

P. O. Box 361, Platteville, Colorado 80651

October 17, 1975

10-23-75

Mr. E. Morris Howard, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

REF: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Howard:

Enclosed please find a copy of Unusual Event Report No. 50-267/75/16,
Final, submitted per the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Frederic E. Swart
Superintendent, Nuclear Production
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station

FES/alk

cc: Mr. Roger S. Boyd

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REPORT DATE: October 17, 1975

UNUSUAL EVENT 75/16
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OCCURRENCE DATE: October 9, 1975

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/75/16

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF
OCCURRENCE:

Apparent failure of control system for "C" circulator high pressure separator resulted in flooding of the high pressure separator.

In discussion with NRC on October 9, 1975, this was identified as an unusual event per section 7.6 of the Technical Specifications, paragraph (C) 2, Non-Routine Reports.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<u>Steady State Power</u>	<u>Routine Shutdown</u>
<u>Hot Shutdown</u>	<u>Routine Load Change</u>
<u>X Cold Shutdown</u>	<u>Other (specify)</u>
<u>Refueling Shutdown</u>	<u></u>
<u>Routine Startup</u>	<u></u>

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

Power	RTR	<u>0</u>	MWth
	ELECT	<u>0</u>	MWe
Secondary	Pressure	<u>2,700</u>	psig
	Temperature	<u>1,100</u>	°F
	Flow	<u>40,000</u>	#/hr.
Primary Coolant	Pressure	<u>-0.4</u>	psig
	Temperature	<u>104</u>	°F Core Inlet
		<u>106</u>	°F Core Outlet
	Flow	<u>42,000</u>	#/hr.

DESCRIPTION OF
OCCURRENCE:

On August 30, 1975, with "C" helium circulator operating at 4,000 rpm on the Pelton wheel drive, the reactor operator called the Results Department to report "C" high pressure separator flow was high.

Results Department personnel reported to the control room and found the reactor operator had placed HC-2176 ("C" circulator main drain valve controller) in manual and to the full open position. (See attached drawing for schematic of controls.)

Results went to check operation of PCV-2176 ("C" circulator main drain valve) and PDC-2176 local controller. Results also verified that LV-21304 ("C" high pressure separator drain valve was open and controlling level. PDV-2176 was full open and the setpoint on PDC-2176 was at -5 Δ P (equivalent to 3 psi or less from current to pneumatic converter, XEP-2176), which is a full open signal.

The air line from the XEP output (setpoint for PDC-2176) was leaking. The air line was repaired and PDV-2176 was then manually operated from HC-2176 in the control room and after satisfactory operation, was placed in "auto". The high pressure separator level and flow were controlling near normal.

Approximately twenty minutes later "C" high pressure separator level began to rise. The reactor operator placed HC-2176 in manual and drove the output to "fully open" signal for PDV-2176. The high pressure separator level rose to 60", and the buffer/mid-buffer measurement was reduced to a slightly positive pressure.

This represented a flooded condition which persisted for about five minutes before the reactor operator manually tripped "C" circulator.

Since an increase in PCRV moisture level was observed, "D" circulator speed was increased to 4,000 rpm and the purification system flow was increased to 120 ACFM to remove the moisture and maximize system cleanup rate.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

<u> </u> Design	<u> </u> Unusual Service Cond. Including Environ.
<u> </u> Manufacture	<u> </u> Component Failure
<u> </u> Installation/Const.	<u> X </u> Other (specify)
<u> </u> Operator	<u> </u> Unable to identify cause.
<u> </u> Procedure	<u> </u>


It was first believed that a control offset signal was generated by a failure of the pneumatic low selector. A manual regulator in the system, set at 12 psig (equivalent to a 25% open position on PDV-2176) supplies an input to the low selector to prevent the main drain valve from going beyond 75% shut. However, no failures could be found to support this supposition.

Co.-Div. _____
 City -- Town _____
 Dept. _____
 By _____
 Project _____

Sheet No. _____
 Date _____
 Job No. _____

SCALE: NONE

---//--- DENOTES
 A PNEUMATIC SIGNAL



ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

Analysis indicated that the high pressure separator flooding probably occurred during the manual stroking of PDV-2176 with the "C" circulator operating at 4,000 rpm. The valve was stroked after repairs were made on the broken air line to the XEP. Although PDV-2176 is a fail-open valve, a control signal offset could have caused the valve to fail shut. This could cause the high pressure separator to flood.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

The low selector was removed, disassembled, inspected, and cleaned since failure of this component could be the only way PDV-2176 could have shut. No problems of any kind were found with the pneumatic low selector. The main drain control system and valve were completely checked out and operated under simulated conditions for all inputs. The system operated correctly as designed. LV-21304, high pressure separator drain valve, was observed to be operating properly.

FAILURE DATA/SIMILAR REPORTED OCCURRENCE:

None


PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT:

None


CODE IMPACT:

None


Submitted by:


Harvey W. Hillyard, Jr.
Technical Services Supervisor

Reviewed by:


H. Larry Bray
Superintendent, Nuclear Production

Approved by:


Frederic E. Swart
Superintendent, Nuclear Production