

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Table of Contents	i
Glossary/Abbreviations	1.1 to 1.3
ERF Directions	2.1 to 2.3
Observer Assignments	3.1 to 3.3
Objectives	4.1 to 4.6
Scope	5.1 to 5.2
Initial Conditions	6.1
Exercise Guide	8.1 to 8.6
Observer Instructions	9.1 to 9.35
Messages	10.1 to 10.24
Observer Checklists	11.1 to 11.16
Plant Data	Appendix A
Inplant Rad Con Data	Appendix B
Radiochemistry	Appendix C
Dose Projection Data	Appendix D
RMS Data	Appendix E
Field Team Data	Appendix F
Rumor Control	Appendix G
In Plant Rover Supplemental Information Packet	(In Plant Rovers Only)

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ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS


ac	Alternating Current
ADV	Atmospheric Dump Valve
AEOF	Annex to the Emergency Operations Facility
A/R	As Read
ATP	Abnormal Transient Procedure
B&W	Babcock and Wilcox
BRP	Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection
BWST	Borated Water Storage Tank
CC	Cubic Centimeter
C/D	Cooldown
CFM	Cubic Feet per Minute
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
ci	Curie
CPM	Counts Per Minute
CRO	Control Room Operator
CW	Circulating Water
DC	Direct Current
DC	Drill Controller
DER	Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources
DGI	Digital Graphics Incorporated
DHR	Decay Heat Removal
DOE	U. S. Department of Energy
DPM	Disintegrations Per Minute
EAA	Emergency Assembly Area
EAAC	Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator
EAC	Environmental Assessment Coordinator
EACC	Environmental Assessment Command Center
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EBS	Emergency Broadcast System
ECC	Emergency Control Center
ED	Emergency Director
EFPD	Effective Full Power Day
EFW	Emergency Feedwater
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
ENS	NRC Emergency Notification System
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPIP	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERF	Emergency Response Facility
ES	Engineered Safeguards
ESAS	Engineered Safeguards Activation System
ESD	Emergency Support Director
ESO	Emergency Support Organization
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBTL	Fire Brigade Team Leader
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FP	Full Power
FRC	Federal Response Center
FRERP	Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
GeLi	Germanium Lithium (isotopic gamma detection crystal)
GM	Geiger Mueller (radiation detection tube)
GPM	Gallons Per Minute
GPUN	GPU Nuclear Corporation

HP	Health Physics
HPI	High Pressure Injection
HPN	NRC Health Physics Network
IAW	In Accordance With
ICS	Integrated Control System
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IP	In Plant Rover
IRO	Initial Response Emergency Organization
IRAP	Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan
ITS	Important to Safety
JIC	Joint Information Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
kv	Kilovolt
LOCA	Loss of Coolant Accident
LPZ	Low Population Zone
LSA	Low Specific Activity
MAP-5	Post-Accident High Range Iodine Sampler
MCF	Maintenance, Construction, Facilities
MFW	Main Feedwater
MIDAS	Meteorological Information and Dose Acquisition System
MS-V/R	Main Steam - Valve/Relief
MU-P	Make-Up Pump
N/A	Not Applicable
NaI	Sodium Iodine Gamma Isotopic Detection Crystal
NAWAS	National Warning System
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC	U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NWS	U. S. National Weather Service
O/P	Office of the President
OOS	Out of Service
OSC	Operations Support Center
OSH	Off Scale High
OTSG	Once Through Steam Generator
PAG	Protective Action Guides
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAS	Post-Accident Sample
PEMA	Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
PD	Plant Data
PI	Public Information
PPB	Parts Per Billion
PPM	Parts Per Million
PRS	Plant Reference Simulator
PTFC	Parsippany Technical Functions Center
QA	Quality Assurance
QCL	Quality Control List
RAA	Remote Assembly Area
RAC	Radiological Assessment Coordinator
R&EC	Radiological and Environmental Controls
RE	Reactor Building
RCP	Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RESP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RM-A	Radiation Monitor - Atmospheric
RMC	Radiation Management Corporation
RM-L	Radiation Monitor - Liquid
RM-G	Radiation Monitor - General Area
RMS	Radiation Monitoring System

SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SCFM	Standard Cubic Feet per Minute
SCM	Subcooling Margin
S/D	Shutdown
SDD	System Design Description
SRO	Senior Reactor Operator
TBV	Turbine Bypass Valve
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
TMI	Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant
TS	Technical Specification
TSC	Technical Support Center
V	Volt
U-1	TMI Unit 1
U-2	TMI Unit 2
WG	Waste Gas
WHM	Warehouse Muster
X/Q	Meteorological Dispersion Factor (Chi/Q)

TMI EMER. RESPONSE FACILITY MAP

PART 1




TMI EMER. RESPONSE FACILITY MAP PART 2



AIRPORT

2.2



AEOF



Pike St.

Ann St.

Wood St.

Stop Lights

Union St.

Royalton

Rt. 441
From
Three
Mile
Island

Susquehanna
River


To access the AEOF:

1. Stop at the gate.
2. Use the phone in the booth to call the AEOF (it dials automatically).
3. When the gate opens, drive through (the gate closes automatically).

TMI EMER. RESPONSE FACILITY MAP

PART 3

2.3



DIRECTIONS TO OFF-SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES

NOTE: These directions are intended to be used with the TMI Emergency Response Facility Map- parts 1, 2 and 3. All directions are written using the TMI North Gate as the starting point.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Joint Information Center (JIC) and Environmental Assessment Command Center (EACC)

- From the North Gate, turn left onto Route 441 North.
- Proceed 2.1 miles to the first traffic light in Middletown.
- Go straight through the traffic light and the next traffic light to a stop sign.
- Turn right at the stop sign then bear left to cross the railroad overpass.
- Turn left at the traffic light just past the railroad overpass onto Route 230 West.
- Proceed West on Route 230 through the next traffic light (at Jamesway Plaza) and turn right onto the entrance ramp for Route 283.
- Proceed to the 283 West) Harrisburg sign. Bear left and continue to the 283 merge area.
- Merge onto Route 283 and continue to the next exit (Interstate 283 North).
- Turn right and merge onto Interstate 283 North and continue to the interchange for 83 North, 81 North and 322 West.
- Proceed straight onto 83 North and continue to the junction of Route 81 South (Carlisle).
- Bear left onto Route 81 South and proceed to the next exit (Exit 24- Progress Ave.).
- Take Exit 24 and proceed to the traffic light.
- Turn left at the traffic light and take the next right turn (Interstate Drive).
- Follow Interstate Drive for approximately 0.5 miles to the EOF/JIC building. The number on the building is 2574.
- Enter at the rear of the building.

Annex to the Emergency Operations Facility (AEOF)

- From the North Gate, turn left onto Route 441 North.
- Proceed 2.1 miles to the first traffic light in Middletown.
- Turn left onto South Union Street.
- Follow South Union Street for approximately 4 blocks and turn right onto Pike Street.
- Proceed straight to the security gate at the Middletown Service Center.
- Use the telephone in the booth to the right of the gate to identify yourself and request access (the telephone dials automatically when the receiver is picked up).
- When the gate opens, proceed to the parking lot and park in the visitor area. The gate will close automatically.
- The AEOF is located on the first and second floors of the Middletown Service Center building.

Near-Site Joint Information Center and Simulator

- From the North Gate, turn right and proceed South on Route 441 for 0.7 miles to the entrance to the TMI Visitor Center parking lot.
- The Near-Site Joint Information Center and the Simulator are in the building behind the Visitor Center.

OBSERVER ASSIGNMENT SHEET			APPENDICES
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	OBSERVER	CONTACT PHONE	
GROUP 1			
50. Drill Coordinator (ECC)	G. Simonetti	2059	A,B-S,C,D,E,F,G
51. Plant Data Controller	N. Brown	2059	A,E
##. Simulator Management	W. Fraser	2059	NO SCENARIO
52. Console Operator	J. Boltz	2059	
53. Operations Evaluator	B. Ogle	2059	
54. Communications	S. Cvijic	2059	
55. TSC	R. Tropasso	8742	A
56. PTFC	F. Kenny	7390	A
57. Tech Support at EOF	C. Shorts	8966	A
GROUP 2			
58. EOF Controller	R. Harper	8966	A,B-S,C,D,E,F,G
59. AEOF	M. Press	944-2922	
60. Public Info/Rumor Control	S. Molello	540-4900	G
GROUP 3			
61. EACC Controller	D. Merchant	540-4501	E,F
62. RAC Controller	F. Linsenbach	2059	B-S,D,E,F
63. Dose Assess Controller	R. Eherts	948-2031	
64. Field Team (On Site)	E. Houser	Radio	F
65. Field Team (On Site)	D. Lawyer	Radio	F
66. Field Team (EOF)	D. Moyer	Radio	F
67. Field Team (EOF)	M. Eckert	Radio 8164/8737	F
68. BRP Field Team	T. Johnson		F
69. BRP Field Team	J. Sliter	979-5227	F
70. Chemistry	E. Gliot	Radio 8164/8737	B-S,C

OBSERVER ASSIGNMENT SHEET			APPENDICES
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY	OBSERVER	CONTACT PHONE	
GROUP 4			
71. In Plant Controller	A. Knoche	8718	B-S
72. In Plt Rov A (Elec.)	D. VanNortwick	8718	B-S
73. In Plt Rov B (Ops.)	G. Hoek	8718	B-S
74. In Plt Rov C (RC)	R. Holmes	8718	B-L
75. In Plt Rov D (Safety)	S. Pettinato	8718	B-S
76. In Plt Rov E (Mech)	T. Coble	8718	B-S
77. In Plt Rov F (RC)	A. Paynter	8718	B-L
78. In Plt Rov G (Mech.)	S. Turns	8718	B-S
79. In Plt Rov H (Elec.)	P. Bickford	8718	B-S
80. In Plt Rov I (Elec.)	P. Karish	8718	B-S
GROUP 5			
81. OSC Controller	J. Whitehead	8718	B-L
82. Emergency Assembly	E. Gee	8064/5042	
83. Security/Accountability	G. DeHoff	Radio	
84. NSCC	S. Williams		
85. NSCC	E. Hammond		
86. PEMA Controller	D. Taylor	783-8192	No Scenario
87. PEMA Controller	R. Casto	783-3740	No Scenario
88. Evacuee	C. Witmer		No Scenario
89. Evacuee	W. Duncan		No Scenario
88. NRC Inspection Team	W. Maier (Team Leader)		A,B-S,C,D,E,F,G
89. NRC Inspection Team	J. Lusher (EOF)	8966	
90. NRC Inspection Team	J. Laughlin (ECC)	2059	
91. NRC Inspection Team	F. P. Bonnett (TSC)	8742	B-S
92. NRC Inspection Team	S. Boynton (RAC)	2059	B-S,D,E,F
93. NRC Ispection Team	R. Larson (OSC)	8718	B-S

THE DRILL COORDINATOR

has the overall responsibility for the implementation of the drill/exercise. All changes to the scenario are authorized by the DRILL COORDINATOR following approval from the affected CONTROLLERS.

CONTROLLERS

are designated for key areas of scenario implementation and also have the responsibility of observing the activities of the drill participants. CONTROLLERS are the ONLY individuals that may change the scenario (data, sequence, etc.). The changes are implemented following authorization from the DRILL COORDINATOR.

OBSERVERS

have the responsibility of monitoring the activities of the drill participants and providing required information (scenario data, messages, etc.).

ANNUAL EXERCISE
4/12/95

ATTACHMENT I

OBJECTIVES FOR THE 1995 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION ANNUAL EXERCISE

A joint exercise will be conducted in order to demonstrate the state of emergency preparedness of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station (TMI); the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the TMI Risk Counties, and the TMI Risk Municipalities. This demonstration will be accomplished through the implementation of the emergency plan dedicated to the response of a TMI incident. This is a full participation exercise.

