

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



September 6, 1974



Mr. Edson G. Case
Acting Director of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545


Dear Mr. Case:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 -
DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-260/7411W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning failure of
core spray system 2B and 2D pump room cooler fan motor power
circuit and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory
Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This event occurred on
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2 on August 28, 1974.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-50-260/7411W
Report Date: September 6, 1974
Occurrence Date: August 28, 1974
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2

Identification of Occurrence

Failure of core spray system 2B and 2D pump room cooler fan motor power circuit.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 2 was in the startup testing phase at approximately 6-percent power.

Description of Occurrence

During performance of routine surveillance, at approximately 0345 on August 28, it was observed that the pump room cooler fan would not operate. Subsequent checks showed that the air circuit breaker feeding the motor would trip about 15 seconds after energization of fan motor contactor.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The failure was caused by a loose terminal block power connection on the inboard side of the contactor compartment. This resulted in the "B" phase 480V power lead being burned off at the terminal block which allowed the core spray room cooler blower motor to attempt to run single phase and therefore trip on overcurrent.

Analysis of Occurrence

Because of the failure of the cooler fan, loop II of the core spray system was declared inoperable. The continued safe operation of the unit 2 reactor was not jeopardized because all other safety systems as specified in technical specification section 3.5.A.2 were proven operable immediately. There was no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public as a result of this occurrence.

Corrective Action

The burned off wire was reterminated and all other connections in the contactor compartment were checked for tightness.

Failure Data

None