avenue
Pasco, Washington 99301-3776
(509) 545-3546 Fax (509) 545-2130

April 30, 1994

Mr. Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairman
FEMA Region X
Federal Regional Center
130 228th Street, SW
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

Dear Mr. Moore:

Subject: SCENARIO PACKAGE FOR JUNE 25, 1994 EWAC DRILL

Reference: Letter dated April 6, 1994, LE Moore (FEMA) to AS Dixon (Franklin County),
"WNP-2 EWAC Drill, June 25, 1994"

Attached is the final Scenario Package for the WNP-2 EWAC Drill scheduled for June 25, 1994. Per our recent discussion, Objectives 1 and 4 have been removed from the package. Also, enclosed is an updated version of IP-12 which has been revised to reflect changes made as a result of FEMA recommendations made subsequent to the April 23, 1994 practice drill. It is our understanding that the draft EWAC procedures contained herein will now be considered the "plan of record". Please provide any comments at your earliest convenience.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding the attached submittal, please contact me at (509) 545-3546. Thank you for all your assistance in our preparation for this drill.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Peggy Bennett'.

Peggy Bennett
REP Planner, FNF Lead

Attachment

cc DE Larson, Supply System
RC Martin, Benton County EM

May 25, 1994, letter from FEMA RX to Washington Department of Health.

May 25, 1994

Robert Mooney, Supervisor
Nuclear Safety Section
WA Department of Health
1511 Third Avenue - Suite #700
Seattle, Washington 98101

Dear Mr. Mooney:

This letter acknowledges receipt of your May 18, 1994, transmittal of Section 9, Washington State Response Procedures for Radiation Emergencies. These revised procedures will be the Plan of Record for the June 25 EWAC Exercise.

We note Section 9 is not marked DRAFT, but is missing signatures in the upper portion of page 9-0. I assume when it is incorporated into the State Procedures you will have completed the signature portion of page 9.0.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Larry E. Moore
Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairman

cc: S. Benbrook, WA CTED/EM
B. Martin, Benton County EM
A. Dixon, Franklin County EM
Don Larson, SS
RX RAC
George E. Bickerton, USDA
Judy Tokarz-Hames, DOE-RL
Dean Kunihiro, NRC RIV-California
Jerry Leitch, EPA
Ken Miles, FDA
Bennie Walthall, DOT
Gene Bates, NRC-RIV-Texas

May 27, 1994, letter from Franklin County Emergency Management to FEMA RX.



**BENTON AND FRANKLIN COUNTIES
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICES**

503-586-1451

509-545-3546



May 27, 1994

Eleanor Castle
FEMA Region X
130 228th Street SW
Bothell, Washington 98021-7996

Dear Eleanor:

The FEMA graded exercise is Saturday, June 25 at 8:00 a.m. Our ability to set up and make operational the Congregate Care Center and Emergency Worker Assistance Center will be observed and graded. The purpose of this graded exercise is to determine areas that may have been overlooked in planning, to familiarize each of us with the roles we will take in the unlikely event that we must activate our shelters, to assist with keeping inventories and supplies current and to expose our staffs to people they will work with in emergency situations. Participation in this exercise by key response agencies like the North Franklin School District is critical to the success of the exercise, but more importantly, to provide assurance that our agencies can adequately respond to the needs of the community in times of emergency.

The following areas of concern need to be defined: we must identify staff, brief them on their roles, review site maps and reach concurrence on space requirements. This agency will need to have a final number of participants by June 10. If you do not know what the staffing needs are please coordinate with me. Timely submittal of this will allow us to identify positions not covered and determine supply needs for the exercise.

Those participating are asked to meet at Michael Jay's Restaurant at 710 S. Columbia in Connell at 8:45 a.m. for a player/ controller initial briefing. For those who are interested there will be a continental breakfast provided at 8:15 a.m. If you will be attending the breakfast or need transportation from Franklin County Emergency Management to Connell please call Scott Fisher at 545-3546. Lunch will also be provided following the exercise.

I look forward to meeting with you and will be contacting you soon to set a time and date.

