P. O. Box 361, Platteville, Colo 80651

April 2, 1975

Mr. E. Morris Howard, Director
Region IV Office of Inspection
611 Ryan Plaza Drive
Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

REF: Facility Operating License
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Howard:

Enclosed please find a copy of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-267/75/6A, Final, submitted per the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Frederic E. Swart
Supt. Nuclear Production
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station

FES:ll

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

50-267 incident

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REPORT DATE: March 21, 1975 ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE

OCCURRENCE DATE: February 2, 1975

FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/74/6A

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

A gas waste vacuum tank rupture disc ruptured releasing a small quantity of gas. This is identified as an Abnormal Occurrence per Technical Specification definition 2.1.c.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

____	Steady State Power	____	Routine Shutdown
____	Hot Shutdown	____	Routine Load Change
X	Cold Shutdown	____	Other (specify)
____	Refueling Shutdown	____	
____	Routine Startup	____	

The major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

Power	Rtr	-	MWth
	Elect.	0	MWe
Secondary Coolant	Pressure	1000	psig
	Temperature	210	°F (Feedwater on pre-boiler recirculation)
	Flow	180,000	#/hr.
Primary Coolant	Pressure	230	psia
	Temperature	254	°F Core Inlet
		254	°F Core Outlet
	Flow	90,000	#/hr.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

While attempting to drain "B" helium purification train water separator via HV-2382, with the separator level indication of 48", the operator drained the separator to 4" and closed HV-2382. Approximately one minute later he received a gas waste vacuum tank high pressure alarm and noticed the gas waste pressure and gas waste flow high. The reactor operator suspected HV-2382 of not closing and dispatched an equipment operator to check regeneration system pressures. The equipment operator closed PV-2352, the manual isolation for HV-2382 and isolated the blown rupture disc M-63802.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

____	Design	____	Unusual Service Cond. Including Environ.
____	Manufacture	__X__	Component Failure
____	Installation/Const.	____	Other (specify)
____	Operator	____	
____	Procedure	____	

The air operated drain valve failed to close properly which allowed primary coolant helium to enter the regeneration system and be vented to the gas waste vacuum tank at a rate which exceeded the capacity of the two gas waste compressors.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The release from the rupture disc was about 3 minutes in duration at approx. 100 ACFM. No increase in activity was detectable on the stack radiation monitors (RT-7324-1, 2 or 7325-1). Subsequent analysis of the gas in the gas waste surge tank for release No. 77 showed no measurable gamma activity. The allowable release rate based on tritium was 3.9 (10^7) ACFM.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

With the reactor depressurized to atmospheric pressure the valve (HV-2382) was isolated and disassembled for inspection. HV-2382 was found to have a small piece of metal in the seat of the valve which prevented the valve from closing properly. The foreign object was removed, the valve seat repaired and the valve was reassembled and tested. No further corrective action is planned.

FAILURE DATA/
SIMILAR REPORTED OCCURRENCES:

Abnormal Occurrences 50-267/74/21, 50-267/74/22, and 50-267/75/5 involved rupture of this rupture disc but the causes are unrelated. No. 74/21 was due to a release of gas from the gas waste compressor relief valves. No. 74/22 was due to a pressure setting error in the operating procedure. No. 75/5 was due to an improper valve lineup during a purge.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT:

None

CODE IMPACT:

None

RECOMMENDED:

/s/ Larry Brey

H. Larry Brey
Superintendent-Operations
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear
Generating Station

APPROVED:

Frederic E. Swart

Frederic E. Swart
Superintendent-Nuclear Production
Public Service Company
of Colorado



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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
P. O. BOX 361
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APR 4, 1975

REPORT NO. 50-267/75-76A

Final

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50-267 inquiry

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