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RICHARD P. CROUSE
Vice President
Nuclear
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Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Serial No. 1-413

March 12, 1984

Mr. James G. Keppler, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Boulevard
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

On July 22, 1983, Toledo Edison received IE Bulletin 83-07 (Log No. 1-824) concerning apparently fraudulent products sold by Ray Miller, Inc.

The enclosed attachment provides Toledo Edison's response to this bulletin.

Very truly yours,

R P Crouse / dm

RPC:CTD:dem

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
SECTION 182a
SUBMITTAL IN RESPONSE
FOR THE
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
UNIT NO. 1
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-3

This letter is submitted in conformance with Atomic Energy Act of 1954
Section 182a in response to IE Bulletin 83-07 (Log No. 1-824). This
deals with apparently fraudulent products sold by Ray Miller, Inc.

By Terry D. Murray
Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent

For R. P. Crouse
Vice President - Nuclear

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12th day of March, 1984.

Laurie A. Brudzinski, nee
Notary Public (Brudzinski)

LAURIE A. BRUDZINSKI
Notary Public, State of Ohio
My Commission Expires May 16, 1986

Toledo Edison response to IE Bulletin 83-07:

Request 1. Based on a review of the attached lists of Ray Miller, Inc. customers who received apparently fraudulent materials (Attachments 1 and 2), and pertinent information obtained from any of these companies, either directly or indirectly:

- (a) Identify those companies on the lists that supplied materials or services to your facility (include subcontractors as well as major contractors); and
- (b) Determine whether any of the apparently fraudulent Ray Miller, Inc. materials were provided to or used at your facility.
- (c) Determine whether any of the apparently fraudulent material supplied to you was installed in safety-related systems at your facility, or is still in stock.
- (d) If other Ray Miller, Inc. materials not listed in Attachments 1 and 2 have been identified by your own initiative, determine whether any was installed in safety-related systems at your facility, or is still in stock.

Response 1(a) A comparison was made between those recipients of Ray Miller materials identified in IE Bulletin 83-07 - including supplements 1 & 2 - and Toledo Edison suppliers. Those recipients who were not suppliers of ASTM/ASME items, or who were identified as end users or who did not specify Toledo Edison as a secondary recipient were deleted from our scope of concern.

Response 1(b) Letters inquiring about Ray Miller shipments were sent to all those recipients identified in response to 1(a). Not all suppliers identified have replied. Efforts will continue to solicit these responses. Any future identification of Ray Miller supplied materials either by Toledo Edison's continuing efforts or by the NRC's efforts identified in bulletin supplements will be handled in accordance with this bulletin.

Response 1(c) It has been identified that RECO Industries, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, has supplied Toledo Edison two Boric Acid Addition Tanks with Ray Miller supplied flanges. These consist of two 18", 150# A182 grade 304 stainless steel flanges and four 3", 150# A182 grade 304 stainless steel flanges. These tanks are ASME Class III and are designated as non nuclear safety related.

Response 1(d) No other material from Ray Miller has been identified.

Request 2. For Ray Miller, Inc. materials, both the NRC-identified apparently fraudulent materials listed in Attachments 1 and 2, and other materials identified by your own initiative, that are installed in safety-related systems of your facility:

- (a) Evaluate the safety significance of the presence of these materials assuming the fraud is as identified in the attachments or assuming material failures.
- (b) Determine the disposition of the installed material; e.g., use as is, remove and replace, etc.

Response 2(a) Although the items supplied by RECO Industries are not installed in a nuclear safety related system, a review was conducted to assess any impact raised by the bulletin concerns. Our review concludes that there are no grounds on which to assume that the flanges are other than what is represented by the documentation in the data package.

Response 2(b) The installed material has been evaluated as acceptable.

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