The Three Mile Island Station objectives are as follows:

NOTE: Bracketed information refers to the correspondence elements identified in NRC Inspection Procedure 82302, Section 82302-03 Inspection Guidance, Paragraph 03.02.

A. Operational Assessment

[a1,2]

1. Demonstrate the ability of the control room personnel to recognize (by Plant Reference Simulator indications) that emergency action levels have been reached or exceeded, properly classify the emergency and implement the emergency plan within approximately 15 minutes of recognition.
2. Demonstrate the ability of the operators to assess plant conditions, effectively utilize engineering support, and implement procedures in order to place the plant in a safe condition, as indicated by the Plant Reference Simulator displays.
3. Demonstrate the ability of the plant personnel to mitigate the in-plant and off-site consequences of a radiological release through operational manipulations.
4. Exhibit the coordination and adequacy of the TMI Emergency Operating Procedures and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

B. Radiological Controls and Environmental Assessment

[a5,6; b14]

1. Satisfactorily perform radiological and environmental monitoring activities in accordance with prescribed procedures.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
4/12/95

Radiological Controls and Environmental Assessment (CONTINUED)

2. Properly assess the monitoring data to formulate accurate off-site radiological dose projection.
3. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate monitoring data, off-site radiological dose projections, and plant conditions to arrive at appropriate protective action recommendations within approximately 15 minutes of the G.E. declaration.
4. Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological protection assessment process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable.
5. Demonstrate that sufficient radiological protection exists for emergency personnel to properly carry out assigned roles and responsibilities in all facilities.
6. Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze appropriate samples (e.g., grab samples, etc.).
7. Exhibit the proper use of appropriate sample results (e.g., grab samples, etc.) for dose assessment and radiological controls activities.
8. Demonstrate the effective coordination of the radiological and environmental assessment process with the Bureau of Radiation Protection.
9. Demonstrate the capability to dispatch a field monitoring team from the facility within 30 minutes of the declaration of an emergency when a release is in progress.
10. Exhibit the ability to develop the initial dose projection within 30 minutes of process initiation and subsequently within approximately 15 minutes as needed.

C. Emergency Organization

[a7,8; b6]

1. Demonstrate that sufficient emergency personnel are available to properly mitigate the consequences of an emergency and support the emergency on a round-the-clock schedule.
2. Exhibit proper response of the emergency personnel to activate emergency response facilities and carry out assigned roles and responsibilities within their allotted 1 hour or 4 hour response time. Note: Response time starts with the activation of the EP Paggers.

Emergency Organization (CONTINUED)

3. Display proper transfer of responsibility between onshift personnel and incoming emergency personnel.
4. Demonstrate timely briefing and dispatch of Emergency Teams at the OSC.

Emergency Response Facilities

1. Demonstrate that sufficient and adequate emergency equipment exists to effectively perform all necessary emergency actions.
2. Demonstrate a viable means of access control exists that restricts entry to authorized personnel only.
3. Show that sufficient space is dedicated in all facilities to allow for proper emergency response.
4. Demonstrate the ability to screen and/or process personnel for access to emergency response facilities.

Communications

[a3,4]

1. Demonstrate that reliable communications systems exist to accomplish notification of off-site agencies within the 15 minute (State and Risk Counties) or 1 hour (NRC) time limits and to communicate with the Bureau of Radiation Protection.
2. Demonstrate that adequate emergency communications systems are in place to facilitate transmittal of data among emergency response facilities.
3. Exhibit the ability to effectively utilize emergency communications systems.
4. Demonstrate the ability to adequately alert station personnel of an emergency through the use of alarms and public address systems.
5. Demonstrate that adequate call out procedures exist to provide for mobilization of emergency response personnel within approximately 30 minutes of the event declaration.
6. Demonstrate the ability to effectively communicate with emergency teams on-site and off-site.
7. Exhibit data display at each facility which is adequate to support the facilities' mission.

Personnel Protection

[b14,17]

1. Demonstrate that initial accountability can be accomplished within thirty minutes, and final accountability can be accomplished within sixty minutes from the request.
2. Demonstrate the ability to muster non-essential personnel on site and that adequate provisions exist to carry out an orderly evacuation.
NOTE: A maximum of 4 personnel will demonstrate evacuation of non-essential personnel.
3. Demonstrate proper adherence to personnel protection/safety rules.
4. Demonstrate the capability to radiologically monitor and, if necessary, decontaminate personnel onsite or offsite.
5. Demonstrate that search and rescue can be implemented following accountability, if required.
6. Demonstrate the ability to control access to changing radiological conditions in-plant and around the site.

Public Information

[b2,9]

1. Demonstrate the ability to develop and disseminate accurate news releases within 1 hour from the time that a major plant event has occurred.
2. Exhibit proper activation of the Joint Information Center.
3. Demonstrate effective rumor control techniques.
4. Demonstrate the ability to conduct news briefings and interface with the news media and concerned citizens on a frequency of at least 1 per hour, as required.

Critique

[d]

1. Demonstrate that previously identified deficiencies have been corrected.

NRC Inspection Report 50-289/94-09
Resident Safety Inspection (5/17/94 - 6/27/94)

Critique (CONTINUED)

Exercise weakness:

- The licensee initially failed to recognize that the high range condenser offgas radiation monitor for gaseous activity, RM-A-5 HI Gaseous, was greater than the high alarm setpoint, which is a condition which requires the licensee to declare an Alert. The Operations Coordinator (Plant Operations Director) noted the condition and the licensee declared an Alert approximately one hour after receiving the radiation monitor alarm.

Areas for potential improvement:

- There were several instances where ECC communications to other facilities could be improved. For example, the ECC and the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) were aware that in addition to the primary-to-secondary leak, there were indications of reactor coolant leaking into the Reactor Building [there was a simulated main steam line leak in the affected OTSG]. However, the OSF and TSC were not aware of the reactor coolant leak. Though the OSF and TSC actions were still correct in attempting to close the open Reactor Building purge valves, the work crews should have known to expect the high radiation levels at the purge valves.
- At the start of the drill, the computer on the Shift Supervisor's desk displayed a recently installed screen that is designed to provide radiological assessment information from the RAC. The screen is a good licensee initiative because it provides up-to-date radiological information to the ED. However, this screen was not functional in the actual Control Room. The concern is that Control Room personnel would become accustomed to using equipment during drills that would not be available during an actual event. The emergency preparedness personnel thought the screen was functional in the Control Room as of April 25, 1994, but on May 20, 1994, the inspector found that the screen was not functional. The Shift Supervisor at the Simulator was aware that the screen would not be available in the actual Control Room and therefore, he would have to use the RAC computer. However, discussions with other licensee personnel indicated that they thought the computer screen was available in the Control Room. The licensee did not make the screen functional until June 15, 1994.
- The OSC repair team assigned to perform mechanical repairs to close the Reactor Building outer purge valve did not have the procedures, technical manuals or drawings at the work site. Although this information was being reviewed at the OSC and although the individuals were very familiar with the purge valve, the information should also be at the work site to assist in their troubleshooting efforts.

ATTACHMENT II

NOTE: This list of items denotes the level of participants that may result if such actions are taken by the participants in response to scenario situations (i.e., if search and rescue is deemed appropriate by the participants, they will be required to actually perform this action rather than simulating it.) It is NOT intended to be an absolute list of actions that will be taken. Actions which affect normal Plant Operation WILL NOT be permitted.

EVENT	ACTUAL	SIMULATION
1. Declaration of Emergency	X	
2. Notification of Off-Site Agencies	X	
3. Emergency Announcements	X	
4. Activation of Initial Response Emergency Organization	X	
5. Activation of Emergency Support Organization	X	
6. Protected Area Accountability	X	
7. Sample and Analysis	X	
8. Evacuation of Site Personnel	X*	
9. Monitoring at Assembly Area	X	
10. Decontamination of Contaminated Person(s)		X**
11. Power Plant Operation		X***
12. Dispatching of Response Teams (e.g., Radiation Monitoring, Repair, etc.)	X	
13. Public Information (e.g., Rumor Control, News Releases, Joint Information Center Activation, etc.)	X	
14. Search and Rescue (e.g., Trapped Person, Missing Person)	X	
15. Evaluate Emergency Responder(s) to meet Fitness for Duty Requirements	X	

* A maximum of 4 personnel will be evacuated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the evacuation process.

** Contamination is simulated by using Lantern mantles. Simulated decontamination is done by following applicable plant procedure(s).

*** Control switches may be operated in the Plant Reference Simulator. All controls in the Plant will not be operated. (ACTUAL PLANT CONFIGURATION WILL NOT BE ALTERED.)

SCOPE

The Annual Emergency Exercise is a Player reactive event run from the Plant Reference Simulator (PRS) using REAL TIME dose assessment. Real Time dose assessment involves actual field monitoring team data transmissions and the use of actual time of day meteorological conditions. Using the Simulator and Real Time dose assessment adds an important degree of realism to the response of the drill participants. The drill encourages a player reactive response to the scenario which in turn enhances the awareness of the plant conditions by the Emergency Organization, especially when their recommendations are implemented. Back up information is available if the simulator malfunctions.

The Initial Conditions for this drill are on the Initial Conditions Sheet (Page 6.1). There is one time clock in effect for this drill. A 30 day Administrative time clock per AP1038 because MU-P-1C is out of service. An additional item is that the pressurizer spray valve is leaking and stuck in the open position with the block valve closed. The block valve is scheduled to be cycled open and closed to provide boron mixing. The drill is started by the Drill Coordinator with an announcement for all drill participants to use radio channel 5.

Shortly after the drill starts the operators attempt to cycle RC-V-3 and find that it is stuck in the closed position. Procedure (EP1202-29) guidance directs that power changes be limited to less than 1% per minute. After the valve is found failed the OTSGs (Once Through Steam Generators) start to leak. The total leakage will be approximately 80 gpm split 70 % to 'A' and 30% to the 'B' generator. The operating staff will quantify the magnitude of the leak and direct the following: 1) Plant Shutdown and 2) Declaration of an Alert.

NOTE: The Operations Evaluator will insure that the shutdown rate is 1 %/minute.

Following the controlled plant shutdown a system cooldown will be initiated. This will be controlled by the Operations Evaluate to be at 90 ± 10 °F/hour. During the cooldown several failures will occur: CF-T-1A will lose its nitrogen overpressure, CF-V-4B will be failed closed, and the total OTSG leakage will increase to about 650 gpm. The operators will attempt to increase the makeup to the RCS by starting a second Makeup pump, which fails to start. Additionally when the 'B' Decay Heat Removal pump attempts to start it will also fail. The leak rate is more than the capacity of one pump and sub-cooling margin will decrease to less than 25°. This condition warrants declaration of a Site Area Emergency. The Site Area Emergency activates the entire Emergency Organization (The Initial Response Emergency Organization {IREO} and the Emergency Support Organization {ESO}). Additionally this level of emergency initiates the Accountability/Mustering/Evacuation activities. The evacuation will be demonstrated by a few select employees in lieu of a full site evacuation.

DRILL 95-03
ANNUAL EXERCISE 1995

One aspect of this particular exercise is that the core heat will be controlled to allow exercise objectives to be met within the time limits of the exercise. Personnel responsible for evaluating heat removal and plant response will be informed that abnormal response can be expected. The manipulation of the core heat will allow a rapid RCS heatup, at the desired time, and fuel cladding failure.

