

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

A0-S2-75-21

CONTROL BLOCK

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME														LICENSE NUMBER														LICENSE TYPE										EVENT TYPE									
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1																								
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32																																						
CATEGORY														REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE									
01	CONT	P	O	T	L	0	5	0	0	2	8	1	1	2	3	0	7	5	0	1	0	8	7	6																							
7	8	9	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80																																			

EVENT DESCRIPTION

03	During normal operation, it was noted that AT protection channel "1" was reading 6 per																																																																															
03	cent low. Channel "1" AT protection was placed in the "tripped" mode. The other AT																																																																															
04	protection channels were operable. A similar event occurred on October 3, 1975 and is																																																																															
05	described in report A0-S2-75-17. This occurrence is a violation of Technical																																																																															
06	Specification 2.3. (A0-S2-75-21)																																																																															

SYSTEM CODE										CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE										PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER										VIOLATION	
07	I	A	E	I	N	S	T	R	U	N	R	3	7	0	Y																				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	43	44	45	46	47	48																			

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	An investigation revealed that a crack in a steam generator blowdown pipe allowed																																																																															
09	steam to impinge upon the "A" loop T _H RTD, causing it to erroneously read low. The																																																																															
10	ohmic characteristics of the installed spare RTD were also incorrect because (con't)																																																																															

FACILITY STATUS										% POWER										OTHER STATUS										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION									
11	E	0	6	8	N/A	A	N/A																																										
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60																										
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED										CONTENT OF RELEASE										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY										LOCATION OF RELEASE																			
12	Z	Z	N/A	N/A																																													
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60																										

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER										TYPE		DESCRIPTION									
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A																
7	8	9	10	11	12	13															

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER										DESCRIPTION									
14	0	0	0	N/A															
7	8	9	10	11	12														

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																																																																															
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE										DESCRIPTION									
16	Z	N/A																	
7	8	9	10																

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																																																																															
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8403090326 760108
PDR ADOCK 05000281
S PDR

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	The health and safety of the general public were not affected because the other two																																																																															
19	operable protection channels would have tripped the unit if necessary.																																																																															

NAME: T. L. Baucem


PHONE: (804) 357-3184

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

of the steam leak. After the leak was stopped, the RTD's returned to normal as they dried. The normal RTD was returned to service. The same model RTD's are in use in both units. Any long term corrective action will be described in subsequent update reports to AO-S1-75-19, previous report date October 2, 1975.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

January 9, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 851
PO&M/ALH:clw

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1,
the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies
of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S2-75-21.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear
Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the
next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures
40 copies of AO-S2-75-21

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid

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COPY SENT REGION II

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