


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE
37401



October 12, 1973



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7320W

The purpose of this report is to provide details concerning events involving unit 1 control rods 54-27 and 26-55 at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on October 3 and 4, 1973. This occurrence was reported by telegram on October 4, 1973, to the Region II Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Atlanta, Georgia.

Description of the Incident

Control rod drive 54-27 was valved out to replace a scram outlet valve seat at 9:00 a.m. on October 3 in a fully withdrawn insequence condition. At 8:51 a.m. on October 4, it was fully inserted. Throughout this time, control rod drive 54-27 could have been valved in and inserted if required.

Control rod 26-55 was in a fully withdrawn insequence condition at 5:15 a.m., on October 4, when it was determined the rod would not move with normal CRD pressure. After raising CRD pressure, it was inserted at 10:30 a.m. on October 4. The plant was operating at less than 8-percent power at less than or equal to rated temperature and pressure.

Investigation and Corrective Action

The occurrence was reviewed by the Startup Coordination Committee about 8:30 a.m. on October 4. In review of the situation with respect to technical specification 3.3/4.3.A, it was decided that control rod 54-27 should be valved in and fully inserted and that

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Mr. John F. O'Leary
October 12, 1973

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -
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
efforts should continue to fully insert control rod 26-55 as soon as possible. After raising CRD pressure, control rod 26-55 was inserted.

Study of this occurrence is not completed. It is under continuing review by members of the Plant Operations Review Committee, the manufacturer's representatives, and the Safety Review Board. Until this study is complete, a violation of technical specification 3.3.A.1 is assumed to have occurred; and written instructions have been issued to require any inoperable control rod to be fully inserted or the reactor placed in a shutdown condition unless it can be immediately determined that technical specification 3.3.A.1 is satisfied.

The strainer for drive water to control rod 26-55 was cleaned. This rod was then tested and returned to normal service.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

for 
E. F. Thomas
Director of Power Production

CC: Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC
230 Peachtree Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303