After several hours into the cooldown and about the time that Decay Removal operations will begin, several failures occur: 1) The OTSG leakage increases, and 2) The remaining pumps (MUP and DHR) controlling RCS inventory are lost. The RCS heats up and suffers fuel clad damage warranting declaration of a General Emergency. A General Emergency declaration requires that a Protective Action Recommendation) PAR be developed and given to the state within approximately 15 minutes. The plant will restore inventory control and evaluate entry into Recovery. (NOTE: De-escalation is not an appropriate alternative following a General Emergency Declaration.)

The drill will end with concurrence from the State and GPU management.

DRILL DRILL DRILL

TMI-1 PLANT STATUS

DATE 04/12/95 TIME 0530

PRIMARY PLANT	SECONDARY PLANT
MODE: POWER OPERATIONS POWER: 99.66 % 2559.3 MWth BURNUP: 525 EFPD; BORON: 16 ppmB PRESSURE: 2156 PSIG; TAVE: 579 F FC PUMPS: 4 RC FLOW: 144.4 Mlb/hr RCS LEAK RATE: Leakage + Losses: .0768 GPM Total Leakage: .0801 GPM Unidentified: .0801 GPM Method A P-S Leakage: 0.14 GPH Method B P-S Leakage: 0.17 GPH	GENERATION: 878 MWe; ACT-PRED: +2.1 MWe CONDNSR VAC: 26.7" Hg; CW TEMP: 74 F OTSG A/B PRESSURE: 911 / 911 PSIG OTSG A/B LEVEL: 58% / 57% Op Range FW A/B FLOWS: 5.35 / 5.30 (MLB/HR) MS Drains Feeding Forward: 4 RC TOTAL ACTIVITY: 2.994 uCi/ml DOSE EQUIV IODINE: 4.49 E-3 uCi/ml CONDENSER OFFGAS: 10025 CPM @ 24 SCFM Lithium: 0.43 ppm RCS hot pH: 7.8

CONTINUOUS DAYS ONLINE: 516

CHEMISTRY & THERMOHYDRAULIC ABNORMALITIES:

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

The Met recorders (Direction, Speed and Temperature) are OOS use the ED/ESD screen on the computer, if information is needed.

MAJOR EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE / PROBLEM AREAS:

MUP1C is OOS. ADMIN 1038 30 day time clock in effect, started 0800 hours 4/10/95. The pump shaft is cracked. The unit is disassembled and awaiting a replacement shaft. The shaft is expected to arrive on site within the next week to 10 days.

RCV1 is leaking. RCV3 is closed. In accordance with EP1202-29 RCV3 is cycled to maintain boron and spray line temperature. The valve is cycled every 4 hours at 35 minutes after the hour.

MAJOR PLANNED ACTIVITIES AND TESTING FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS:

NONE.

PDMS:

NONE.

COMMENTS:



RB Purge in progress for non-routine safety related corrective maintenance (check RB coolers).

MET RECORDERS are OOS. ** Use ED Display on computer for current data. **

DRILL DRILL DRILL

Shift Technical Advisor

Ops Director, TMI-1



**THIS
PAGE
INTENTIONALLY
BLANK**



TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = -30	1500	Initial Conditions	N/A	None	Plant Data Controller/ OSC Controller	Senior Management/ Shift Supervisor/ Shift Foreman/ Group Rad Con Supervisor	Inform drill participants of drill plant conditions.
T = 0	1530	Exercise Begins	The time is now T = 0.	DC-1 (10.5)	Drill Coordinator	Drill Observers/ Drill Participants	Start the exercise. Change radios to Channel 5.
T = 5	1535	Drill Control Feature	Cycle RC-V-3.	OE-1* (10.6)	Operations Evaluator	Control Room Staff	Cycle RC-V-3.
T = 5	1535	RC-V-3 Fails Closed	N/A	None	Plant Data	Control Room Staff	Investigate.
T = 15	1545	Primary to Secondary Leak of 80 to 100 gpm. (70%-A/30-B)	N/A	None	Plant Data	Control Room Staff	Attempt to quantify leak rate.
T = 25	1555	Plant shut down initiated.	Shut down at 1% per minute.	OE-2* (10.7)	Operations Evaluator	Control Room Staff	Shut down at 1% per minute.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 25	1555	Leak Rate Quantified at ≈ 80 gpm.	N/A	None	Plant Data	Control Room Staff	Declare an ALERT.
T = 45	1615	Alert Declaration	Declare an Alert.	DC-2* (10.8)	Drill Coordinator	Emergency Director	Declare an Alert.
T = 60	1630	Information Request	TRAFFAX reporter requesting information.	PI-1 (10.9)	Public Information Observer	ECC Staff Member	Refer caller to Public Information Department.
T = 120	1730	Information Request	Request for television coverage.	PI-2 (10.10)	Public Information Observer	ECC Staff Member	Refer caller to the Communications Division.
T = 150	1800	Plant Cool Down Initiated.	Cool Down at $90^{\circ} \pm 10^{\circ}$ /Hour.	OE-3* (10.11)	Operations Evaluator	ECC Staff	Cool down plant at $90^{\circ} \pm 10^{\circ}$ /Hour.
T = 155	1805	CF-T-1A N ₂ Pressure Loss. CF-V-4B Fails Shut.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Dispatch an Emergency Repair Team to investigate when discovered.
T = 160	1810	Plant Parameter Information	Decay Heat is being controlled.	OE-4 (10.12)	Operations Evaluator	ECC Staff	Allow for control feature while performing calculations.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 160	1810	Plant Parameter Information	Decay Heat is being controlled.	TSC-1 (10.13)	TSC Observer	TSC Staff	Allow for control feature while performing calculations.
T = 160	1810	Plant Parameter Information	Decay Heat is being controlled.	TS-1 (10.14)	EOF Tech Support Observer	EOF Tech Support Staff	Allow for control feature while performing calculations.
T = 160	1810	Plant Parameter Information	Decay Heat is being controlled.	TF-1 (10.15)	PTFC Observer	PTFC Staff	Allow for control feature while performing calculations.
T = 165	1815	MU-P-1A Failure. DH-P-1B Failure. Decreasing Sub Cooling Margin.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Dispatch Emergency Repair Team. Attempt to recover sub cooling margin. Declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
T = 165	1815	OTSG Leakage Increases to ≈650 gpm.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Continue cool down.
T = 180	1830	Site Area Emergency Declaration.	Declare a Site Area Emergency.	DC-3* (10.16)	Drill Coordinator	Emergency Director	Declare a Site Area Emergency.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 185	1835	RCS Pressure at 600 psi. CF-T-1B problem discovered.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Investigate and/or dispatch Emergency Repair Team.
T = 190	1840	Muster Complete.	Select three individuals to demonstrate the evacuation process.	EA-1 (10.17)	Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation Observer	Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator	Comply with direction. NOTE: The three evacuees are pre-designated.
T = 200	1850	Accountability Complete. One person missing.	N/A	None	Security and Accountability Observer	Site Security	Report status to Emergency Director. Commence Search and Rescue.
T = 210	1900	Fitness for Duty Testing at EOF.	Individual consumed alcoholic beverages.	EOF-1 (10.18)	EOF Controller	Emergency Support Director	Test BAC I.A.W. EPIP-TMI-.27.
T = 215	1905	Missing Injured Person Located.	N/A	None	In Plant Rover	Search and Rescue Staff	Extricate and treat individual.
T = 220	1910	Evacuation	Initiate a mini evacuation	DC-4 (10.19)	Drill Coordinator	Emergency Director	Commence the evacuation.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 240	1930	Information Request	Conrail Yard Master asking about rail safety near TMI.	PI-3 (10.20)	Public Information Observer	EOF Staff Member	Refer caller to the Communications Division.
T = 265	1955	MU-P-1B Failure. DH-P-1A Failure.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Dispatch Emergency Repair Team.
T = 265	1955	OTSG Leak Rate Increases.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Continue cool down.
T = 280	2010	Evacuees arrive at the AEOF.	N/A	None	AEOF Observer	AEOF Staff	Decontaminate personnel. Utilize manpower as needed.
T = 295	2025	Sub Cooling Margin Negative.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Attempt to recover Sub Cooling Margin. Declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Make a PAR within 15 minutes.
T = 300	2030	General Emergency Declaration	Declare a General Emergency	DC-5* (10.21)	Drill Coordinator	Emergency Director	Declare a General Emergency.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 301	2031	Intermediate and Turbine Building Personnel Contaminations.	N/A	None	In Plant Rovers	Plant Staff	Monitor and Decontaminate.
T = 305	2035	MU-P-1A Returned to Service. DH-P-1A Returned to Service	N/A	None	In Plant Rover	Emergency Repair Teams	Report status to OSC and ECC.
T = 320	2050	Sub Cooling Margin Recovered.	N/A	None	Plant Data	ECC Staff	Continue recovery operations.
T = 330	2100	Information Request	Fuel oil truck driver concerned about making a delivery to TMI.	PI-4 (10.22)	Public Information Observer	EOF Staff Member	Refer caller to the Communications Division.
T = 345	2115	AEOF Support Request	Obtain a mobil breathing air compressor.	AE-1 (10.23)	AEOF Observer	Site Services Coordinator	Identify source of supply.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

TIME		MAJOR EVENT	MESSAGE CONTENT	MESSAGE NUMBER (PAGE)	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED BY	DETAILS/ MESSAGE DELIVERED TO	EXPECTED ACTIONS
SCENARIO	CLOCK						
T = 390	2200	Drill Ends	The drill is terminated.	DC-6 (10.24)	Drill Coordinator with ED & ESD concurrence.	Drill Observers & Participants	Terminate the drill.

* Indicates a Contingency Message. Refer to the Observer Instructions.

DRILL COORDINATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. When all personnel have been briefed (i.e., watch turnover) and the Plant Reference Simulator is lined up for the drill, read Message DC-1 over the plant page system.
2. Several events will occur during the course of the drill that, in reality, could require off site assistance. Calls are to be simulated with the exception of the Emergency Off Site Notification process and calls to PEMA regarding the site evacuation process. A similar instruction is included in the Communications Observer Instructions.
3. At T = 45 (1615 hours), if the Emergency Director has not declared an Alert or is not preparing to declare an Alert, read Contingency Message DC-2 to him. This message will ensure the drill follows the time line approved by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and that off-site activities are not adversely affected.
4. The Public Information Observer will call the ECC with Message PI-1 at T = 60 (1630 hrs.) and Message PI-2 at T = 120 (1730 hrs.). See the Public Information Observer Instructions for the specific messages. These calls will test the ability of the ECC personnel to deal with distractions and outside agencies during a stressful situation. Monitor the response to these calls.
5. At T = 180 (1830 hours), if the Emergency Director has not declared a Site Area Emergency or is not preparing to declare a Site Area Emergency, read Contingency Message DC-3 to him. This message will ensure the drill follows the time line approved by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and that off site activities are not adversely affected.
6. At T = 220 (1910 hrs.) or when muster is complete, direct the Emergency Director to initiate the mini evacuation by reading message DC-4 to him. Verify the Emergency Director consults with the Radiological Assessment Coordinator to consider radiological exposure implications relative to the evacuation route. Provide the Emergency Director with the modified Emergency Report Form for Site Evacuation.

DRILL COORDINATOR INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

7. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency has indicated that they will actually send an Incident Response Team as part of this drill. If they elect to do so, actual NRC personnel could arrive at the TMI emergency response facilities. Response to team activities should be in accordance with established procedures. Individuals requiring site access who do not presently possess a TMI security badge should be processed through the AEOF. Should the team require assistance in obtaining site entry processing or clearance, ensure the Emergency Director and staff support the team's visit/site entry as necessary. Monitor the interaction between the Incident Response Team and the ECC staff and record comments in your Observer Comments.
8. At T = 300 (2030 hours), if the Emergency Director has not declared a General Emergency or is not preparing to declare a General Emergency, read Contingency Message DC-5 to him. This message will ensure the drill follows the time line approved by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and that off site activities are not adversely affected.
9. At T = 390 (2200 hrs.) with the drill objectives satisfied and with Emergency Director and Emergency Support Director concurrence, end the drill by reading Message DC-5 over the plant page system. Then read Message DC-5 to the EOF, AEOF, Joint Information Center, and PTFC using commercial or emergency telephones.
10. Contact the Shift Supervisor/Shift Foreman at extension 8070 or 8071 and inform him of the completion of the drill.
11. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to the proper storage location and the Simulator Control Room is returned to pre-drill conditions.

