


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Commonwealth Edison Company

ONE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Address Reply to:

POST OFFICE BOX 747 ★ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R. R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
August 3, 1971

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject: LICENSE DPR-25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT #3
SECTION 6.6.A.1 AND 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Reference: Letter in Lieu of Telegram Because of Western Union Strike
to Mr. Boyce Grier from H. K. Hoyt, Dated July 26, 1971

Dear Dr. Morris:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the Station in which the upper isolation valve for a Scram Discharge Volume Level Switch was found in the closed position. The closed valve rendered the level switch inoperable, contrary to the requirements of Section 3.1 of the Dresden Unit 3 Technical Specifications.

Problem, Investigation, and Corrective Action

During investigation, at 0153 hours on July 25, 1971, of scram discharge volume draining difficulties following a planned reactor scram at 2242 hours on July 24, 1971, the upper isolation valve for scram discharge volume level switch 302-8A was found in the closed position. The valve was opened immediately. The closed isolation valve rendered the level switch incapable of performing its function at the set point specified in the Technical Specifications, although it would probably have operated at some higher discharge volume level. The remaining three level switches were operable and performed as required.

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
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August 3, 1971

Investigation revealed that the valve had been checked open during system valve lineups on June 11, 1971, and July 3, 1971, and that a surveillance test of the subject level switch had been performed on July 10, 1971. The procedure for this test requires closure and subsequent reopening of the isolation valve. Review of the check list used indicated that the valve was reopened following the test. A review of the records of entry to the scram discharge volume room, and discussion with personnel involved, revealed no work associated with the isolation valve. Though the check list indicates the valve was reopened following the test, it is probable that it was not.

To minimize the possibility of recurrence, the importance of a conscientious check of valving was reemphasized to the instrument maintenance group. Additionally, the valve check list has been revised to include the valve identification numbers to preclude error.

Sincerely,

H. K. Hoyt
Superintendent

HKH:GJD:ls