




Commonwealth Edison  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Post Office Box 216  
Cordova, Illinois 61242  
Telephone 309/654-2241



NJK-75-178

April 5, 1975

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

REFERENCE: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30  
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 6.6.B.1.a and Table 3.7.1

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/75-10 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on March 26, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on March 26, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

NJK/1k

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
J. S. Abel

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REPORT NUMBER: A0-50-265/75-10

REPORT DATE: April 4, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: March 26, 1975

FACILITY:

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Cordova, Illinois 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of pressure suppression valves A0-2-1601-23, A0-2-1601-56, and A0-2-1601-63 to close in the required time.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 2 was shutdown in the refuel mode.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During operating cycle surveillance testing of the Unit 2 pressure suppression valves on March 26, 1975, the closure times of the above valves were found to exceed their Technical Specification limits. A work request was initiated to repair the subject valves.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

Equipment Failure

The air bleed-off on all three valves were found to be out of adjustment. Additionally, the solenoid on valve A0-2-1601-63 was malfunctioning.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

All valves involved are normally closed during reactor power operation. Upon the receipt of a Group II isolation signal the valves are signaled to close. Based upon the fact that the valves are normally closed and simply remain closed under an isolation signal there is minimal effect on reactor safety from slow closure time.

A0-2-1601-63 did operate in both directions on December 18, 1974 and in the open direction when the drywell was being purged on December 20, 1974 at 10:20 p.m. prior to the Unit 2 shutdown on December 23, 1974. The valve then remained open to sustain air circulation in the drywell throughout the subsequent refueling outage. The valve was tested for

closure time on March 26, 1975 and failed to close. The safety implications of the failure of A0-2-1601-63 valve to close are minimal since it was operable prior to the reactor shutdown. The failure occurred while the unit was shutdown and depressurized in the refuel mode.

There were no personnel injuries or abnormal radiation exposures as a result of this occurrence and the public health and safety were not affected.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The corrective action was to initiate a work request to repair the malfunctioning valves. A defective plunger on the solenoid on A0-2-1601-63 was replaced and the bleed-offs on all three valves involved were adjusted. Upon the completion of the work on March 26, the valves were retested and all closed within the 10 second Technical Specification limit.

#### FAILURE DATA:

The failure data indicates only two air operated valves associated with the 1600 system previously would not close within the required time limit. Since these valves are also normally closed and remain closed during a Group II isolation signal, the reactor safety implications based on cumulative experience are again minimal.