

Public Service Company of Colorado

P. O. Box 361, Platteville, Colorado 80651



February 18, 1975

Mr. E. Morris Howard, Director
Region IV, Office of Inspection
and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive - Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

Ref: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Howard:

Enclosed please find a copy of Abnormal Occurrence Report No.
50-267/75/6, submitted per the requirements of the Technical
Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Frederic E. Swart

Frederic E. Swart
Superintendent Nuclear Production
Public Service Company
of Colorado

FES:il

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

*50-267
incident*

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COPY SENT REGION IV

REPORT DATE: February 10, 1975

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

OCCURRENCE DATE: February 2, 1975

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/74/6

Preliminary

IDENTIFICATION OF
OCCURRENCE:

A gas waste vacuum tank rupture disc ruptured releasing a small quantity of gas. This is identified as an Abnormal Occurrence per Technical Specification definition 2.1.c.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO
OCCURRENCE:

<u> </u>	<u> </u> Steady State Power	<u> </u> Routine Shutdown
<u> </u>	<u> </u> Hot Shutdown	<u> </u> Routine Load Change
<u> X </u>	<u> </u> Cold Shutdown	<u> </u> Other (specify)
<u> </u>	<u> </u> Refueling Shutdown	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u> Routine Startup	<u> </u>

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

Power	Rtr <u> </u> - <u> </u>	MWth
	Elect. <u> </u> 0 <u> </u>	MWe
Secondary Coolant	Pressure <u> </u> 1000 <u> </u>	psig
	Temperature <u> </u> 210 <u> </u>	°F (Feedwater on pre-boiler recirculation)
	Flow <u> </u> 180,000 <u> </u>	#/hr.
Primary Coolant	Pressure <u> </u> 230 <u> </u>	psia
	Temperature <u> </u> 254 <u> </u>	°F Core Inlet
	<u> </u> 254 <u> </u>	°F Core Outlet
	Flow <u> </u> 90,000 <u> </u>	#/hr.

DESCRIPTION OF
OCCURRENCE:

While attempting to drain "B" helium purification train water separator via HV-2382, with the separator level indication of 48", the operator drained the separator to 4" and closed HV-2382. Approximately one minute later he received a gas waste vacuum tank high pressure alarm and noticed the gas waste pressure and gas waste flow high. The reactor operator suspected HV-2382 of not closing and dispatched an equipment operator to check regeneration system pressures. The equipment operator closed PV-2352, the manual isolation for HV-2382 and isolated the blown rupture disc M-63802.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

_____ Design	_____ Unusual Service Cond. Including Environ.
_____ Manufacture	<u> X </u> Component Failure
_____ Installation/Const.	_____ Other (specify)
_____ Operator	_____
_____ Procedure	_____

The air operated drain valve failed to close properly which allowed primary coolant helium to enter the regeneration system and be vented to the gas waste vacuum tank at a rate which exceeded the capacity of the two gas waste compressors.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

The release from the rupture disc was about 3 minutes in duration at ~100 ACFM. No increase in activity was detectable on the stack radiation monitors (RT-7324-1, 2 or 7325-1). Subsequent analysis of the gas in the gas waste surge tank for release No. 77 showed no measurable gamma activity. The allowable release rate based on tritium was $3.9 (10^7)$ ACFM.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

When the reactor is depressurized to atmospheric pressure the valve (HV-2382) will be isolated and disassembled for inspection and resolution of the problem. Until that time the cooler will be drained manually with V-23203.

FAILURE DATA/
SIMILAR REPORTED OCCURRENCES:

Abnormal Occurrences 50-267/74/21, 50-267/74/22, and 50-267/75/5 involved rupture of this rupture disc but the causes are unrelated. No. 74/21 was due to a release of gas from the gas waste compressor relief valves. No. 74/22 was due to a pressure setting error in the operating procedure. No. 75/5 was due to an improper valve lineup during a purge.


PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT:

None

CODE IMPACT:


None

RECOMMENDED:




H. Larry Brey
Superintendent-Operations
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station

APPROVED:



Frederic E. Swart
Superintendent-Nuclear Production
Public Service Company
of Colorado



REPORT DATE: February 10, 1975


ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

OCCURRENCE DATE: February 2, 1975

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
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<u>X</u>	Cold Shutdown	_____	Other (specify)
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50-267
incident

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COPY SENT REGION IV

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
PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT:

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
CODE IMPACT:

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RECOMMENDED:


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Superintendent-Operations
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