

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

February 10, 1975



Mr. Edson G. Case  
Acting Director of Licensing  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. Case:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-259/751W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning improper time setting of RERSW pump D1 start sequence time delay relay TD1-D and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 on January 31, 1975.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Regional Office  
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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Incident

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## ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report No.: BFAO-50-259/751W  
Report Date: February 10, 1975  
Occurrence Date: January 31, 1975  
Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2

### Identification of Occurrence

Improper time setting of RHRSW pump D1 start sequence time delay relay TD1-D.

### Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit 1 was operating at rated power and unit 2 at approximately 700 MWe.

### Description of Occurrence

At 1330 hours during a routine surveillance test, RHRSW pump D1 start sequence time delay relay TD1-D actuated in 6.14 seconds instead of the 13 to 15 seconds required.

### Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The time dial setting on relay TD1-D was found to be 6 seconds. The data sheets of the previous surveillance which was performed August 14, 1974, recorded the "as-left" setting of relay TD1-D as 13.71 seconds. The timer dial setting had apparently been moved inadvertently since the previous surveillance test.

### Analysis of Occurrence

The short time setting of relay TD1-D would have altered the designed starting sequence of emergency core cooling pumps on diesel generator "D" power due to Emergency Equipment Cooling Water pump D1 starting approximately 8 seconds early. Preoperational testing has proven that single timer failures in the pump starting sequence logic for diesel generator power causes no detrimental overloading of diesel generators. This occurrence caused no damage to any systems, structures, or components. There were no adverse effects to the health and safety of the public, and there were no personnel injuries or exposures due to this occurrence.

### Corrective Action

Relay TD1-D was recalibrated and left with an operating time of 14.12 seconds. The surveillance instruction on the subject timer and other similar timers will be changed to call for "as-found" and "as-left" relay dial knob settings in addition to "as-found" and "as-left" relay operation times.

### Failure Data

None