

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

USRE-S1-76-13

CONTROL BLOCK

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME										LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					EVENT TYPE	
01	V	A	S	P	S	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	3	3	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	

CATEGORY			REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE								
01	CONT	P	O	L	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	0	0	9	1	6	7	6	1	0	1	5	7	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	During normal operations, it was discovered that normal boric acid makeup to the volume																															
03	control tank could not be accomplished due to an apparent plugging of CVCS line 1"-CH-																															
04	56-152. In order to clear the line, recirculation between the boric acid tanks and the																															
05	boron injection tank was secured for five (5) minutes to permit installation of a																															
06	blank flange in the line. Since Technical Specification 3.2.C.6 requires con- (con't)																															

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION	
07	P	C	F	X	X	X	X	X	X	Z	Z	9	9	9	9	Y
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	Boric acid is transferred through line 1"-CH-56-152 on a regular basis for volume con-																															
09	trol tank make-up. This routine usage, coupled with the fact that no malfunctioning																															
10	heat tracing was found either in the pipe in question or any upstream pipe (con't)																															

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS					METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION													
11	E	1	0	0	N/A	B	N/A																		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY					LOCATION OF RELEASE																
12	Z	Z	N/A					N/A																	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION																											
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A																											
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32							

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER			DESCRIPTION																													
14	0	0	0	N/A																												
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32							

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																														
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION																													
16	Z	N/A																													
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																														
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32						

8403090148 761015
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	Since the capabilities of the safety injection system were not impaired by this event																														
19	the health and safety of the general public were not affected.																														

NAME: Tyndall L. Baucom

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

tinuous recirculation, an immediate reactor rampdown was initiated until boron injection tank recirculation was returned to normal. Once the line was cleared of the obstruction, boron recirculation was again secured while the blank flange was removed. A reactor rampdown was performed during this operation which lasted for approximately three (3) minutes. (USRE-SI-76-13)


CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

leaves the cause of the obstruction as an unknown factor. The line was inspected for potential "cold" spots which could cause isolated solidification of boric acid, but none were found in the area of the obstruction. The line will be inspected for indications of solidification during the next refueling shutdown.

During the period of obstruction, the capability to add boric acid to the reactor coolant system was maintained. In addition, the boron injection tank was capable of performing its intended function.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

October 20, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 292
PO&M/ALH:clw

Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Licensee Event Report USRE-S1-76-13.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4
(40 copies USRE-S1-76-13)

COPY SENT REGION

10715