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COMPONENT CODE

PRIME
COMPONENT
SPECTRUM

COMPONENT

 $\text{VCl}_4 \cdot 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

FACILITY

% POWER

OTHER STATUS

METHOD OF DISCOVERY

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

FORM OF
ACTIVITY
RELEASED

CONTENT
OF RELEASE

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

LOCATION OF RELEASE

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
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PUBLICITY

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

NAME: T. L. Baucum

PHONE (804) 357-3134

COUPE SENSING SYSTEM (con't)

wall) and over the sensing line. The louvers were closed and sealed allowing the line to thaw and the transmitter to be returned to normal service.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (con't)

heat tracing on the sensing lines which are located adjacent to the ventilation louvers.


The ability of the safety injection system to perform its function was in no way impaired by this failure. Although the transmitter failed in the nonconservative direction (drifted high) it was only in this condition for a brief period of time before it was placed in the trip mode. In addition, the other two remaining channels were in proper working order and could have provided a safety injection signal, if required, since only two out of three channels are required to initiate a safety injection.

The health and safety of the general public were in no way endangered since the safety injection system was able to perform its intended function at all times during this occurrence.

This is a similar occurrence to that noted on Unit No. 2 on December 19, 1975.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

January 13, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 860
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket Nos. 50-280
License Nos. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S1-75-31.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures
40 copies of AO-S1-75-31

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid