



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OI/B NO. 3150-0104  
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At approximately 0510 hours on February 10, 1984, the reactor tripped from 18% power due to a turbine trip on low discharge pressure of the shaft-driven oil pump. A plant restart was in progress at the time from a Hot Standby condition following a previous reactor trip on February 9, 1984 (reference LER 84-010).

The motor suction pump (MSP) on the turbine oil system had not been started prior to increasing turbine speed, and the turbine trip subsequently occurred upon reaching the interlock speed of 1300 RPM. The MSP is used to supply the main oil pump with a positive suction pressure until the turbine reaches approximately 90% of rated speed. The cause of the trip was procedural inadequacy in not verifying the operation of the MSP prior to plant restart from Hot Standby.

Plant response subsequent to the reactor trip was normal. Following the trip, steam loads were reduced in an attempt to minimize cooldown since there was minimal decay heat (pressurizer pressure was 2120 psig, Tav<sub>g</sub> was 545° and pressurizer level was less than 17%). Plant parameters indicated that cooldown was continuing so the Shift Supervisor directed the closure of the MSIV's, and the cooldown was stopped. When Tav<sub>g</sub> had returned to 557°, Operations personnel inadvertently opened the "A" MSIV instead of the bypass valve during warmup of the main steam headers. Main steam line "A" pressure was subsequently reduced to at least 97 psi below the "B" and "C" steam lines. The differential pressure between steam lines was sensed by the Engineered Safety Feature instrumentation which initiated an SI at 0537 hours. Operations personnel terminated the SI (total injection of 2,340 gallons) after verifying plant parameters. The cause of the inadvertent SI is attributed to personnel error. The operator mistakenly operated the wrong switch which is directly above the MSIV bypass valve control switch.

The Plant remained in Mode 3 until various hardware related repairs could be completed. The inadequate system operating procedure was revised on February 10, 1984, to prevent a potential recurrence of the turbine trip. The revision requires that the MSP operation be verified prior to increasing turbine speed.

The personnel error which initiated the inadvertent SI is considered to be an isolated incident. Corrective actions are addressed in the Plant Manager's review of the events and are documented in an Action Plan for Improved Reliability dated February 10, 1984. These actions are being taken to reduce future personnel errors.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 764

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

March 8, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
LER 84-011

Dear Sir:

Please find attached Licensee Event Report #84-011 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/dwf  
Attachment

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