

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

January 22, 1976



Mr. Benard C. Rusche  
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Rusche:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 -  
DOCKET NO. 50-260 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - ABNORMAL  
OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-50-260/761W

The enclosed report is to provide details concerning 1A and 1B SRM's  
which were made inoperable and is submitted in accordance with  
Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. This  
event occurred on Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. F. Thomas  
Director of Power Production

Enclosure

CC (Enclosure):

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Regional Office  
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 818  
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## ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT

Report Number: BFAO-50-260/761W

Report Date: January 22, 1976

Occurrence Date: Reported to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on January 12, 1976

Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2

Three design deficiencies on unit 3 were discovered by the Division of Engineering Design; and Design Deficiency Report Nos. 222, 223, and 225 will be issued in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). These deficiencies, which also apply to units 1 and 2, were reported to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant on January 12, 1976. Following is a summary of each deficiency and the corrective action to be taken.

1. DDR-222 - The demineralized water system piping to the drywell was found to have Class M inboard isolation valves several feet from the drywell penetration. Being Class M, the valves cannot be considered containment isolation valves as required in the FSAR Section 5.2.3.5. A Class D hand valve that is seismically qualified will be added immediately outboard of the present outboard check valve.
2. DDR-223 - During an analysis of the unit 3 steamlines in the determination of the effects of substituting two Crosby relief valves for two Target Rock main steam relief valves, it was found that, during relief valve operation, sections of the discharge lines underwent stresses which exceed the stress level stated in the FSAR. Snubbers will be added to each main steam relief valve discharge line to correct this problem.
3. DDR-225 - The drawing revision necessitated by design change ECN L1140 which modifies the standby liquid control pump discharge relief valve piping inadvertently specified schedule 40 pipe instead of schedule 80 pipe. The SLC pump discharge piping modification will be changed to schedule 80 pipe.

This report serves as an interim report. The final report for each occurrence will be included in the respective design deficiency reports.