COMMUNICATIONS OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. During the course of the drill, various events will take place which, in reality, could require off-site assistance. All calls to off-site entities shall be simulated with the exception of the emergency off-site notification process. Also, calls to PEMA regarding the site evacuation process (refer to EPIP-TMI-.02) should not be simulated. In all other cases, allow the drill participants to produce applicable telephone numbers and explain the contact method, but stop the process at the point that the call would be placed.
2. Off-site notifications are to be performed as specified in the applicable communications Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure.
 - o The initial notifications shall be performed in their entirety in accordance with the Emergency Notifications and Call Outs procedure, EPIP-TMI-.03.
 - o Reclassification notifications shall be performed in their entirety in accordance with the Emergency Notifications and Call Outs procedure, EPIP-TMI-.03.
 - o Closeout notifications shall be performed in their entirety in accordance with the Emergency Notifications and Call Outs procedure, EPIP-TMI-.03.
 - o The call out of emergency personnel shall be in accordance with the Emergency Notifications and Call Outs procedure, EPIP-TMI-.03.
3. Ensure drill demands placed upon state and county emergency management agencies are held to a minimum. For example, if the Communicator fails to cancel the ring tone on the Notification Line, intervene and cancel the ring tone yourself. Any intervention performed by the observer to lessen the drill impact on state/county dispatch centers should be noted in your Observer Checklists.
4. Should the USNRC elect not to participate in this drill relative to the use of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), the Plant Data Controller will turn off the ERDS

COMMUNICATIONS OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

modem. The Communicator should perform the steps in Procedure EPIP-TMI-.03, Emergency Notifications and Call Outs regardless of the NRC's decision. If the modem is turned off, the CRT indications will differ from those specified in the procedure as follows:

Modem Status: Fail
Link Status: Fail
ERDS Status: Inactive

Explain to the Communicator that the NRC is not participating via ERDS and give the drill participant credit if the steps were performed properly. The steps in EPIP-TMI-.03 should actually be performed. Do not allow the Communicator to report the system out of service; simulate that the ERDS system is in service and operating.

5. Before securing from the drill, ensure closeout notifications have been completed in accordance with procedures EPIP-TMI-.03 and EPIP-TMI-.27. Verify completion with the EOF Communications Coordinator or Communicators as well as the ECC Communications Coordinator or Communicators.
6. If problems are encountered with any communications hardware, ensure you record all relevant information so that repairs can be arranged following the drill. Do not allow the ECC Communications Coordinator to actually call off site companies for communications repairs during the drill. Bell of Pennsylvania, AT&T, Communications Systems Specialists, etc. will be contacted through normal channels following the drill.

OPERATIONS EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS

1. Arrive at the Plant Reference Simulator in sufficient time to allow for simulator start up and set up. Initial Conditions will be provided to the drill participants in the simulator at T = -30 (1500 hours).
2. Because this drill is a full participation exercise, a number of outside agencies will be participating. To allow for a proper evaluation of outside agencies, this scenario must closely follow a time line agreeable to regulatory agencies, as well as GPU Nuclear. In order to comply with the selected time line, certain contingency messages and scenario control features are necessary for this drill.
3. As part of the initial conditions, the control room staff will be informed that block valve RC-V-3 is closed to compensate for leakage past Pressurizer Spray Valve RC-V-1. A schedule for cycling RC-V-3 will be provided to them identifying that RC-V-3 must be cycled at 1535 hours. Should the control room staff neglect to cycle RC-V-3 at the specified time (T = 5 /1535 hours), read Contingency Message OE-1 to them. This message serves to identify a plant component failure and provides a scenario control function.
4. At approximately T = 25 (1555 hours), the Control Room staff should decide to shut down the plant once the primary to secondary leak rate is determined to be of sufficient magnitude to require such an action. If a shut down rate other than 1 % per minute is selected or if the decision is not made to shut down, read contingency Message OE-2 to the Emergency Director.
5. In order to control the drill parameters and the drill time line, read contingency Message OE-3 to the ECC staff at T = 150 (1800 hours) if a cool down rate other than 90 degrees per hour is selected. This will specify a cool down rate of 90 ± 10 degrees per hour.
6. After the plant cool down is initiated at approximately T = 160 (1830 hours), read Message OE-4 to the ECC staff. This message will inform them that decay heat is being controlled (frozen at 4%) and will not be at expected levels to allow the drill to meet exercise objectives.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1994

OPERATIONS EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

7. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to the proper storage location and the Simulator Control Room is returned to pre-drill conditions.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS

- Note 1:** Do not allow drill participants to enter actual contamination, airborne, or high radiation areas. Entry into a radiation area is acceptable provided the ALARA program is observed and entry into the area will enhance drill continuity and realism. Ensure all drill participants are signed on to a valid Radiation Work Permit before entering any actual RWP areas. Ensure observers and participants do not violate site radiological practices.
- Note 2:** Do not allow drill participants to actually manipulate, disassemble, or take readings on plant equipment. However, drill participants will be expected to work on "mock-ups" if provided.
- Note 3:** Ensure extreme caution is exercised in the vicinity of energized, rotating, moving, or hot equipment. Obey all safety rules.
- Note 4:** Applicable drawings and tech manual pages are provided only for the observers in the In Plant Rover Supplemental Information Package. Do not supply this information to drill participants unless otherwise directed.
- Note 5:** Do not allow drill participants to simulate procurement of tools, drawings, spare parts, etc.

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

- A. A reactor building purge is in progress.
- B. Pressurizer Spray Block Valve RC-V-3 is closed due to leakage through the Spray Valve RC-V-1. While this condition exists, the block valve is cycled every four hours to confirm operability. The next scheduled cycling of RC-V-3 is at T = J (1535 hours).
- C. "A" Make Up pump MU-P-1A is off but available.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

- D. "B" Make Up pump MU-P-1B is running and powered from the 1E 4160 volt bus.
- E. "C" Make Up pump MU-P-1C is out of service due to the discovery of a cracked shaft on the pump on April 04-10-94 at 0800. The pump is disassembled and a replacement shaft is being shipped to the site. Because two other Make Up pumps were available when MU-P-1C was taken out of service, the plant did not enter a Tech. Spec. time clock but a 30 day administrative time clock is in affect.

2. PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE ISOLATION VALVE RC-V-3

In accordance with the Initial Conditions, the Pressurizer Spray Line Block Valve is closed due to leakage through Spray Valve RC-V-1. In accordance with Technical Specifications, RC-V-3 is required to be cycled to ensure operability every four hours. The block valve was last cycled successfully at 1135 hours. At T = 5 (1535 hours), the Control Room Operators will be informed that the time to cycle RC-V-3 has elapsed and it must again be verified operable.

When Operations attempts to cycle RC-V-3, it will not respond. When an Emergency Repair Team is assembled to address the problem, follow them through the briefing, preparation and work process. All tools, parts, test equipment, and documentation (including prints, drawings, technical manuals, and procedures) that would be needed to actually trouble shoot the system must be produced at the job site by the Emergency Repair Team. Do not allow the team to actually open, troubleshoot, or take readings on the in-service switch gear.

Discussions regarding the motor operated valve control circuitry should take place at the 1B ES Control Center, Unit 10B. Have the Emergency Repair Team explain their trouble shooting process in detail using the applicable prints and drawings provided by the drill participants.

If the Emergency Repair Team takes the proper actions to

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

investigate the failure of the block valve to open, inform them that the control circuit is tripping on torque overload. Jammed valve internals are the source of the problem but this problem would not be detectable by the Emergency Repair Team without a reactor building entry and physically disassembling the valve.

3. PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK

A Primary to Secondary leak will commence in both Steam Generators at T = 15 (1545 hrs.). The leak rate is between 80 and 100 gallons per minute with 70% coming from the "A" OTSG and 30% coming from the "B" OTSG. The leak rate will be quantified at approximately 80 gallons per minute and a plant shut down will be initiated between T = 15 and T = 25. The steam generator leakage will increase to \approx 650 gpm at T = 165 (1815 hours) and the Sub Cooling Margin will decrease to less than 25 degrees. At T = 265 (2000 hours), the leak rate increases. The Sub Cooling Margin will become negative at T = 295 (2025 hours). The Sub Cooling Margin will be recovered (less than saturation temperature) at T = 320 (2050 hours).

4. MAKE UP PUMP MU-P-1A

When Operations attempts to start the "A" Make Up Pump at T = 165 (1815 hours), it will not start. If it is already running, it will trip at T = 165. Repeat attempts to start or restart the pump will not be successful.

If an Auxiliary Operator or Emergency Repair Team is tasked with investigating or rectifying the pump start failure, monitor the briefing and any preparations for the assignment. Any items needed to accomplish the task such as hand tools, test equipment, supplemental lighting, protective clothing, documentation (including drawings, prints, procedures, and technical manuals), or keys must be produced at the job site. Do not allow drill participants to actually manipulate, adjust, disassemble, open, take readings on, or work on plant equipment. Have the individuals involved explain in detail what they would do to investigate the problem. If they must operate a component,

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

the staff must be able to locate the device.

Discussions concerning the control circuit should take place at the 1D 4160 volt Switch Gear on the 338 foot 6 inch elevation of the Control Building. The "A" Make Up Pump is Unit 1D7.

Have the Emergency Repair Team explain their troubleshooting process in detail using the applicable prints and drawings provided by the drill participants. Any electrical test readings taken will result in normal values. As the team progresses through the trouble shooting process, they should investigate the possibility of a circuit breaker malfunction. When this avenue is investigated, inform the Emergency Repair Team that the breaker is mechanically binding if their actions/explanation would have revealed such a problem.

The Emergency Repair Team may elect to repair the circuit breaker, or replace it with a compatible unit. Possible sources for a replacement breaker include Unit 1D8 (for MU-P-1C which is presently powered from the 1E bus) or 1E 4160 volt Unit 1E8 (for the out of service MU-P-1C).

If the time is $T = 305$ (2035 hours) or later, repairs or replacements performed by the Emergency Repair Team will return the "A" Make Up Pump to service. If necessary to delay repair efforts until $T = 305$, contingency failures must be used. Difficulties in removing the circuit breaker from, or inserting the replacement breaker into the cabinet can be used. Misalignment, binding, or stripped rack-in components are some of the possibilities. Select contingency failures only as necessary to prevent the Make Up Pump from a return to service time earlier than $T = 305$. See "Miscellaneous" in these In-Plant Rover Instructions.

5. DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PUMP DH-P-1B

At $T = 165$ (1815 hours), the "B" Decay Heat Pump will also trip and attempts to restart the unit will be unsuccessful. Shortly after the trip, AMS-3 alarms will be received in the Auxiliary Building.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

When an Emergency Repair Team is assembled to investigate the loss of the "B" Decay Heat Pump, accompany them during their briefing and preparatory activities as well as on the job. All tools, test equipment, and documentation (such as prints, drawings, procedures, and technical manuals) necessary to actually perform the task must be produced by the team at the job site. Do not allow the participants to actually work on or take readings on the equipment.

