

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



February 22, 1974



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545


Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7410W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning main steamline
high flow switch malfunction which occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear
Plant unit 1 on February 13, 1974, and is submitted in accordance
with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-7410W
Report Date: February 22, 1974
Occurrence Date: February 13, 1974
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1

Identification of Occurrence

Main steamline high flow switch malfunction.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Reactor in cold shutdown.

Description of Occurrence

During routine surveillance testing, main steam high flow indicating switches PdIS-1-36B and PdIS-1-50A were found to operate outside the technical specification setpoint of less than or equal to 140-percent flow, which corresponds to 108.75 psid. The switches were found to operate at 109.7 and 109.0 psid, respectively.

Analysis of Occurrence

There are four pressure switches for each of the four main steamlines. One switch from each steamline is connected in series to form one channel of one out of two taken twice logic to cause main steamline isolation upon detection of a high flow. The remaining 14 pressure switches were tested and found to operate within technical specification limits. If a steamline break had occurred, the system would have isolated the main steamlines as intended.

Corrective Action

The two switches were reset to 106.5 psid and functionally tested several times to confirm repeatability. Since only 2 of the 16 switches had drifted slightly above the setpoint, an accelerated testing frequency of once every 2 weeks has been established for the two switches and will continue until three consecutive tests are satisfactory, at which time the normal testing frequency of once a month will be resumed.

A setpoint of 105 psid will be established at the next calibration interval for all 16 switches to provide additional drift margin.

Failure Data

Barton Model 278 differential pressure indicating switches:

PdIS-1-36B--Serial No. 278-2995

PdIS-1-50A--Serial No. 278-2999