

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE  
37401



August 23, 1973

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-735W

The purpose of this report is to provide details concerning the  
failure of a pressure switch at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on  
August 13, 1973.

This occurrence was reported to the AEC Regulatory Operations  
Inspector by telephone on August 13, 1973, and by telegram  
on August 14, 1973.

Description of Incident

During monthly routine surveillance testing, pressure switch  
PdIS-1-36A, main steamline "C" high flow, did not operate at its  
technical specification setpoint of less than, or equal to,  
140-percent rated steamflow which corresponds to 108.75 psid.  
The as-found setpoint was 111.5 psid. The reactor was in a  
cold, open-vessel condition in preparation for initial  
criticality.

Investigation and Corrective Action

The pressure switch is a part of the one out of two taken twice,  
initiation logic in the main steamline isolation valve isolation  
system. There are four pressure switches on each steamline. The  
switches are Barton Model 278 differential pressure indicating  
switches with a range of 0 to 150 psid. The investigation did

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August 23, 1973


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not indicate any reason that would account for the setpoint drift. The switch was within the proper accuracy when previously tested on July 17, 1973. The test standard was within its calibration interval, and a recheck confirmed its accuracy. The pressure switch was reset to 106.5 psid and operated several times to ensure repeatability.

This is not considered a violation since the reactor has never been critical and steam has not been generated from nuclear heat. This report is made to provide information data for your instrument reliability record system.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

CC: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC  
230 Peachtree Street, NW.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303