NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Division Two Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	1 2	8 4	8 4	0 0 4	0 0	0 3	0 6	8 4	Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
R. KOENIG	AREA CODE 8 1 5 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
X	J M	0 0 F U	Z 9 9 9	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	XX NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 12, 1984, at 0707 hours, a division two isolation signal was received on Unit 2. PCIS groups 1 thru 7 were actuated (except for the MSIV's). This also caused a secondary containment isolation, Units 1 and 2, and both standby gas treatment systems to start (Unit 1 was restored within 1 hour).

The cause of this occurrence was attributed to an electrical fuse blowing on the DC inboard isolation logic, in panel 2PA14J. This fuse blowing had the same effect as if the "D" manual isolation pushbutton were depressed.

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 reactor was in refuel, and Unit 1 reactor at approximately 85% power. The consequences of this event were minimal since Unit 2 has not yet been critical, and primary containment has never been established.

The blown fuse was replaced at the 2PA14J panel. All Division 2 isolations were reset back to normal with the reactor building ventilation and standby gas treatment system secured. No reason for the fuse blowing can be determined.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
LASALLE COUNTY STATION	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4	8 4	— 0 0 4	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 12, 1984, at 0707 hours, a division two isolation signal (JM) was received on Unit 2. PCIS groups 1 through 7 were actuated (except for the MSIV's). This also caused a secondary containment isolation which includes both Units 1 and 2, and both standby gas treatment systems (BH) started (Unit 1 was restored back to normal within 1 hour).

II. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was attributed to an electrical fuse blowing on the DC inboard isolation logic, in panel 2PA14J. This fuse blowing had the same effect as if the "D" manual isolation pushbutton were depressed.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 reactor was in refuel and Unit 1 reactor was at approximately 85% power. The consequences of this event were minimal, since Unit 2 has not yet been critical, and primary containment has never been established. Had Unit 2 been in operation, producing power, the system isolations may have caused the unit operator to shutdown the unit due to loss of containment coolers (KM) and loss of cooling water (CC) to the reactor recirculation pumps. Loss of the reactor building ventilation (VA) may have caused excessive steam tunnel temperatures if the isolation had remained in effect for a long period.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The blown fuse was replaced at the 2PA14J panel. All division two isolations were reset back to normal, the reactor building ventilation started, and standby gas system secured. No reason for the fuse blowing can be determined.

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

No previous occurrences of division two isolation due to loss of a fuse have occurred on Unit Two as of this date.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER:

R. D. Koenig, 815/357-6761, extension 292.

Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

March 6, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-004-00, Docket #050-374 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G J. Diederich
Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/GW/psk

Enclosure

cc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

IE22
1/1