Investigation of the control circuit should take place at the 1E 4160 Volt switch gear on the 338 foot 6 inch elevation of the Control Building. DH-P-1B is Unit 1E7. Teams may already be in the area for work involving MU-P-1A. Have the Emergency Repair Team explain in detail the process by which they would troubleshoot the problem. Prints and drawings, supplied by the drill participants, should be used. If they check the indicator flags, the unit will be discovered to have tripped on overload. Electrical readings will show normal voltage to be available. ϕ to ϕ readings will reveal normal resistance readings, as will ϕ to ground resistance readings. To obtain this information, the personnel must have the appropriate test equipment with leads, and the test equipment must be selected to the correct function and scale.

When the "B" Decay Heat Pump vault is approached, radiation levels will increase. Steam is seen issuing from the "B" Decay Heat Pump vault, significant enough to preclude the possibility of approach. This condition will exist for approximately ten minutes, or until the pump is successfully isolated by Operations. After pump isolation and steam dissipation, it may be decided to inspect the vault. Review Note 1 at the beginning of the In-Plant Rover Instructions. The entrance to DH-P-1B vault is located in an actual High Radiation Area and cannot be entered for drill purposes. If inspected, use prints and drawings and have the Emergency Repair Team explain their investigation. Obvious mechanical damage will be discovered at the pump. Bearing failure will have resulted in failure of the pump seals. Damage is obviously severe and cannot be repaired during the drill time frame

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

6. CORE FLOOD TANK CF-T-1A NITROGEN

At T = 155 (1805 hours), nitrogen pressure will be lost on the "A" Core Flood Tank. This will reduce the amount of water available to replace the reactor coolant volume which is lost due to cool down.

If an Auxiliary Operator or Emergency Repair Team is tasked with investigating or rectifying the loss of pressure, monitor the briefing and any preparations for the assignment. Any items needed to accomplish the task such as hand tools, test equipment, supplemental lighting, protective clothing, documentation (including drawings, prints, procedures, and technical manuals), keys, or ladders must be produced at the job site. Do not allow drill participants to actually manipulate, adjust, disassemble, open, take readings on, or work on plant equipment. Have the individuals involved explain in detail what they would do to investigate the loss of CF-T-1A pressure. If they must adjust a valve, the staff must demonstrate the ability to locate the valve. Increasing the nitrogen flow to the tank will not cause pressure to be regained in CF-T-1A, indicating that the nitrogen is being lost at a rate greater than can be made up. Because the nitrogen supply piping and leak in the piping or associated components are located inside the Reactor Building, it will not be probable that an entry into the reactor building will be made to determine the exact location of the leak.

Although unlikely, the staff may decide to send an Emergency Repair Team into the Reactor Building to attempt to find and correct the cause of the Core Flood Tank depressurization. If this is done, all preparatory actions must be performed by the support and entry teams. After donning the required protective clothing, stop the entry at the step-off pad at the entrance to the Reactor Building air lock. Then have the team explain the location of the valves and piping to be investigated. If this is done to your satisfaction, inform the individual(s) that the one inch nitrogen piping has sheared between valve CF-V-26A and CF-V-27A. Any further action will be discussed by the team and Observer but repairs will not be completed during the drill time frame.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

7. CORE FLOOD VALVE CF-V-4B

At approximately T = 155 (1805 hours) or when needed, the "B" Core Flood Tank check valve will fail to open. This will reduce the amount of water available to replace the reactor coolant which is lost because of the cool down. Although the valve will fail at T = 155, the plant staff will not be aware of a problem until RCS pressure is reduced to 600 psi. When CF-T-1B fails to flow water, it should be apparent that a problem exists with the check or block valve.

If an Auxiliary Operator or Emergency Repair Team is tasked with investigating or rectifying the inability to use the contents of CF-T-1B, monitor the briefing and any preparations for the assignment. Any items needed to accomplish the task such as hand tools, test equipment, supplemental lighting, protective clothing, documentation (including drawings, prints, procedures, and technical manuals), keys, or ladders must be produced at the job site. Do not allow drill participants to actually manipulate, adjust, disassemble, open, take readings on, or work on plant equipment.

Have the individuals involved explain in detail what they would do to investigate the lack of flow from CF-T-1B. Any troubleshooting outside the reactor building must include the ability to locate the components involved. Because the piping and components associated with the failure are located inside the Reactor Building, it will not be readily accessible. Although unlikely, the staff may decide to send an individual into the Reactor Building to attempt to investigate. If this is done, all preparatory actions must be performed by the support and entry teams. After donning the required protective clothing, stop the entry at the step-off pad at the entrance to the Reactor Building air lock. Then have the team explain the location of the relevant valves and procedures necessary to open them. Despite their best efforts, check valve CF-V-4B cannot be opened during the drill time frame.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

8. SEARCH AND RESCUE

When the accountability process is completed, one individual will be discovered to be missing. The individual will be found to be injured in the turbine building. Monitor the Search and Rescue Process. Due to the person's injuries, the plant staff will need to extricate him from a cat-walk. Personnel should be dispatched from the OSC to perform and/or assist with the rescue. The Safety and First Aid Observer will have responsibility for monitoring the rescue evolution.

9. MAKE UP PUMP MU-P-1B

At T = 265 (1955 hours), the "B" Make Up Pump will trip. Attempts to restart the pump, powered from either the 1E 4160 Volt bus or the 1D 4160 volt bus, will be unsuccessful.

When an Emergency Repair Team is assembled to investigate the loss of the "B" Make Up Pump, accompany them during their briefing and preparatory activities as well as on the job. All tools, test equipment, and documentation (such as prints, drawings, procedures, and technical manuals) necessary to actually perform the task must be produced by the team at the job site. Do not allow the drill participants to actually work on or take readings on the equipment.

Investigation of the control circuit should take place at the 1E 4160 Volt switch gear on the 338 foot 6 inch elevation of the Control Building. MU-P-1B is Unit 1E9 on the 1E 4160 (Unit 1D8 on 1D 4160). Teams may already be in the area due to continuing work on MU-P-1A and DH-P-1B. Have the Repair Team explain in detail the process by which they would troubleshoot the problem. Prints and drawings, supplied by the drill participants, should be used. If checked, the unit will be discovered to have tripped on over current. Electrical readings will show normal voltage to be available. Phase to ground readings will reveal normal resistance readings. Phase to phase resistance readings, however, will indicate a direct short between two phases.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

To obtain this information, personnel must have appropriate test equipment with leads, and the test equipment must be selected to the correct function and scale.

Pursuing the ϕ to ϕ short will reveal that the problem is not in the switch gear. Through a process of elimination, if the proper actions are explained in detail, the insulation break down will be traced to the motor itself. Testing at the motor lead connection box will confirm the motor to be unusable. As a motor rewind would not be possible during the drill time frame, MU-P-1B will not be returned to service.

10. DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PUMP DH-P-1A

When Operations attempts to start the "A" Decay Heat Pump at T = 265 (1955 hours), it will not start. Repeat attempts to start the pump will result in no response.

If an Auxiliary Operator or Emergency Repair Team is tasked with investigating or rectifying the pump start failure, monitor the briefing and any preparations for the assignment. Any items needed to accomplish the task such as hand tools, test equipment, supplemental lighting, protective clothing, documentation (including drawings, prints, procedures, and technical manuals), or keys must be produced at the job site. Do not allow drill participants to actually manipulate, adjust, disassemble, open, take readings on, or work on plant equipment. Review Note 1 at the beginning of the In-Plant Rover Instructions.

Have the individuals involved explain in detail what they would do to investigate the problem. If they must operate a component, the staff must be able to demonstrate the ability to locate the device.

Discussions concerning the control circuit should take place at the 1D 4160 volt Switch Gear on the 338 foot 6 inch elevation of the Control Building. The "A" Decay Heat Pump is Unit 1D6. A team may also be working in the adjacent breaker cubicle in an attempt to return MU-P-1A to service.

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Have the Emergency Repair Team explain their troubleshooting process in detail using the applicable prints and drawings provided by the drill participants. Any electrical test readings taken will result in normal values with the exception of the circuit down stream of the control fuses. The fuses will be found to be blown if the Emergency Repair Team has the relevant test equipment and test leads, the test equipment is selected to the correct function and scale, and describes the method used to check the fuse.

If the Repair Team can produce a compatible replacement fuse and the time is $T = 305$ (2035 hours) or later, the "A" Decay Heat Pump can be returned to service. If the Emergency Repair Team does not take any action to discover and correct the problem, DH-P-1A will remain out of service. If the repairs will be completed prior to $T = 305$, it will be necessary to introduce contingency delays. If significant time remains, the fuse holder can be broken when installing the replacement fuse. If a short time remains, the down stream fuse can also be found to be blown. A defective replacement fuse can also be discovered. Review the "Miscellaneous" section in these In-Plant Rover Instructions.

11. TURBINE BUILDING

Because of the Primary to Secondary Leak, any personnel entering or traversing the Turbine Building without proper protective clothing after $T = 301$ (2031 hours) will become contaminated in accordance with the Worker Contamination Report on page 9.18. AMS-3 alarms will activate in the building at $T = 301$ (2031). If evaluating personnel passing through the Turbine Building without the correct personnel protective clothing after $T = 301$, wait until they are monitored before informing them of their contamination.

12. INTERMEDIATE BUILDING

Because of the Primary to Secondary Leak, any personnel entering or traversing the Intermediate Building without proper protective clothing after $T = 301$ (2031 hours) will become contaminated in accordance with the Worker

IN PLANT ROVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Contamination Report on page 9.18. AMS-3 alarms will activate in the building T = 301 (2031 hours). If evaluating personnel passing through the Intermediate Building without the correct personnel protective clothing after T = 301, wait until they are monitored before informing them of their contamination.

13. MISCELLANEOUS:

In order to drive the drill toward the desired result and satisfy the drill objectives, it may be necessary to fail certain components and either prevent or further delay their return to service. To realistically control the Emergency Repair Team's progress toward success, the In-Plant Rover may need to resort to contingency situations. These can include but are not limited to, tools breaking or missing, torn protective clothing, failed respiratory protection equipment, rounded nut or bolt flats, sheared bolts, etc.

Do not allow any failed component to be returned to service earlier than specified in the drill time line without specific approval from the Plant Data Controller. However, due to extraordinary Emergency Repair Team efforts, it may be necessary to give the repair team credit for an expeditious repair and not allow the Simulator Control Room (ECC) or Operations Support Center to know of the component's availability until permitted by the drill time line or Drill Coordinator.

Annual Exercise
4/12/95

WORKER CONTAMINATION REPORT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TMI-1 <input type="checkbox"/> TMI-2																																																						
Name Inplant Worker	Time 2031 hrs	Date 4/12/95																																																							
<p>Describe cause of contamination:</p> <p>Use this data if a worker enters the Turbine or Intermediate Buildings without proper protective clothing after 2031 hrs.</p>																																																									
SURVEY DATA																																																									
By _____ Date _____ Time _____ Inst. _____																																																									
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SAFETY AND FIRST AID OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. This evolution will have two observers assigned. The primary observer will evaluate the response and the victim's comments will also be reviewed.
2. When the mustering and accountability process is completed, one individual will be discovered to be missing. This individual will be staged in the turbine building on the platform at the 344 foot 10 inch elevation, accessible from the ladder north-west of the high pressure turbine on the 355 foot elevation. The reason the person does not comply with the muster and accountability instructions is because he has a possible fracture of the right fibula. There is no page phone at this location and the person is unable to climb the ladder.
3. The estimated time the person will be found is at T = 215 (1905 hours). At this time, the Medical Department and TMI Volunteer EMS personnel should be dispatched to assist in the treatment of the injured worker. The worker will inform the plant staff that he slipped while descending the ladder and will complain of severe pain in his right lower leg, radiating to above the knee. Extreme tenderness is present at the injury site with discoloration noted. All other signs and symptoms, including vital signs, will be as read/seen. The patient is not contaminated and all measurements will be as read.
4. The patient will need to be extricated from the platform. At least three personnel on each shift have been trained in the use of the confined space rescue equipment, and the fire brigade has been trained to assist. The use of this equipment would be a logical choice when deciding how to extricate the victim. Other possibilities exist including use of the over-head crane, or even pure manpower. Whatever method is selected, patient care must be the priority factor in its application.
5. The observer is not to assist the rescue personnel in the decision or implementation process. Personnel skills and equipment capabilities will be evaluated, as will the ability to actually perform the task. Because of the nature of the evolution, either Observer (Safety Observer or

SAFETY AND FIRST AID OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

victim) will have absolute authority and responsibility to stop the evolution if the safety of any person, or the integrity of any plant component is about to be compromised.

