



Northeast
Nuclear Energy

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station
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The Northeast Utilities System
Donald B. Miller Jr.,
Senior Vice President - Millstone

Re: 10CFR50.73

June 13, 1995

MP-95-188

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Licensee Event Report 95-020-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 95-020-00 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Donald B. Miller, Jr.
Senior Vice President - Millstone Station

DBM/RT:dlr

Attachment: LER 95-020-00

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000336 PAGE (3) 1 OF 3

TITLE (4) Automatic Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature During Maintenance

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
05	16	95	95	020	00	06	13	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)	
		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)	
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER	
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Philip J. Lutz, Nuclear Licensing TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (203) 440-2072

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) 10 02 95

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On May 16, 1995 at 1408 hours, with the plant in Mode 6, an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) occurred. As Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESAS) Cabinet 5 was being powered down for maintenance, and fuses were removed in accordance with the applicable procedure, Facility 1 Enclosure Building Filtration System fan (F25A) and Control Room Air Conditioning fan (F32A) started and containment radiation monitor fan (F39A) secured. These actuations were anticipated during the restoration phase of the procedure.

The cause of the event is inadequate design of the ESAS system for maintenance. Fuses cannot reliably be removed and reinstalled without causing component actuations.

Corrective action is to investigate possible changes to the ESAS system which would allow maintenance to be performed without causing component actuations. A supplement to this report will be submitted to detail the results of this investigation. The ESAS cabinets are not expected to be downpowered during the plant's operating cycle.

This event is being reported pursuant to requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protective System (RPS).

EXPIRES: 5/31/95

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	05000336	95	020	00	02 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 368A) (17)

I. Description of Event

On May 16, 1995 at 1408 hours, with the plant in Mode 6, operators were preparing to remove Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESAS) Facility 1 actuation cabinet 5 from service. ESAS Facility 1 was being shut down to implement modifications to the system. Operators were in the process of down-powering actuation cabinet 5 per operations procedure OP2384. When one of the cabinet's +24 vdc power supply fuses was removed (Block Relay Supply), Facility 1 Enclosure Building Filtration System (EBFS) fan F25A and Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) fan F32A started and Containment radiation monitor fan F39A shut down automatically. A caution in the procedure anticipates these automatic actuations of ESAS equipment, but only during restoration of the power supply fuses, not during their removal.

II. Cause of Event

The cause for the inadvertent equipment actuations is inadequate design of the ESAS circuitry for maintenance. It is not always possible to remove the fuses without getting a momentary contact causing an actuation cabinet re-energization sequence. It is believed that as the operator removed the power supply fuse it momentarily recontacted the fuse holder, generating the component actuations (which are expected when the fuse is reinstalled).

The block logic that would have prevented these actuations gets its power from the same power source that supplies the actuation modules. Thus, when power is restored, a limited number of actuations are expected due to the fact that some blocks will not have been repowered and, thus, enabled prior to the actuation signal.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is being reported pursuant to requirements of 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B) as any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

An assessment has determined there was no safety consequence associated with the event because Facility 1 equipment was being shutdown for modifications and was not being relied on to be operable. The redundant Facility 2 equipment was available and operable to mitigate the consequences of any postulated accident for Mode 6.

IV. Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was securing of fans F25A and F32A. The containment purge valves were closed due to the containment radiation monitor fan being secured.

The plant's engineering department will investigate possible changes to the ESAS system which would allow maintenance to be performed without causing component actuations. A supplement to this report will be submitted to detail the results of this investigation. The ESAS cabinets are not expected to be downpowered during the plant's operating cycle.

One proposed modification is installation of a switch in actuation cabinets 5 & 6 to facilitate de-energization and re-energization without having to remove fuses. The installation of the switch would enable the actuation block signals prior to energizing the trip circuitry.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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FACILITY NAME (1)

Millstone Nuclear Power Station
Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000336

LER NUMBER (6)

YEAR

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NUMBER

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95

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03 OF 03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

V. Additional Information

Similar LER's:

LER 94-010-01 Inadvertent Actuation of ESAS Equipment.

LER 94-017-01 Inadvertent ESAS Actuations.

LER 95-005-01 Inadvertent Actuation of ESF Equipment.

ELIS Codes

•JE;XC;c560 -- Engineered Safety Actuation System.

•VC;Fan;F25A Enclosure Building Filter Fan