

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE  
37401



January 14, 1974

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7352W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning recirculation  
pump A d/p indicating switch malfunction which occurred on Browns  
Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 on January 4, 1974, and is submitted in  
accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1,  
October 1973.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*E. F. Thomas*  
E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC  
230 Peachtree Street, NW.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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## ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.--BFAO-7352W  
Report Date--January 14, 1974  
Occurrence Date--January 4, 1974  
Facility--Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

### Identification of Occurrence

Recirculation pump A d/p indicating switch malfunction.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor was at 30-percent thermal power during startup testing.

During accelerated biweekly surveillance testing, PdIS-68-85 was found to operate outside the technical specification limit of less than or equal to 2 psid as specified in Table 3.2.B. The switch operated at 2.2 psid.

### Analysis of Occurrence

Each PdIS switch operates a relay having two sets of contacts, which are arranged in a one out of two taken four times logic in each trip system of the LPCI break detection system. The other three d/p switches on recirculation pump A were tested and found to operate satisfactorily. If the LPCI break detection has been required, it would have performed its intended function.

### Corrective Action

There were no apparent reasons for the setpoint drift. This instrument will be tested once a week until three consecutive tests are satisfactory, at which time an accelerated frequency of biweekly will be resumed. Evaluation of testing on the accelerated biweekly interval will be made before its normal test period is resumed. Additionally, if possible, the instrument will be tested with the same personnel and test instruments during the accelerated tests. An offset to compensate for drift will also be added to the setpoint.

### Failure Data

Barton Model 288 differential pressure indicating switch.

Serial No. 288-4545

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>
PdIS-68-85	11/26/73	Setpoint drift	Installed new locking device
PdIS-68-85	12/7/73	Setpoint drift	Replaced PdIS due to stripped locking device

Failure Data (Continued)

Serial No. 288-6379

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Failure</u>	<u>Corrective Action</u>
PaIS-68-85	1/4/74	Setpoint drift	Reset switch