



BOSTON EDISON

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Rocky Hill Road
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Roy A. Anderson
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

January 13, 1992
BECO Ltr. 92- 002

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Docket No. 50-293
License No. DPR-35


Subject: Special Report - Inoperable Electric Fire Pump

Dear Sir:

This special report is being submitted in accordance with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification 3.12.B.a. The report is required because the Fire Suppression System Electric Fire Pump (EFP) was declared inoperable on December 14, 1991 at 0817 hours and could not be returned to an operable status within seven days. The EFP was declared inoperable as a result of an electrical fault in the motor controller. Refer to Attachment I for further details.

During the time the EFP is inoperable, it may still be started manually. A new motor starting circuit is being procured. The Diesel Fire Pump is operable and capable of auto starting.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions regarding this subject.


R. A. Anderson

JC/bal

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
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ATTACHMENT I

Boston Edison Company
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

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The water supply to the Fire Suppression System is delivered by either the Diesel Fire Pump (DFP) or the Electric Fire Pump (EFP). The DFP is redundant to the EFP and is available for standby and emergency use (loss of AC power). The EFP and DFP are each rated at 2000 gallons per minute (gpm) and discharge to the common 12" Fire Suppression System header.

The EFP was declared inoperable on December 14, 1991 at 0817 hours when an electrical fault in the motor controller caused a failure of the controller air circuit breaker. Operations personnel were performing the weekly surveillance test, Procedure 8.3.1 "Fire Pump Test". Failure and Malfunction Report 91-524 was written to document the problem in the EFP motor controller circuit.

Weekly surveillance testing of the DFP has been conducted satisfactorily during the time period the EFP has been inoperable. As the motor controller was original plant equipment, repair parts are not readily available. The Nuclear Engineering Department is working on a modification to replace the controller panel. As an interim measure, a temporary modification (TM 91-64) to the motor controller was installed on December 20, 1991. This modification allows manual starting of the EFP by shutting the supply breaker. This temporary modification will continue to keep the EFP available until a new motor controller can be procured.

Further, the Pilgrim Station fire truck is available for backup service if necessary. Measures taken in response to the problem are consistent with Procedure Number 2.4.54, "Loss of all Fire Suppression Pumps or Loss of Redundancy in the Fire Water Supply System". The procedure outlines immediate and subsequent operator actions that include measures to be taken when a loss in redundancy of the Fire Suppression System pumps occurs.

The measures are commensurate with the degree of loss of redundancy and are determined by the Watch Engineer in consultation with the Fire Protection and Prevention Officer (FPPO) or designee.