NIAGARA MOHAWK

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

February 27, 1984
(8113)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss on
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is an interim report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning Anchor-Darling valves. This problem was reported via telecon to W. Lazerus of your staff on January 27, 1984.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering & Licensing

CVM/MWS:ja
Enclosure
xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Interim Report for a Problem
Concerning Anchor-Darling Valves
(55(e) - 84-03)

Description of the Problem

The problem pertains to the Anchor-Darling globe valves used in the high-pressure core spray system. The problem is attributed to the loosening of the antirotational set screws, due to the vibration in these valves. General Electric (GE) has informed Niagara Mohawk that it has reported this problem to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10CFR21. The problem was also addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in I.E. Information Notice No. 83-70. On Nine Mile Point Unit 2, three valves with mark Numbers 2CSH*MOV110, 111 and 112 are affected.

Analysis of Safety Implications

General Electric believes that these valves may fail to operate as a result of this condition. On Nine Mile Point Unit 2, these valves are provided for flow testing of the HPCS. The failure of valves 2CSH*MOV110 and 112 to close after a testing operation would provide an open flow path from the discharge of the HPCS pump to the condensate storage tank. In addition, with valves 2CSH*MOV110, 111 and 112 open, the effectiveness of the HPCS system to respond following a LOCA would be reduced, since HPCS injection water would preferentially flow to the lower pressure condensate storage tank and/or suppression pool rather than the reactor vessel. Therefore, if this problem remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operation of the plant. As a result, the criteria for reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) have been met.

Corrective Action

The corrective action is still being investigated and a final report will be submitted by July 23, 1984.