



**Entergy
Operations**

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Attn: J. Paul Smith

Hydrospace, Inc. 72001

1-801-904-3400

November 8, 1991

2CAN119101


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-368
License No. NIF-6
Licensee Event Report 50-368/91-017-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) enclosed is the subject report concerning station battery surveillance testing.

Very truly yours,



James J. Fisicaro
Director, Licensing

JJF/TFS/mmg

Enclosure

cc: Regional Administrator
Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle, 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two

DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003681
PAGE (3) 1 OF 5

TITLE (4) Weekly Station Battery Surveillance Test Not Performed
Within The Required Interval Due To Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names
1	0	1	9	1	9	1	0	8	9
									Docket Number(s)
									050003681

OPERATING MODE (9) 3 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:

(Check one or more of the following) (11)

POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
000																					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	Telephone Number
Thomas F. Scott, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist	Area Code 501964-5000

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NRC	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to NRC

SUPPLEMENT REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Yes (If yes, complete Expected Submission Date)	No	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	Month	Day	Year
	X				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0810 on October 11, 1991, it was discovered that the Technical Specification surveillance test for the Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 station batteries had not been performed within the maximum allowable time interval. Both batteries were declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. The tests for both batteries were completed satisfactorily by 0838, three hours and eight minutes after the end of the allowable interval. The root cause of this event was attributed to personnel errors by Electrical Maintenance personnel that resulted in a lack of oversight of the scheduled surveillance activity. A contributing factor was a failure of the Surveillance Coordinator to communicate to appropriate personnel the late completion status of the test. Actions have been taken to highlight surveillance tests on the shop schedule, standardize assignment of the battery surveillance to one crew, and improve communication between the Surveillance Coordinator and groups performing surveillances. A "lessons learned" training is being conducted with the Maintenance staff of both units. The surveillance program was reviewed and determined to be adequate. This event is reportable as an operation prohibited by Technical Specifications because of the entry into specification 3.0.3.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Two		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	
	05000368	91	017	00	02 OF 05

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. Plant Status

At the time this condition was discovered, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) was in Hot Standby (Mode 3) with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) [AB] temperature 542 degrees and pressure 2246 psia. A forced outage to replace an excore nuclear instrumentation [IG] detector was in progress.

B. Event Description

At 0810 on October 11, 1991, it was discovered that the weekly surveillance test of the station batteries [EJ] required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.8.2.3.a had not been performed prior to exceeding the maximum allowable time interval. The last surveillance had been completed at 1130 on October 2, 1991. An extension of the seven day surveillance time interval of up to 25 percent, allowable by T.S. 4.0.2, resulted in the allowable surveillance interval ending at 0530 on October 11, 1991.

The weekly battery surveillance is issued under a surveillance test job order on Wednesday of each week. It consists of bank and cell voltage as well as electrolyte level, specific gravity and temperature measurements on the pilot cells of each station battery. Also included are general inspection requirements for each battery bank. The job order is normally assigned to one of the four Electrical Maintenance crews on Thursday for performance during the following week.

Oversight of scheduled surveillance activities is provided by a Surveillance Group that performs daily tracking of the status of scheduled surveillances, generates a daily status report of surveillances within 48 hours of their critical completion date, and directs notification of impending overdue surveillances to the responsible organizations.

On October 2, 1991, the weekly battery surveillance job order was scheduled for one of the Electrical Maintenance crews. On October 4, 1991, the job order package and schedule were sent to the shop and placed in the job order work file for the assigned crew. Circumstances resulted in most of the assigned crew, including the supervisor, being unavailable. The supervisor who was responsible for assuming the work did not refer to the other crew's schedule. On October 9, 1991, the plant began a forced outage.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Pl is for the forced outage diverted attention from a review of work scheduled for that day (including the battery surveillance) during the regular Electrical Maintenance staff meeting. Outage preparations also resulted in cancellation of another routine status and scheduling meeting later in the day. The individual who normally gathered shop work status was diverted to a job in support of the forced outage. The maintenance staff and craft personnel began to focus on outage related work and failed to review the status of regular jobs because all normal scheduled work for the shop had been deferred by Operations. The Surveillance Coordinator attempted to contact one of the cognizant Electrical Maintenance personnel for an update when he realized that the job status had not been changed to completed on the tracking computer. This effort was unsuccessful. The Surveillance Coordinator did not meet management expectations for elevating his concerns to the appropriate level of management. The surveillance group provided to management a daily status report that listed the battery surveillance as overdue; however, the routine nature of the report did not result in action to determine the status of the test. When the Electrical Maintenance Specialist began to file job orders for the following week in the shop files on October 11, 1991, he discovered the surveillance package still in the work pending file, notified Operations personnel, and dispatched a crew to perform the test.

T.S. 4.0.3 states that failure to perform a surveillance test within the specified time interval constitutes a failure to meet operability requirements for the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Since the surveillance test for neither battery had been completed when required, the ANO-2 Shift Supervisor declared both batteries inoperable and entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 0810 on October 11, 1991. At 0820 the surveillance test for battery 2D-11 was satisfactorily completed to exit T.S. 3.0.3 and enter the LCO for T.S. 3.8.2.3. At 0838 the surveillance test for battery 2D-12 was satisfactorily completed to exit T.S. 3.8.2.3 three hours and eight minutes past the end of the allowable surveillance interval.

C. Root Cause

The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel errors that resulted in a lack of oversight of the scheduled surveillance activity. The primary responsibility for scheduling, completing, and verifying completion of the surveillance rested with the Electrical Maintenance Specialist and Supervisor assigned the task. The Surveillance Coordinator also failed to meet expectations concerning elevation of problems with surveillance completion to appropriate management levels.

Contributing causes included:

1. Inadequate turnover of scheduled work in the Electrical Maintenance organization.

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2. Allowing the forced outage to disrupt the normal shop routine for assigning and maintaining status of work.

3. Inadequate emphasis on surveillance job order packages by the shop.

D. Corrective Actions

The following corrective actions have been completed:

1. Surveillance tests are being highlighted on the Electrical Maintenance shop schedule.
2. Copies of the complete shop schedule are being issued to each craft Supervisor for Electrical Maintenance.
3. Management expectations with regard to performance of surveillance testing have been communicated to appropriate Maintenance personnel.
4. Surveillance Coordinators have been given instructions concerning the need to aggressively pursue notifications of organizations with surveillance tests nearing completion deadlines.
5. Battery surveillance tests have been assigned so that the day shop crew will be responsible for performance each week to provide continuity of supervision for this activity.
6. A meeting was conducted between the Surveillance Group and representatives from all site organizations performing surveillances to emphasize the correct method of updating the status of surveillance job orders.
7. Increased emphasis has been provided to all levels of management concerning the importance of proper oversight of surveillance testing activities.
8. The surveillance program was evaluated and determined to be adequate.

A "lessons learned" training is being provided to the Maintenance staff of both units to emphasize the hazards of treating any surveillance as routine and the necessity for proper turnover of assigned work. This training is complete for all on-site personnel. Further personnel training and documentation of this training will be completed by November 20, 1991.

E. Safety Significance

The two banks of batteries, 2D-11 and 2D-12, are designed to provide a source of reliable continuous power for control, instrumentation, Reactor Protective System [JC], Engineered Safety Features Actuation System [JE], and other safety-related DC loads during emergency conditions.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Following discovery of the missed surveillance, the performance of the required tests was completed in twenty eight minutes. The time period from the end of the allowable surveillance interval until tests on both batteries were complete was three hours and eight minutes. Tests on both batteries were satisfactory; therefore, the batteries were capable of performing their intended safety function during the time period the surveillance test was overdue. Since there was only a short period of time between the end of the allowable interval and the completion of the test and the batteries were both found to be in an operable status, this event is judged to have little safety significance.

F. Basis For Reportability

Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 represents an operation prohibited by Technical Specifications reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

G. Additional Information

Previous similar events have been reported in LERs 50-368/85-013-00 and 50-368/90-008-00. A T.S. surveillance has not been missed on either unit for approximately one year prior to this event due to the effectiveness of corrective actions associated with the surveillance program upgrade effort which is part of the ANO Business Plan.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].