



Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Generating Station
Post Office Box 216
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241

NJK-75-45

January 24, 1975



Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing Regulation
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C. 20545

REFERENCE: QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.2.A., and 6.6.B.1.a.

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-50-265/75-5 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on January 15, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on January 15, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK:RAR/dkp

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations

J. S. Abel

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REPORT NUMBER: AO 50-265/75-5

REPORT DATE: January 24, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: January 15, 1975

FACILITY: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, IL 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Instrument drift of PS-2-261-30B beyond its limit.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit two was in cold shutdown for refueling.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On January 15, 1975 at 3:00 p.m., while doing routine REFUELING OUTAGE surveillance calibration of the Main Steam Line Low Pressure Isolation pressure switches, it was discovered that one switch, PS-2-261-30B, tripped at 846 psig. Technical Specification 3.2.A. gives a limit of ≥ 850 psig for this switch. No operator actions were needed to bring the situation under control.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Instrument Drift - The instrument history was reviewed. It showed that all the Main Steam Line Low Pressure switches tend to drift in both the positive and negative directions. Normally, this drift is not enough to exceed the limit.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There are four Main Steam Line Low Pressure switches that are arranged in a one out of two taken twice logic system. The other three switches had set points within limits. These switches are provided mainly to protect against a pressure regulator malfunction which would cause a control or bypass valve to open. If this condition had occurred the system would have isolated before the pressure reached the limit of 850 psig and no fuel would have been uncovered and the peak clad temperature would have been much less than 1500°F. Therefore, no radioactive materials, other than what was contained initially in the water, would have been released. Thus, there are no safety implications related to this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The switch was recalibrated and left at 864 psig. Since March 1973, when the setpoint was raised to 864 psig and the calibration frequency was increased from once a quarter to once a month, there have been no cases of instrument drift beyond the Technical Specification limit. This regular routine surveillance will be continued. There is no plan at this time to initiate any further corrective action.

FAILURE DATA:

Since the setpoint was raised in March 1973 this is the first case of an instrument drifting beyond the limit.

EQUIPMENT PIECE NUMBER
MANUFACTURER
MODEL
RANGE

PS-2-261-30B
Barksdale
B2T-A12SS
50-1200 psig