

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S1-76-03

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME [01] V A S P S 1		LICENSE NUMBER [0] [0] - [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] - [0] [0]					LICENSE TYPE [4] [1] [1] [1] [0]				EVENT TYPE [0] [1]											
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32										
CATEGORY [01] CONT		REPORT TYPE [M] [I]		REPORT SOURCE [T] [L]		DOCKET NUMBER [0] [5] [0] - [0] [2] [8] [0]					EVENT DATE [0] [7] [2] [1] [7] [6]				REPORT DATE [0] [7] [2] [7] [7] [6]							
7	8	9	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

[02] During the review of the jumper log while the unit was at hot shutdown, it was noted

[03] that the outputs of two pressure switches (PS-IM-100C and PS-IM-100D) were still

[04] jumpered to prevent initiation of CLS Containment Hi Signal. This violated Technical

[05] Specification 3.7 and is reportable under Technical Specification 6.6.2a.(AO-S1-76-03).

[06]

SYSTEM CODE [07] Z Z		CAUSE CODE [A]		COMPONENT CODE [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z] [Z]				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER [Z]		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [Z] [9] [9] [9]				VIOLATION [Y]		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	43	44	45	46	47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

[08] The event was caused when the jumper log was not reviewed at the proper time in accor-

[09] dance with the operating procedure. The immediate corrective action taken was to re-

[10] move the jumpers. To prevent further events of this nature the operating (continued)

FACILITY STATUS [11] G		% POWER [0] [0] [0]		OTHER STATUS Hot Shutdown		METHOD OF DISCOVERY [Z]		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED [12] Z		CONTENT OF RELEASE [Z]		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A				LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER [13] 0 0 0		TYPE [Z]		DESCRIPTION N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER [14] 0 0 0		DESCRIPTION N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

[15] N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE [16] Z		DESCRIPTION N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	12

PUBLICITY

[17] N/A

8403070413 760727
PDR ADOCK 05000280
S PDR

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

[18] This event caused the CLS Hi containment isolation functions to be inoperative. If a

[19] loss of coolant accident had occurred during this time, no fission products (continued)

NAME: T. L. Baucom

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

procedure will be revised to have the review of jumper log as a "Sign Off" step rather than listed as an initial condition.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

would have been released since the core had no decay heat power history. If a steam line break accident had occurred, only an energy release to the containment would have resulted. In either case the CLS Hi-Hi protective function would have caused spray initiation and thus ultimate termination of the transient. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. In addition, administrative controls prior to criticality would have prevented the unit from being taken critical with the jumpers installed.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

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August 4, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 163
PC&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Licensee Event Report No. AO-S1-76-03.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40 copies)
Operating Reactors Branch 4

7914

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