

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401

October 9, 1974

TVA
40TH
ANNIVERSARY
OF PEOPLE IN
PARTNERSHIP

Mr. Edson G. Case
Acting Director of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545



Dear Mr. Case:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 - FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33, DPR-52

The enclosed report, submitted as required by Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Technical Specification 6.7.2.B(3), is to provide details concerning Reactor Building crane modifications described in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report but still not incorporated at the plant. The discrepancy between existing design and the FSAR was discovered on September 9, 1974.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Gilleland
Assistant to the Manager of Power

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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ENCLOSURE

NON-ROUTINE 30-DAY REPORT

Report Date: October 8, 1974

Occurrence Date: September 9, 1974

Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Description of Occurrence

While making an unreviewed safety question determination of the plant modifications covered by TVA Engineering Change Notice (ECN) C9, it was determined that the modifications to the Reactor Building Crane created a potentially reportable condition under Technical Specifications 6.7.2.B(2) and 6.7.2.B(3). On September 9, 1974, after further investigation, it was determined that these modifications did constitute a reportable condition.

Causes of Deficiency

TVA ECN-C9 was issued on November 15, 1972, prior to the issuance of the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 operating license; and these modifications were added to the discussion in FSAR section 12.2.2.5.2 under Amendment No. 24. The modifications have not been accomplished to date as a result of late materials shipments. The last materials shipment arrived at BFNP on August 20, 1974. The deficiency arises in the fact that the FSAR states that the 125-ton Reactor Building Crane passes single failure protection for refueling cask handling which in reality has not been added due to later materials shipment.

Safety Implications

The only safety implications involved are those associated with the 125-ton Reactor Building Crane during handling of the refueling cask. No refueling casks have been handled at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant to date.

Corrective Measures

The modifications covered by TVA-ECN-C9 will be performed on the 125-ton Reactor Building Crane prior to the handling of a spent fuel cask containing spent fuel.