

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

July 25, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 612  
PO&M/JTB:clw


Docket No. 50-280  
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 3.11.B.1 the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Special Report No. SR-S1-75-03.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,


  
C. M. Stallings  
Vice President-Power Supply  
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. K. R. Goller  
39 copies SR-S1-75-03

50-280  
inquiry

340312034B 750725  
PDR ADOCK 05000280  
S PDR

COPY SENT REGION 

8193

SPECIAL REPORT

SR-S1-75-03

VENTILATION VENT GASEOUS ACTIVITY

DOCKET NO. 50-280  
LICENSE NO. DPR-32

JULY 22, 1975

SURRY POWER STATION

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

## I. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.B.3 for Surry Power Station, this report describes the release of gaseous wastes in excess of 4 per cent of the Technical Specification limit established by Technical Specification 3.11.B.1.

## II. SUMMARY OF OCCURRENCE

On July 9, 1975, routine sampling of the ventilation vent activity revealed an Iodine-131 activity of 4.6 per cent of the Technical Specification limit. Purging operations and maintenance activities associated with Unit No. 2 shutdown are believed to have led to the increase in the level of activity in the ventilation vent. This, in conjunction with the existing auxiliary building activity levels due to the processing of liquid waste, raised the total vent activity above the 4 per cent limit. In order to reduce the level of activity in the ventilation vent, the containment purge exhaust was diverted through the charcoal filter system. Subsequent sampling on July 10, 1975 indicated the operation had reduced the level of I-131 activity to approximately 2.9 per cent of the Technical Specification limit, a value consistent with previous levels immediately prior to the shutdown.

## III. CONCLUSION

The excess ventilation vent I-131 activity was believed to be caused by containment purging operations and containment maintenance activities with some contribution from processing liquid waste. The activity was

reduced below the 4 per cent limit by diverting the containment purge exhaust through the charcoal filter system. Procedure changes have been implemented to ensure all future containment purges are directed through the charcoal filters.

The releases described herein were well below the limits established by 10 CFR 20; therefore, there were no safety implications associated with the occurrence.