

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



November 23, 1973

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545


Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-734CW

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning HPCI steamflow
excessive pressure switches' malfunctions which occurred on Browns
Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on November 15, 1973, and is submitted in
accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1,
October 1973.

Very truly yours,


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.--BFAO-734CW
Report Date--November 23, 1973
Occurrence Date--November 15, 1973
Facility--Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

Identification of Occurrence

Unit 1 HPCI steamflow excessive pressure switches malfunctioned.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor at 25-percent thermal power during startup testing.

Description of Occurrence

During accelerated surveillance testing on November 15, 1973, HPCI steamflow excessive pressure switches FDIS-73-1A and 1B were found to operate outside technical specification setpoint of less than or equal to 90 psid as specified in Table 3.2.B. The as-found settings were 92.5 and 96.0 psid, respectively.

Analysis of Occurrence

These switches have two contacts in parallel that form a trip logic in the trip system. The trip logic acts to trip the HPCI turbine and isolate the system upon high steamline flow. Since only one set of contacts in each switch was found out of technical specification setting and the other two contacts tested satisfactorily, the logic would have performed its intended function if required.

Corrective Action

Locking plate assemblies have been received and are being installed in all Barton Model 288 switches, and an accelerated testing frequency of once a week has been initiated and will continue until three consecutive tests prove satisfactory. The testing frequency will then continue on a biweekly schedule until three consecutive biweekly tests are satisfactory, whereupon the original schedule will be resumed.

Failure Data

Barton Model 288

Serial Nos.: FDIS-73-1A, 288-5843; FDIS-73-1B, 288-5842

Failure Data (continued)

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>
PDIS-73-1A	9/20/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Reset switch, adjusted for free operation
PDIS-73-1A	11/15/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Installing new locking plate assembly
PDIS-73-1B	11/15/73	Operated outside tech spec limit	Installing new locking plate assembly