6. Once the patient is extricated and packaged for transport, he is to be transported to a gate or door an ambulance would be able to access. Off-site EMS response will not be a part of this drill and the ambulance will be simulated. Once the patient reaches a protected area gate, this mini scenario is complete.

PUBLIC INFORMATION OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. When personnel respond to the Joint Information Center, provide the video tape for simulated Media Broadcast monitoring.
2. At T = 60 (1630 hrs.), call the ECC at 948-2069, 948-2070, or 948-2071 and read Message PI-1 to the individual answering the telephone. The caller is seeking information for a Traffax report. Record the instructions or response from the ECC staff member who should refer the caller to the Communications Division.
3. At T = 120 (1730 hrs.), call the ECC at 948-2070, 948-2071, or 948-2069 and read Message PI-2 to the individual answering the telephone. The caller is a television news show producer requesting permission to place a camera on site for real time footage of the emergency. The caller should be referred to the Communications Division.
4. At T = 240 (1930 hrs.), call the EOF at 948-8903, 657-0739, or 657-0471 and read Message PI-3 to the individual answering the phone. The caller is the Yard Master at the Summerdale Conrail Yard inquiring if his trains can safely pass the plant along the east shore rail lines. The Yard Master should be directed to contact the TMI Communications Division or County Emergency Management Agency.
5. At T = 330 (2100 hrs.), call the EOF at 657-0739, 657-0471, or 948-8903 and read Message PI-4 to the individual answering the telephone. The caller is a truck driver tasked with delivering fuel oil to Three Mile Island for the Auxiliary Boilers. He is concerned with his safety if he comes on the island. The caller should be directed to contact the Communications Division.
6. At the completion of the exercise, ensure the Joint Information Center is returned to pre-drill conditions.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

this or other security related activities as you see fit.

If the individual has been located prior to the initiation of the accountability process, restage the individual so that Search and Rescue is demonstrated.

5. Personnel completing their normal work day who are not directly involved in the drill will be allowed to exit the island.
6. The Emergency Assembly Area muster sheets will be given to a Site Protection Officer in accordance with the Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation procedure (EPIP-TMI-.36). Collect the muster sheets from Site Security and turn them in with your observer comments following the drill.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. An individual has been pre-designated to act as the missing person. He will wait in the turbine building on the platform at the 344 foot 10 inch elevation, accessible from the ladder north-west of the high pressure turbine on the 355 foot elevation. This person has been instructed not to manipulate any plant equipment and he is to remain inconspicuous. The individual will not respond to the muster and accountability instructions provided over the plant page system. He further understands the following items:
 - a. The person is not to respond to muster and accountability instructions.
 - b. The person should not answer if paged.
 - c. The person is not to evade security but stay in the location given above.
 - d. The individual is not to violate any security regulations such as piggybacking through key-carded doors.
2. The person staged to be the missing person will also test the "rescue" aspect of the Search and Rescue process. He will simulate a victim with a broken leg who is unable to climb the platform's exit ladder. It will be necessary for the plant staff to effect an extrication using the confined space rescue equipment. The Safety and First Aid Observer will be responsible for monitoring this process.
3. When a Site Area Emergency Accountability/Mustering is announced, observe the accountability process. Record the response of the Security Officer and if the information is forwarded to the AEOF.
4. The Accountability process should be completed around T = 200 (1850 hrs.). When the individual staged in the first instruction is discovered to be missing, observe Security's involvement in the Search and Rescue process. Once the individual has been located, the Safety Observer takes the lead responsibility for monitoring the rescue process. As the Security and Accountability Observer, you may monitor

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1994

OSC OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. At T = -30 (1500 hrs.), arrive at the OSC and review the Drill Ground Rules and Initial Conditions with the OSC personnel that are to be Drill Participants.
2. During this drill, a number of major plant components will fail. Monitor the response of the OSC staff in dealing with the multiple failures, the ability to devote appropriate resources to the situation, and the application of the correct priorities to each incident as set by the Emergency Director.

NOTE: Do not allow the staff to actually call out bargaining unit personnel.

3. At the completion of the exercise, collect all applicable drill paperwork (completed procedures, training attendance forms, etc.). Ensure all equipment is returned to the proper storage location and that the OSC is returned to pre-drill conditions.

EMERGENCY ASSEMBLY AND SITE EVACUATION OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Obtain a vehicle from Transportation before 1500 hours on Wednesday, April 12, 1995. Scheduled pick up time is 1300 hours on Wednesday.
2. Proceed to Warehouse 1 with the vehicle at T = 0 to observe the activation of the Emergency Assembly Area in accordance with procedure EPIP-TMI-.36. If the Emergency Director chooses Warehouse 3, proceed to Warehouse 3.
3. All nonessential personnel in Unit 1 and Unit 2 who are not exempt from the drill will participate in the muster and accountability process. Upon completion of the accountability process, the sweep of the outlying areas, and the mustering process, personnel not selected as evacuees for the drill may return to their normal duties with the exception of personnel working in the protected area.

Instruct the Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator to hold those personnel who work inside the protected area until released by the Drill Coordinator.

4. Before any individuals mustering at the Warehouse are released, read Message EA-1 to the Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator (EAAC). In order to ensure personnel are available to demonstrate the evacuation process, three individuals are provided for this purpose.
5. When the muster is complete, the muster sheets will be given to the Site Protection Officer in accordance with the Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation procedure (EPIP-TMI-.36). When the EAAC is finished with this procedure, collect the signed off copy of EPIP-IMP-.36 minus the muster sheets.
6. When the mini-evacuation is ordered by the Emergency Director, accompany the evacuees to the designated Remote Assembly Area.

EMERGENCY ASSEMBLY AND SITE EVACUATION OBSERVER
INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)


7. The evacuees will be monitored at the designated monitoring station in accordance with EPIP-IMP-.36. Two individuals will be found to be contaminated in accordance with the diagrams on pages 9.27 and 9.28 .

Note 1: The observer will place sealed radioactive sources (Coleman lantern mantles) on two of the evacuees to simulate contamination in accordance with the diagrams on pages 9.27 and 9.28 (where practicable).

Note 2: Provide the information on pages 9.27 and 9.28 as the monitoring is performed. Do not give these sheets to the monitors. Forms from the emergency kit are to be used by the drill participants.

8. The two contaminated individuals will be decontaminated at the AEC ' in accordance with EPIP-TMI-.36. Observe the decontamination process in cooperation with the AEOF Observer.
9. Individuals acting in the capacity of the pre-designated evacuees may remain at the AEOF for the duration of the drill after the monitoring process is complete, or they may go home at their option. The Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation Observer should assist the AEOF Observer in monitoring AEOF staff activities.
10. Return the company vehicle to Transportation after completion of the drill (scheduled for return no later than 1200 hours Thursday, April 13, 1995).

ANNUAL EXERCISE
4/12/95

Personnel Contamination Report			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TMI-1 <input type="checkbox"/> TMI-2																																												
Name <u>Evacuee #1</u>	Time <u>1915 hrs</u>	Date <u>4/12/95</u>																																													
Describe cause of contamination: Evacuee traversed plume during evacuation.																																															
SURVEY DATA																																															
By _____ Date _____ Time _____ Inst. _____																																															
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140	<100																																														
Remarks:																																															

ANNUAL EXERCISE

4/12/95

Personnel Contamination Report

☒ TMI-1☐ TMI-2

Name Evacuee #2

Time 1915 hrs

Date 4/12/95

Describe cause of contamination:

Evacuee traversed plume during evacuation.


SURVEY DATA

By _____

Date _____

Time _____

Inst. _____



SURVEY RESULTS (CPM)

Initial	Decon 1	Decon 2	Decon 3
900	400	230	<100
400	250	120	<100
800	400	200	<100
400	180	<100	
450	200	<100	

Remarks:

AEOF OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Proceed to the AEOF at Crawford Station at T = 0 (1530 hrs.) to observe the activation process. Unless specifically requested by the Emergency Director, personnel should not begin to man the facility until a Site Area Emergency is declared at approximately T = 150 (1800 hours).
2. Do not assist responding staff members with entrance to the facility through the motorized gate or locked front door. The AEOF staff members must demonstrate the ability to enter independent of help by non-AEOF staff members. The three Site Services Coordinators all have gate openers and keys for this purpose.
3. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency has indicated that they will actually send an Incident Response Team as part of this drill. For that reason, testing of the site access process by the AEOF Observer will not be performed. Should the NRC Incident Response Team arrive at the AEOF and require processing and badging, all activities by the AEOF staff are to be in accordance with EPIP-TMI-.32 and other applicable procedures. Monitor the process and record comments in your Observer Comments.
4. Any time around T = 280 (2010 hrs.), depending on the Remote Assembly Area selected, the contaminated evacuees from the plant should arrive at the AEOF. Monitor the decontamination process to ensure compliance with procedure 6610-ADM-4330.02, "Personnel Contamination Monitoring and Decontamination". The Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation Observer is available to monitor the decontamination process if other AEOF activities require your attention.

Note 1: All parts of the decontamination process must be performed except showering and the actual removal of clothing.

Note 2: Refer to pages 9.27 and 9.28 for the number of times each person must be decontaminated and the levels of contamination involved.

AEOF OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)

Note 3: Coleman lantern mantles are used (where appropriate) to simulate contamination.

5. At T = 345 (2115 hours), read Message AE-1 to the Site Services Coordinator. The Emergency Support Director is requesting the AEOF staff to obtain a mobil unit capable of filling Self Contained Breathing Apparatus cylinders. Monitor the ability of the staff to locate such a unit. Most businesses will be closed by this time and the staff will not be able to make contact with a vendor. The most likely source would be to forward the request to the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency. They have a listing of resources and control dispatch fire department units capable of satisfying the need. Do not allow AEOF staff personnel to actually contact businesses, the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency, or fire companies for the compressor unit. Have the staff explain how they would obtain a mobil compressor unit capable of supplying breathing air. Ensure the AEOF staff does not contact the EOF or Emergency Support Director with the results of their search as this mini scenario affects only the AEOF.
6. Numerous plant components will fail during this drill which may exhaust the supply of on-site personnel available for Emergency Repair Teams. The AEOF staff should be expected to be requested to supply supplemental personnel for repair activities. Verify the staff's knowledge of the location of the personnel telephone number listing at the AEOF. Do not allow bargaining unit personnel to be contacted or called out for this drill.
7. The Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation Observer is available to assist you in monitoring AEOF activities once the evacuees have been decontaminated.
8. At the completion of the exercise, ensure all equipment is returned to the proper storage location and the AEOF is returned to pre-drill conditions. Ensure all personnel have exited the facility and it is secured. Ensure the automatic gate closes before departing the area.

