

Arizona Public Service Company

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WILLIAM F. CONWAY
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR

102-02096-WFC/TRB/RJR
January 2, 1992

Mr. J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368

Reference: Letter dated December 4, 1991, from Ross A. Scarano, Director,
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region V, to
Mr. William F. Conway, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, Arizona
Public Service.


Dear Sir:

Subject: RESPONSE TO NRC CONCERN
File: 91-019-026

Arizona Public Service (APS) has reviewed the circumstances described in the enclosure to the reference letter (Enclosure 1). The details of this review are included in enclosure (2) to this letter.

If you have any questions concerning this information, please contact Mr. Frank Larkin at (602) 393-2527.

Very truly yours,



WFC/TRB/RJR/dmn

Enclosures

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ENCLOSURE 1

On November 3, 1991, at about 0500 hours, a security officer was supposedly dispatched by the Palo Verde Central Alarm Station (CAS) to assess an alarm at vital Door 3A-404. Shortly afterwards, this officer reported to the CAS via radio that he had verified that the area was secure. The CAS quickly determined through a review of computer records that the officer had not reached Door 3A-404 since he was located in another area of the plant. The CAS immediately dispatched another security officer to vital Door 3A-404, and the alarm was properly assessed within the required time limit. It is our understanding that if the CAS had not detected and resolved this situation, you would have violated your security plan, and that the officer's erroneous actions may have been intentional. Sergeant [] is supposedly familiar with this incident.

ENCLOSURE 2

Statement: On November 3, 1991, at about 0500 hours, a security officer was supposedly dispatched by the Palo Verde Central Alarm Station (CAS) to assess an alarm at vital door 3A-404.

Response: This statement is true. At approximately 0505 an alarm was received by the CAS on vital door 3A-404. A contractor security officer was directed by CAS personnel to respond to the alarm.

Statement: Shortly afterwards, this officer reported to the CAS via radio that he had verified that the area was secure.

Response: This statement is true.

Statement: The CAS quickly determined through review of computer records that the officer had not reached door 3A-404 since he was located in another area of the plant.

Response: This statement requires clarification. When the contractor security officer was directed to respond to the alarm, he asked directions to the correct door from an APS security officer. When the contractor officer called in the area as secure, the APS officer realized the contractor officer must have gone to the wrong door and communicated this information to CAS. The APS officer made this determination because the time lag for the contractor officer to reach the alarmed door appeared too short.

Statement: The CAS immediately dispatched another security officer to vital door 3A-404, and the alarm was properly assessed within the required time limit.

Response: This statement is true. The alarm was assessed approximately six minutes and forty seconds after receipt.

Statement: It was our understanding that if the CAS had not detected and resolved this situation, you would have violated your security plan, and that the officer's erroneous actions may have been intentional.

Response: It is true that had the situation not been resolved within the required compensatory period, a violation of the security plan would have occurred.

No objective evidence could be found which indicates this erroneous action may have been intentional. The fact that the contractor officer asked directions to the alarmed door and then apparently misinterpreted those directions would tend to support a belief that this was not, in fact, intentional.

- Corrective Actions:
- (1) The CAS operators and security personnel involved in ensuring the alarmed door was compensated within the required time frame were commended.
 - (2) APS security and security training have undertaken a program to upgrade contract security personnel familiarization with site locations necessary in the performance of their duties.