

Georgia Power Company  
40 Inverness Center Parkway  
Post Office Box 1295  
Birmingham, Alabama 35201  
Telephone 205 877-7279

J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
Vice President - Nuclear  
Hatch Project



June 21, 1995

Docket No. 50-321

HL-4876

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555


Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 1  
Special Report 1-95-002  
Fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable For Greater than 14 Days

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications and Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning an event wherein Fire Barrier Assemblies were inoperable for greater than 14 days as the result of planned activities.

Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Sincerely,



J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/eb

Enclosure: Special Report 1-95-002, Fire Barrier Assemblies  
Inoperable for Greater Than 14 days

cc: (See next page.)

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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cc: Georgia Power Company

Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr., Nuclear Plant General Manager  
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.

Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator

Mr. B. L. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

## ENCLOSURE

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant  
Special Report 1-95-002  
Fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable For Greater Than 14 Days

### A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1. Specifically, Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2 states:

Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating portions of safety-related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be OPERABLE.

Furthermore, Action Statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing device to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided, within 1 hour, a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. In the event described in this report, two fire doors were breached in a controlled manner to provide a cooler environment for equipment located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator Set rooms and remained inoperable for more than 14 days.

### B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

On 5/30/95, at 0023 EDT, Unit 1 was in the run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% rated thermal power). Unit 2 was in the Run mode at a power level of 2436 CMWT (100% rated thermal power).

### C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

This report describes an event in which two fire rated assemblies were breached in a controlled manner to provide additional cooling to temperature sensitive equipment for testing activities.

On 5/16/95, at 0023 EDT, fire doors 1L48-1C48 and 1L48-1C49 on the 130 foot elevation of the control building were blocked open in a controlled manner to

provide additional cooling for equipment located inside the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor-Generator Set rooms. Licensed Control Room personnel were notified prior to blocking the fire doors open as required by plant procedures. Subsequently, Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 1-95-199 and 2-95-196 were initiated on 5/16/95 to track the status of the affected fire doors as required by the FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, Action (a). Appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established prior to blocking the doors open.

**D. CAUSE OF THE EVENT**

Fire doors 1L48-1C48 and 1L48-1C49 were blocked open in a controlled manner to provide additional cooling for temperature sensitive equipment located inside the Unit 1 and Unit 2 RPS Motor-Generator Set rooms in support of testing activities in progress.

**E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT**

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the fire doors inoperable and established the required fire watches to ensure compliance with FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1 Action (a). The action statement requires that:

With one or more of the required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices (as stated in section 1.1.1) inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(ies) and/or sealing device(s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

The fire doors described in this report were breached in a controlled manner following approved administrative control procedures. An hourly fire watch was established and all requirements of the FHA were met. Thus, had a fire occurred in the affected areas, it would have been promptly detected and extinguished.

**F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

By 6/2/95, the fire doors were restored to operable status and LCOs 1-95-199 and 2-95-156 were terminated.