



PEACH BOTTOM—THE POWER OF EXCELLENCE

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

R. D. 1, Box 208

Delta, Pennsylvania 17314

(717) 456-7014

July 19, 1991

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2

This LER concerns potential Primary Containment leakage as a result of non-seismically qualified pressure transmitters due to inadequate installation during initial plant construction.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-277
Report Number:	2-91-021
Revision Number:	00
Event Date:	06/24/91
Report Date:	07/19/91
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

Sincerely,

cc: J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7 1 OF 0 3				PAGE (3) 0 3		
TITLE (4) Potential Primary Containment leakage as a result of non seismically qualified Pressure Transmitters due to inadequate installation during initial plant construction																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER (8)			
0 6	2 4	9 1	9 1	0 2 1		0 0	0 7	1 9	9 1					0 5 0 0 0		
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 9 9			20 402(b)				20 406(a)				50 73(a)(2)(v)				73 71(b)	
			20 405(a)(1)(i)				50 36(a)(1)				X 50 73(a)(2)(v)				73 71(b)	
			20 405(a)(1)(ii)				50 36(a)(2)				50 73(a)(2)(v)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract Section and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
			20 406(a)(1)(i)				50 73(a)(2)(i)				50 73(a)(2)(i)(A)					
			20 405(a)(1)(ix)				50 73(a)(2)(ii)				50 73(a)(2)(iv)(B)					
			20 406(a)(1)(iv)				50 73(a)(2)(iii)				50 73(a)(2)(v)					
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Albert A. Fulvio - Regulatory Engineer										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 1 7 4 5 6 - 7 0 1 4						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH DAY YEAR				
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 6/24/91 at 1410 hours, two pressure transmitters were discovered to be non seismically supported by an Installations Engineer during an instrument rack walkdown for a future modification. The Suppression Chamber Wide Range Pressure Transmitter and Suppression Chamber Containment Atmospheric Dilution Vent Pressure Transmitter were the instruments identified. This could have resulted in excessive leakage from the Primary Containment if a design basis accident would have occurred coincidental with a seismic event. The cause of the event was improper rack installation. The racks were installed during initial plant construction and the installation of this rack was less than adequate. Shift Permits were applied to the instrument lines. The same instrument line racks on Unit 3 have been inspected and found to be acceptable. A review will be performed on similarly mounted safety related instrument racks and a Non Conformance Report has been initiated which will provide the interim repair method and the final repair disposition. No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. There have been no previous similar events identified.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 6 0 0 0 2 7 7 9 1 -	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's. (17))

Requirements for the Report

This report is being submitted to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) describing a condition that alone could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function.

Unit Condition At Time of Event

Unit 2 was in the RUN mode at 99% of thermal reactor (EII:EA) power. There were no other systems, structures, or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event.

Description of Event

On 6/24/91 at 1410 hours, two pressure transmitters were discovered to be non seismically supported by an Installations Engineer during an instrument rack walkdown for a future modification. The Suppression Chamber (EII:NH) Wide Range Pressure Transmitter (EII:PT) (PT-4952) and Suppression Chamber Containment Atmospheric Dilution (EII:BB) (CAD) Vent Pressure Transmitter (PT-4955) were the instruments identified. The rack that holds the pressure transmitters (PT) was inadequately attached to the grating in the '2B' Residual Heat Removal system room. Six of the eight rack hold down bolts were not installed. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.A.3 was entered which allows continued operation for an additional 24 hours with inoperable Primary Containment. An instrument line failure could have resulted in excessive leakage from the Primary Containment if a design basis accident would have occurred coincident with a seismic event. The instrument lines were isolated at the root valves and two shift permits were applied to ensure that these lines are maintained isolated and the LCO was exited at 1730 hours. The same instrument line racks on Unit 3 have been inspected and found to be acceptable. The NRC was notified via ENS at 1757 hours.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event was improper rack installation. The racks were installed during initial plant construction and the installation of this rack was less than adequate since the correct number of bolts in the base plate were not installed.

Additionally, a contributing factor to this event is that the installation details used during plant construction to install this rack were designed for mounting the base plate to concrete and did not address attaching the plate to grating. The design and installation processes used today are much enhanced to ensure future recurrences are prevented.

Analysis of the Event

No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. PT-4952 and PT-4955 are used for indication only. PT-4952 instrument tap is located inboard of the containment isolation valves. PT-4955 instrument tap is located outboard of the isolation valves. PT-4952 is used for suppression Chamber wide range pressure monitoring which has a redundant operable PT. The process line to which PT-4955 is attached is used during post accident conditions to vent the containment per the CAD system design function. This indication function is not required for CAD.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/98

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

operability. Additionally, the CAD system is still operable with the PT isolated. The failure of the PT-4952 or PT-4955 instrument lines, which are one half inch in diameter, during a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident coincident with a seismic event would result in additional leakage to the Secondary Containment. The Standby Gas Treatment (EHS:BH) system would have then filtered the leakage to minimize the release to the environment.

Corrective Actions

Two Shift Permits were applied at approximately 1730 hours to the instrument lines to ensure that the lines are maintained isolated. The same instrument line racks on Unit 3 have been inspected and found to be acceptable.

A review will be performed on similarly mounted safety related instrument racks to ensure that no other deficiencies exist.

Additionally, a Non Conformance Report has been initiated which will provide the interim repair method and the final repair disposition.

Previous Similar Events

There have been no previous similar events identified concerning an inoperable safety system as a result of inadequately supported seismic instrumentation racks.