Sincerely,

Peggy Bennett

Peggy Bennett, REP Planner FNF-Lead

RECEIVED
JUN 8 1994
FEMA-REGION X

June 3, 1994, memorandum from FEMA RX to Selected Distribution.



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region X
Federal Regional Center
130 228th Street, S.W.
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

June 3, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: Susan May, WA DOH
Andrew Dixon, Franklin County EM
Larry Aeschliman, SS

FROM: *Larry E. Moore*
Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairman

Subject: Change in Vehicle Monitoring Location for
June 25 Connell EWAC Drill

This letter is intended to clarify the comments I provided during the subject conference call on May 31, 1994. I understand why the drill participants are concerned about the forced switch in location for the vehicle monitoring and related parking for the Connell EWAC Drill. I again wish to assure you that any direct effects this may cause during the June 25 drill will not result in an adverse finding.

Following are examples of direct effects I see as possible results due to the change in location. I would anticipate perhaps a slight increase in the time required for set-up and staff orientation. I also recognize that the temporary location may not be satisfactory in size and configuration. We will overlook this at the drill but, the state and county plans should be revised soon after the construction has been completed at the school.

I would not object to additional staff for vehicle or evacuee traffic control. I would also not object to the Drill Manager supervising the directing of the first vehicle or first evacuees from the parking area to the reception center.

My concern is that everyone clearly understand that most of the objectives and ARCAs to be demonstration in the drill, including those in the vehicle monitoring area, should not be affected by this change in location. The vehicle monitors should be able to demonstrate proper monitoring technique, as well as knowledge of their equipment and procedures, regardless of location. The others in this area, such as traffic control and decontamination staff, should be able to demonstrate their knowledge of the plans and procedures at any locations as long as the basic functional areas called for in the plan are present and identified to the staff.

Please provide me a copy of your plan for the temporary vehicle monitoring and parking areas you intend to use for the June 25 drill. I will share this with the evaluators at the pre-drill briefing on June 24. I will also provide them a copy of this letter and will emphasize the key points.

I appreciate the additional time and effort this late development will cause for all of you in preparation for the drill. I'm confident your hard work will result in a successful drill.

cc; Gene Bates, NRC RIV
Drill Evaluators

June 21, 1994, letter from Washington Department of Health to
FEMA RX.

KRISTINE M. GIBBL
Secretary




STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
1511 Third Avenue — Suite #700
Seattle, Washington 98101

June 21, 1994

Larry E. Moore
RAC Chairperson
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Regional Center
130 - 228th Street SW
Bothell, WA 98021-9796

Dear Mr. Moore,


Attached are the updated drawings for the Connell Emergency Worker Assistance Center. We are now using two diagrams to show EWAC setup. The Personnel Monitoring diagram has only been modified slightly to show the evacuee traffic route. The second diagram shows the new temporary parking setup to be used on June 25. If you have any questions and/or comments, please call (206/464-7639).


Tracey R. Patterson
Nuclear Safety Section

cc: Bob Mooney, WA DOH
Susan May, WA DOH
Larry Aeschilman, WPPSS
Andrew Dixon, FCEM

Attachments (2)


A-9a



EWAC/CONNELL TRAFFIC SA

CONNELL HIGH SCHOOL

EWAC ENTRANCE



A-9b



APPENDIX B ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Assistance Center
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Areas Requiring Corrective Action
ARFI	Areas Recommended for Improvement
B/F	Benton/Franklin
CCC	Congregate Care Center
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
cpm	Counts Per Minute
DOH/DRP	Department of Health/Division of Radiation Protection
DWI	Disaster Welfare Inquiries
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EEM	Exercise Evaluation Methodology
EMD	Emergency Management Division
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EWAC	Emergency Worker and Assistance Center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FNF	Fixed Nuclear Facility
GE	General Emergency
INEL	Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
KI	Potassium Iodide (Thyroid Blocking Agent)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
mR	Milliroentgen(s)
MSRV	Main Steam Relief Valve
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	NRC documents reference
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation(s)
REM	Roentgen Equivalent Man
R	Roentgen(s)
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RHP	Radiation Health Physicist
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SGT	Standby Gas Treatment
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter