

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



November 16, 1973



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7333W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning a reactor water level switch malfunction which occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on November 8, 1973, and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure
CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.--EFAO-7333W
Report Date--November 16, 1973
Occurrence Date--November 8, 1973
Facility--Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

Identification of Occurrence

Unit 1 reactor protection system reactor water level switch malfunction.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor at 30-percent power, 300 MWe, during startup test program.

Description of Occurrence

During accelerated surveillance testing on November 8, 1973, reactor water level switches LIS-3-203B and C were found to operate outside the technical specification setpoint of 538 inches above vessel zero as specified in Table 3.1.A. The switches operated at 533 inches and 537 inches, respectively.

Analysis of Occurrence

These level switches are arranged in a one out of two taken twice logic in the reactor protection system. The other two channels were immediately tested and found to operate satisfactorily. If required, the RPS would have performed its intended function.

Corrective Action

The switches were recalibrated and functionally tested several times to verify repeatability. New locking plate assemblies will be installed pending their receipt which is expected within two weeks. An accelerated testing frequency of once a week has been initiated for all four switches. This test frequency will also apply to the switches after locking devices are installed until three consecutive tests prove satisfactory. The testing frequency will then be increased to biweekly and the original test schedule of once a month will be resumed after three consecutive tests have been satisfactorily performed on the biweekly frequency.

Failure Data

Barton Model 288A differential pressure indicating switch.

Serial Nos.: LIS-3-203B--288A-9959
LIS-3-203C--288A-9960

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>
LIS-3-203B	10/9/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Reset switch to setpoint
LIS-3-203C	10/9/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Reset switch to setpoint
LIS-3-203B	11/8/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Reset switch to setpoint
LIS-3-203C	11/8/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Reset switch to setpoint