TSC OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Arrive at the Technical Support Center at T = -30 (1500 hrs.) to set up the data link to the Simulator. Observe the TSC activation process when the Initial Response Emergency Organization is called out. Depending on the time required to identify and declare the event, the TSC personnel could begin to man the facility any time around T = 25 (1555 hours.).
2. During the course of the drill, multiple equipment failures will be experienced. As well as taxing the personnel manning the Emergency Repair Teams, TSC Engineers will undoubtedly be requested to assist in returning equipment to service or provide suggestions for backup equipment. Monitor the response to these demands.
3. After the plant cool down is initiated at approximately T = 160 (1830 hours), read Message TSC-1 to the TSC staff. This message will inform them that decay heat is being controlled (frozen at 4%) and will not be at expected levels to allow the drill to meet exercise objectives.
4. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to its proper storage location and the TSC is returned to pre-drill conditions.

EOF CONTROLLER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Arrive at the EOF any time around T = 0 (1530 hours), to observe the activation process. Personnel should not man the facility until they are called out upon declaration of the Site Area Emergency at approximately T = 150 (1800 hrs.) unless the Emergency Director orders an earlier activation.
2. During the course of the drill, several events will occur, that, in reality, could require off-site assistance. Calls are to be simulated with the exception of the emergency off site notification process and calls to PEMA regarding the site evacuation process. A similar instruction is included in the Communications Observer Instructions.
3. At T = 210 (1900 hours), read Message EOF-1 to the Emergency Support Director. You will be playing the part of a member of the Emergency Support Organization whose fitness-for-duty status is questionable. The Emergency Support Director should direct the Emergency Preparedness Representative to administer a blood alcohol concentration test in accordance with Procedure EPIP-TMI-.27, Exhibit 9A, "Emergency Operations Facility Fitness for Duty Determination Instructions". For the purposes of the drill, all tests administered will result in a zero percent blood alcohol concentration.
4. The Public Information Observer will call the EOF at T = 240 (1930 hours) with Message PI-3. The caller will play the role of Summerdale Conrail Yard Master. The yard master is calling to inquire if it is safe to send rail cars down the tracks along the east side of the river near Three Mile Island. The caller should be directed to the Communications Division or the Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency.
5. At T = 330 (2100 hours), the Public Information Observer will call the EOF with Message PI-4 in the role of an oil truck driver. The driver is assigned a delivery of fuel oil the Three Mile Island for the boilers but is concerned for his safety. Monitor the conversation to see if the caller is properly directed to the Communications Division or is given guidance regarding site access.

EOF CONTROLLER INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)


6. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency has indicated that they will actually send an Incident Response Team as part of this drill. If they elect to do so, actual NRC personnel could arrive at the TMI emergency response facilities. Response to team activities should be in accordance with established procedures. Individuals requiring site access who do not possess a TMI security badge should be processed through the AEOF. Monitor the interaction between the Incident Response Team and the EOF staff and record comments in your Observer Comments.
7. If dose projections, Protective Action Recommendations, etc. are in progress, do not allow items 3, 4, and 5 to reduce your attention to the monitoring of the more significant items in the drill. Regardless of the items being observed however, do not allow calls to be placed to outside entities as specified in the instructions above.
8. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to its proper storage location and the EOF is returned to pre-drill conditions.

EOF TECHNICAL SUPPORT OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS


1. Arrive at the Emergency Operations Facility at T = -30 (1500 hours) to set up the data link to the Simulator. Observe the EOF activation process when the Emergency Support Organization is called out. Depending on the time required to identify and declare an event, the EOF personnel could begin to man the facility any time after T = 150 (1800 hours), or sooner if the Emergency Director so directs.
2. After the plant cool down is initiated at approximately T = 160 (1830 hours), read Message TS-1 to the EOF Tech Support staff. This message will inform them that decay heat is being controlled (frozen at 4%) and will not be at expected levels to allow the drill to meet exercise objectives. Ensure all functional areas are aware of this control feature.
3. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to its proper storage location and the EOF is returned to pre-drill conditions.

PARSIPPANY TECH FUNCTIONS CENTER OBSERVER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Arrive at the Tech Functions Center any time around T = 15 (1545 hours) to observe the PTFC activation process when the staff is called out. Depending on the time required to identify and declare an event, the personnel could begin to man the facility any time after T = 250 (1555 hrs.).
2. After the plant cool down is initiated at approximately T = 160 (1830 hours), and as PTFC staff members arrive, read Message TF-1 to the personnel. This message will inform them that decay heat is being controlled (frozen at 4%) and will not be at expected levels to allow certain drill objectives to be met. Be certain the various functional areas are all aware of this drill control feature.
3. At the completion of the drill, ensure all equipment is returned to its proper storage location and the PTFC is returned to pre-drill conditions.



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ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGES / ANNOUNCEMENTS

Unless provided in this section, normal plant procedures will be used to make announcements. All announcements and messages shall be preceded and ended with the statement:

"THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL."

CALL OUT

- ☐ LEVEL 1 Onshift
☐ LEVEL 2 Initial Response Emergency Organization & Onshift
☐ LEVEL 3 Emergency Support Organization & Initial Response Emergency Organization & Onshift

DRILL USE ONLY - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

- ☐ This is a drill. This is a drill. ☐ This is NOT a drill. This is NOT a drill.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

- ☐ An Unusual Event has been declared ☐ A Site Area Emergency has been declared
☐ An Alert has been declared ☐ A General Emergency has been declared
☐ The event has been terminated

at _____ hours on _____
Emergency Classification Time *Emergency Classification Date*

- This represents: ☐ An initial Classification Status ☐ An escalation in Classification Status
☐ No change in Classification Status ☐ A reduction in Classification Status

EVENT DESCRIPTION

There is: ☐ No abnormal radioactive ☐ An abnormal radioactive airborne ☐ An abnormal radioactive liquid release to the environment as a result of this emergency.

MUSTER/EVACUATION

ALL PRE-DESIGNATED EVACUEES

- (Select one) ☐ Remain at your stations and await further instructions.
☐ In radiologically controlled areas, report to the Rad-Con access point, and those outside radiologically controlled areas, REPORT TO: (A or B or "for evacuation C")
☐ Your supervisor and await further instructions

(Muster) Required for Site Area emergency.

- B ☐ Warehouse 1 ☐ Warehouse 3 ☐ describe route, if applicable

(Evacuation) Required for General Emergency.

- C ☐ AEOF (Crawford Station) ☐ Training Center
via (describe route) _____
using the ☐ North Bridge ☐ South Bridge ☐ North and South Bridge
Assemble with your supervisor and await further instructions.

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION

- ☐ Shelter ☐ Evacuate _____ mile radius
☐ Shelter ☐ Evacuate _____ miles downwind in the affected and adjacent sectors (circled below):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Wind direction is from _____ and the wind speed is _____ miles per hour.

RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUCTIONS

(Required for radiological events)

- (Select one) ☐ No smoking, drinking, or eating until further notice.
☐ Sound station emergency alarm

- ☐ This is a drill. This is a drill. ☐ This is NOT a drill. This is NOT a drill.

Approved - ED

CALL OUT

- ☐ LEVEL 1 Onshift
☐ LEVEL 2 Initial Response Emergency Organization & Onshift
☐ LEVEL 3 Emergency Support Organization & Initial Response Emergency Organization & Onshift

DRILL USE ONLY - GENERAL EMERGENCY

- ☐ This is a drill. This is a drill.
 ☐ This is **NOT** a drill. This is **NOT** a drill.

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

- ☐ An Unusual Event has been declared
☐ An Alert has been declared
☐ A Site Area Emergency has been declared
☐ A General Emergency has been declared
☐ The event has been terminated

at _____ hours on _____
Emergency Classification Time *Emergency Classification Date*

- This represents:
 ☐ An initial Classification Status
 ☐ An escalation in Classification Status
☐ No change in Classification Status
 ☐ A reduction in Classification Status

EVENT DESCRIPTION

There is: ☐ No abnormal radioactive
 ☐ An abnormal radioactive airborne
 ☐ An abnormal radioactive liquid release to the environment as a result of this emergency.

MUSTER/EVACUATION

All non-essential personnel

- (Select one) ☐ Remain at your stations and await further instructions.
☐ In radiologically controlled areas, report to the Rad-Con access point, and those outside radiologically controlled areas, REPORT TO: _____ or _____ for evacuation (C)
☐ Your supervisor and await further instructions

(Muster) Required for
 Site Area emergency.

- ☐ Warehouse 1 ☐ Warehouse 3 Describe route, if applicable:
 via _____

(Evacuation)
 Required for General
 Emergency.

☐ SITE EVACUATION IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS DRILL
 EXCEPT FOR PRE-DESIGNATED EMPLOYEES
 SITE EVACUATION IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS DRILL
 EXCEPT FOR PRE-DESIGNATED EMPLOYEES

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION

- ☐ Shelter ☐ Evacuate _____ mile radius
☐ Shelter ☐ Evacuate _____ miles downwind in the affected and adjacent sectors (circled below):
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Wind direction is from _____ and the wind speed is _____ miles per hour.

RADIOLOGICAL INSTRUCTIONS

(Required for radiological events)

- (Select one) ☐ No smoking, drinking, or eating until further notice.
☐ Sound station emergency alarm

- ☐ This is a drill. This is a drill.
 ☐ This is **NOT** a drill. This is **NOT** a drill.

Approved - ED

EXHIBIT 6 (Cont'd)

ANNUAL EXERCISE
APRIL 12, 1995

This form is completed by the Emergency Director Assistant and approved by the Emergency Director. This form directs the evacuation and informs Dauphin County and PEMA of the evacuation to a Remote Assembly Area (RAA).

Given to Dauphin County and PEMA, before the Evacuation for a Site Area Emergency / or optional evacuation ordered by the Emergency Director.

MESSAGE 1: Approximately _____ non-essential personnel will be evacuating the TMI site (number)

to the (Select one) ☐ Crawford Station (AEJF).
☐ Training Center

using the following route _____

via the (Select one) ☐ North Bridge
☐ South Bridge
☐ North and South Bridge

Traffic Control will / will not be needed.
(Select one)

XX

PLANT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT

☐ 1. Turn on Whelen speakers.

READ MESSAGE SLOWLY

MESSAGE 2: Attention all personnel. Attention all personnel. All non-essential personnel report:
(Read shadowed information from above)

Assemble with your supervisor and await further instructions.

REPEAT MESSAGE

☐ 2. Turn off Whelen speakers.

Approved: _____ Date: _____

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-1 T = 0 / 1530 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Drill Controllers, Observers, Participants

HOW GIVEN: Plant Page System

MESSAGE: ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

The time is now T = 0. All drill participants issued
radios switch to Channel 5. All drill participants issued
radios switch to Channel 5.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: OE-1* T = 5 / 1535 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Operations Evaluator

TO: Control Room Staff

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Cycle RC-V-3.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes a Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: OE-2* T = 25 / 1555 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Operations Evaluator

TO: Control Room Staff

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Commence a reactor shutdown at 1% per minute.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-2* T = 45 / 1615 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Emergency Director

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

 Declare an ALERT.

 THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes a Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: PI-1 T = 60 / 1630 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Public Information Observer

TO: ECC Staff Member

HOW GIVEN: By Te [REDACTED] (dial 948-2069, 948-2070, or 948-2071)

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Hello. This is Charles Duryea in the Traffax Command Center. We picked up on our monitors that you are having an emergency at Three Mile Island. Will this have any effect on traffic along Route 441?

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: PI-2 T = 120 / 1730 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Public Information Observer

TO: ECC Staff Member

HOW GIVEN: By Telephone (dial 948-2070, 948-2071, or 948-2069)

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Hi. My name is Ansel Adams. I'm the news director at television station W-U-P-S. We've been monitoring the emergency at Three Mile Island and would like to give our viewing audience better coverage. Is there some way we could set up at least one camera for a remote feed from inside the plant? If you want, we can set it up and leave, without the need for an operator to be left behind. How soon can we get some live coverage on the air?

