




Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Post Office Box 216
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241



NJK-75-73

February 18, 1975

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

REFERENCE: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.2.A, Table 3.2.1, 6.6.B.1.a


Dear Mr. O'Leary:

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/75-7 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on February 10, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on February 11, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK/RAR/lk

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations
J. S. Abel

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REPORT NUMBER: AO 50-265/75-7

REPORT DATE: February 18, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: February 8, 1975

FACILITY:

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, Illinois 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line flow switch, FS-2-2352, failed to cause an isolation of the system within Technical Specification limit.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

The unit was in the cold shutdown condition for a refueling outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On February 8, 1975, while doing routine surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) steam line flow switches, FS-2-2352 failed to trip at any applied differential pressure. The purpose of this switch is to isolate the HPCI system when the steam flow is $\geq 300\%$ of the rated flow.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Misalignment

The failure was investigated and it was discovered that the switch linkage was binding and would not move through its full travel.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There are two HPCI steam line flow switches; FS-2-2352 and FS-2-2353. Each one is capable of isolating the HPCI system; therefore, even though FS-2-2352 failed, FS-2-2353, which was found within limits, would have isolated the HPCI system before the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation was exceeded.

February 18, 1975

Due to the redundancy of the circuitry, safe HPCI and thus safe reactor operation were not jeopardized. No hazard to the health of the public or plant personnel was presented.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The linkage was adjusted and the switch was recalibrated and functionally tested to verify its operability.

FAILURE DATA:

Equipment Piece Number	2-2352
Manufacturer	Barton
Model	288
Range	-200" to +200" of water

This is the first HPCI switch which has failed by the linkage binding at Quad-Cities Station; therefore, there are no safety implications based on cumulative experience.