

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Calvert Cliffs, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 7	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)	Improper Operation of Containment Isolation Valves
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EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)															
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
									N/A					0 5 0 0 0											
0	1	2	3	8	4	8	4	-	0	0	3	-	0	0	0	2	2	2	8	4	0 5 0 0 0				

OPERATING MODE (8)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
1		20.402(b)		20.406(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 10 10	20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c).2		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
		20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Evelyn M. Eshelman, Chemist	AREA CODE	
	3 0 1	2 6 0 - 4 6 1 3

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE. DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While attempting to perform an operational maintenance check on the Post Accident Sampling System on 1-23-84, chemistry technicians operated containment isolation valves by opening valves 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G, the radiogas return to containment atmosphere. This violated Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 which does not allow these valves to be open in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. Operation of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was originally intended for mode 5, shutdown, emergency conditions. The procedure did not incorporate Technical Specification requirements during power modes. To prevent recurrence of this event, a new procedure will be written for operational maintenance check of the PASS, administrative controls of these valve keys will be initiated, and a Technical Specifications amendment has been submitted.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

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Calvert Cliffs, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 7	8 4	— 0 0 3	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On January 23, 1984 at 1408 containment valves 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G (FSV) were opened for a 3 minute duration. The 2 chemistry personnel operating the valves were running purge check tests on the Post Accident Sampling System (IP). The valves control the return of radiogas to containment atmosphere from the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS). The Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedures (ERPIP) for the PASS were being followed. Chemistry notified the Control Room just prior to opening valves 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 does not permit the "G" valves to be open when in modes 1, 2, 3, or 4. The chemistry group was immediately notified via the page system by the Control Room to shut these valves. This event was caused by error in the use of ERPIP which do not reflect the Technical Specifications' requirements for operating the PASS during power operations.

During the investigation of this incident, it was also reported by the Chemistry Supervisor that on January 19, 1984 the PASS had been operated from 1600 to 1845. The ERPIP had again been followed, calling for valves 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G to be open. No action was taken at that time.

The PASS was originally designed and ERPIPs written for operation under mode 5 conditions. However, to verify its operability a maintenance check, using the same procedure, was initiated while in mode 1. The ERPIP requires that the PASS gas discharge valves (1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G) be open. In doing so, containment isolation valves were opened. The present procedure does not address the operation of the PASS under power conditions. Having 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G in the open position should not result in a release flow path since check valves, although not seismically qualified, would prevent outward flow from containment and would mitigate any potential release. There was no other equipment inoperable which contributed to the event. This event would not have been more severe under other reasonable and credible alternative conditions.

To prevent recurrence of this incident the valves will not be opened for power operation of the PASS; also, an amendment has been submitted to the NRC to allow operation of 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G for this evolution. The following additional measures are also being taken:

1. Keys which operate 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G will be administratively controlled exclusively by operations. The keys would be signed out from the Shift Supervisor for a specific evolution and Control Room Operator notified just prior to and after valve cycling so it can be logged.
2. A new Radiation Chemistry Procedure will be written for the PASS use during power operational maintenance checks. This procedure will clearly state a) initial conditions which allow its use, b) proper administrative control of all pertinent valves, and c) initial and final valve line up conditions with a chemistry technician sign off for verification.

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- A review of administrative requirements for operation of 1-SV-6540-G and 1-SV-6507-G and similar valves has been initiated with plant chemistry personnel, operations personnel, and personnel of the electrical and controls group.

No other similar event has been reported.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

P.O. BOX 1475

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657

February 22, 1984

Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406


Docket No. 50-317
License No. DPR 53

Dear Dr. Murley:

The attached LER 84-03 is being sent to you as required by
10 CFR 50.73.

Should you have any questions regarding this report, we would
be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,



L. B. Russell
Plant Superintendent

LBR:EME:bsb

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

Messrs: A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
J. A. Tiernan

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