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: OE-3* T = 150 / 1800 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Operations Evaluator

TO: ECC Staff

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Cool down at $90^{\circ} \pm 10^{\circ}$ per hour.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes a Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: OE-4 T = 160 / 1810 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Operations Evaluator

TO: ECC Staff

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Decay Heat is being controlled. It will not be at
expected levels.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: TSC-1 T = 160 / 1810 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: TSC Observer

TO: TSC Staff

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Decay Heat is being controlled. It will not be at
expected levels.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: TS-1 T = 160 / 1810 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: EOF Tech Support Observer

TO: EOF Tech Support Staff (all functional groups)

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Decay Heat is being controlled. It will not be at
expected levels.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: TF-1 T = 160 / 1810 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: PTFC Observer

TO: PTFC Staff (all functional groups)

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Decay Heat is being controlled. It will not be at
expected levels.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-3* T = 180 / 1830 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Emergency Director

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

 Declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

 THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes a Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: EA-1 T = 190 / 1840 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Emergency Assembly and Site Evacuation Observer

TO: Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Assemble three individuals to demonstrate the site evacuation process. Three individuals have already been recruited to act as the evacuees.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: EOF-1 T = 210 / 1900 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: EOF Controller

TO: Emergency Support Director

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Hey. I had a couple of low alcohol beers when I got home from work. I don't believe I'm impaired, but I know I'm supposed to report this.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-4 T = 220 / 1910 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Emergency Director

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Instruct the Emergency Assembly Area Coordinator to
initiate the mini evacuation.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: PI-3 T = 240 / 1930 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Public Information Observer

TO: EOF Staff Member

HOW GIVEN: By Telephone (dial 948-8903, 657-0739, or 657-0471)

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Hi. This is the Conrail Yard Master at Summerdale. We understand you're having an emergency down there and I was wondering if it's safe to send trains down the tracks along the east shore, past your power plant. Is it?

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-5* T = 300 / 2030 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Emergency Director

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

 Declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY.

 THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

* Denotes a Contingency Message. See your Observer Instructions.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: PI-4 T = 330 / 2100 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Public Information Observer

TO: EOF Staff Member

HOW GIVEN: By Telephone (dial 657-0739, 657-0471, or 948-8903)

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

Yeah. My name is Mack Thermodyne. I'm supposed to deliver a load of fuel oil to Three Mile Island but the radio is full of news about an emergency down there. Should I deliver my oil? Can you guarantee my safety?

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: AE-1 T = 345 / 2115 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: AEOF Observer

TO: Site Services Coordinator

HOW GIVEN: Verbally

MESSAGE: THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

The Emergency Support Director wants you to find a mobil unit capable of refilling Self Contained Breathing Apparatus tanks with breathing air. Show me how you would determine a source. Do not call the EOF. Give all information to me.

THIS IS A DRILL. THIS IS A DRILL.

ANNUAL EXERCISE
April 12, 1995

MESSAGE: DC-6 T = 390 / 2200 Hours
 Scenario/ Clock

FROM: Drill Coordinator

TO: Drill Participants/Controllers/Observers

HOW GIVEN: Plant Page and Telephone (See Observer Instructions)

MESSAGE: ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL.

The drill is terminated. The drill is terminated.

DRILL GROUND RULES

1. Approach and perform all tasks with the same attitude, professionalism, and enthusiasm as if the situation were real. Do not assume that certain actions are unimportant because "THIS IS ONLY A DRILL". All actions are to be performed and not simulated, unless the action will result in personnel harm, damage to plant equipment or change the actual plant status.
(For example:
 - 1) Procurement of repair parts via a vendor or warehouse,
 - 2) Troubleshooting a failed component by use of test equipment,
 - 3) Checking for a pulse and breathing on a simulated injured unconscious person).

Although a task may appear to be redundant, inconvenient or a waste of materials, the task should still be performed in that it provides a realistic sense of timing and assures the observer that the action can and will be performed during actual accident (emergency) conditions.

2. Actually sign-off procedures as actions are performed, unless otherwise directed. Used procedures will be replaced following the drill. To minimize conflict between drill conditions and actual plant status precede and end communications with
"THIS IS A DRILL! THIS IS A DRILL!"
(This is to include the plant page, radio and intercom as a minimum.) Off site notifications and emergency personnel call outs are actually performed.

3. Ensure that observers are aware of your activity by verbalizing your actions (For example: procedures used, actions initiated, personnel contacted, decisions made, etc.). Let the observer know WHAT you are doing, WHY you are doing it, HOW you will do it and WHAT procedures you will use. This will promote a more accurate observer evaluation.

Plant data is provided to selected emergency response facilities (TSC, EOF, PTFC) via data links to CRT's from the Plant Reference Simulator. If Simulator indications are questionable, check with the facility observer or Plant Data Controller to validate the indications prior to taking actions.

If in doubt, ASK.

DRILL GROUND RULES (Continued)

4. Prompting by drill observers is not allowed. Observers will only provide information which is normally available by visible or audible inspection. (For example: meter readings but not historical trends, instruments currently alarming, etc.)
5. Obey all plant page announcements. For example, do not eat, drink or smoke after the "no eating, drinking or smoking" announcement is made. Unless otherwise announced, personnel muster and accountability will be performed for nonexempt personnel. Site evacuation will be demonstrated using only designed individuals, unless otherwise announced.

Additionally, Radiological Controls and Security requirements are to be followed.

This means: 1) Do not violate drill Rad Con barriers,



2) Follow Rad Con instructions (e.g., wearing respirators and/or PC's),

3) Do not violate Security procedures (i.e., piggybacking, etc.)


6. Drills are run from the Simulator. Therefore, calls normally made to the Control Room are to be directed to the Simulator Control Room, if they pertain to the drill. During the drill, the Simulator is accessible by Plant page (use the red button), radio (Channel 5) and telephone (948-2069, 948-2070, 948-2071, or 948-2063 [RAC]).
7. **The DRILL RWP for 1995 is # 97380.**

The following is a breakdown, by discipline and number, of personnel working on a randomly selected shift for the 1995 First Quarter Drill. This is the maximum number that will be allowed to participate at the beginning of the drill. Any number between this maximum and the minimum on-shift staffing level required by the Emergency Plan is acceptable. FOR THIS DRILL response for "BEEPER" paged individuals will be delayed for ≈ 35 minutes, 'simulating' a 7:00 PM start time. This is an assumed average response time for emergency responders that are not at work. Response time is from BEEPER activation.

Section	Breakdown	Total Number
Security	SPSS - ** SSPO - ** SPO - **	Max. number of Security Personnel (SPO) immediately available for this drill has been provided to Security Management
Warehouse	Stockkeeper B -2	2
TMI-1 Ops	SS -1 SF -2 CRO -4 AO - 6	13
TMI-1 Rad Waste	Supr -1 Tech -3	4
TMI-1 Chemistry	Tech -1	1
TMI-1 Rad Con	GRCS -1 Tech -4	5
TMI-1 Maintenance	Supr -1 Tool room -1 I & C -3 Repair -2 Machine -2 Electric -2	11
Utility	Utility -4 Util/Janitor -0	4
STA	STA -1	1
Misc.	QA -0	0



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Filed

Social
Security
Number

Exam
P/F/I/E

Grade
(%)

Printed Name

Signature

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Method of Evaluation

- ☐ Written (Category Type _____)
☐ Oral
☐ Practical Factor
☐ Other _____

- ☐ TCR
☐ Blank Exam
☐ Exam Key
☐ Student Exam

Attachments

- ☐ Exam Cover Sheet
☐ Seating Chart
☐ Other _____

Instructor Comments _____

I hereby acknowledge that the persons listed on this Training Attendance Form have attended the indicated training as specified.

Submitted by _____
Signature

Social Security Number

Date

-OR-

Instructor Signature

SSN on front

Date

Mode Format

Basic prin sim	(BPS)	On-the-job	(DJT)
Correspondence	(CCS)	Originator	(ORG)
Drill	(DRL)	On-shift training	(OST)
Examination	(EXM)	Replica sim	(RPS)
Film	(FLM)	School	(SCH)
Laboratory	(LAB)	Seminar	(SEM)
Lecture	(LEC)	Videotape	(VTP)

Date Format Status Format

MM/DD/YY
Example: 01/21/89

Active (A)
Complete (C)
Make up (M)

Grade Format

Pass (P)
Fail (F)
Incomplete (I)

Actual Hours Format

XXX.X
Example: 40.0

Office Use Only

Received

Entered

Filed

Date _____ Initials _____

Date _____ Initials _____

Date _____ Initials _____

Program No. 10.6.01

Title EMERGENCY PLAN DRILL (95-03)

Cycle/Week	N/A
------------	-----

Location TMI

Unit 1 Group No.

Course No. 006

Course Occurrence Status (A/C) _____

Course Revision _____ Course Completion Date _____

Course Description ANNUAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE

Lesson No. AD

Taken Date _____ Lesson Status (C/M) _____

Lesson Revision _____ Lesson Plan No. _____ Instructor SSN _____ - _____

Actual Hours _____ Mode DRL Lesson Completion Date 04/12/95

Lesson Description ANNUAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE 1995, DRILL 95-03

Social
Security
Number

Exam
P/F/I/E

Grade
(%)

Printed Name

Signature

* * * * *

*** Make entry for this column only if directed by instructor.

See reverse for Mode, Date, Status, Grade and Actual hours format.

N 2071

Social
Security
Number

Exam
P/F/I/E

Grade
(%)

Printed Name

Signature

Method of Evaluation

- ☐ Written (Category Type _____)
☐ Oral
☐ Practical Factor
☐ Other _____

- ☐ TCR
☐ Blank Exam
☐ Exam Key
☐ Student Exam

Attachments

- ☐ Exam Cover Sheet
☐ Seating Chart
☐ Other _____

Instructor Comments _____

I hereby acknowledge that the persons listed on this Training Attendance Form have attended the indicated training as specified.

Submitted by _____
Signature

Social Security Number

Date

-OR-

Instructor Signature

SSN on front

Date

		Mode Format	
Basic prin sim	(BPS)	On-the-job	(OJT)
Correspondence	(CCS)	Originator	(ORG)
Drill	(DRL)	On-shift training	(OST)
Examination	(EXM)	Replica sim	(RPS)
Film	(FLM)	School	(SCH)
Laboratory	(LAB)	Sammar	(SEM)
Lecture	(LEC)	Videotape	(VTP)

Date Format Status Format
MM/DD/YY
Example: 01/21/89

Grade Format
Pass (P)
Fail (F)
Incomplete (I)

Active (A)
Complete (C)
Make up (M)

Actual Hours Format
XXX.X
Example: 40.0

OBSERVERS NAME: _____

NOTE:

Please take the time to write constructive and positive comments, as well as deficiencies. For each deficiencies write a recommendation to correct the problem and identify the appropriate priority for the deficiency.

PRIORITY 1 This item is a regulatory or safety issue and must be resolved in no more than 15 working days.

PRIORITY 2 This item involves Emergency Preparedness Program corrections and must be resolved in no more than 45 days.

PRIORITY 3 This item involves significant improvements to the Emergency Preparedness Program and is to be resolved in no more than 90 days.

PRIORITY 4 This item involves minor procedure enhancements to the EP program and should be included in the next scheduled substantive procedure change or during the annual review, whichever comes first.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OBSERVERS NAME: _____

[illegible]

OBSERVERS NAME: _____

[illegible]

EMERGENCY DRILL
OBSERVER SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SHEET
(OPTIONAL)

OBSERVERS NAME: _____

[illegible]

OBSERVERS NAME: _____

[illegible]