



Commonwealth Edison  
Quad-Cities Generating Station  
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NJK-75-207

April 18, 1975

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director  
Directorate of Licensing Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

REFERENCE: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Docket No. 50-265, DRP-30  
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.9.A.1

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/75-11 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations on April 9, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on April 9, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

NJK/SRH/vmm

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
J. S. Abel

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REPORT NUMBER: AO-50-265/75-11

REPORT DATE: April 15, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: April 8, 1975

FACILITY: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Cordova, Ill. 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

While performing the monthly Unit 2 Diesel Generator surveillance test, the field diode transient voltage suppressors failed.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 2 was in the cold shutdown condition for the current refueling outage.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 3:25 PM on April 8, 1975, during Unit 2 Diesel Generator monthly operability surveillance testing, electrical arcing above the excitation cabinet was discovered by the operational analysis department. The arcing was caused by the shorting of the field diode selenium surge suppressors. The diesel generator output breaker was immediately tripped and the diesel generator was shut down.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

EQUIPMENT FAILURE - The apparent cause of this occurrence is equipment failure. All six selenium surge suppressors had shorted out. The electrical circuitry is such that if one selenium surge suppressor fails, the remaining selenium surge suppressors will likely also fail. Work request #1259-75 was initiated to replace the failed suppressors.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The safety implications of this occurrence are minimized by the fact that Unit 2 was in the cold shutdown condition for refueling and both the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator and off-site power were available. Moreover, in spite of the failed surge suppressors, the Diesel Generator could have been started and loaded in the event of an accident condition.

There were no personnel injuries and the incident had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to shutdown the Unit 2 Diesel Generator and replace the failed selenium surge suppressors. On April 10, 1975 at 1:44 PM, the Unit 2 Diesel Generator was placed back in service, and was successfully operated.

Work request #1334-75 was initiated to check the selenium surge suppressors on the other two diesel generator field diodes. Additional corrective action taken to prevent repetition was to initiate modification M-4-1-75-25, M-4-2-75-25, and M-4-1/2-75-4. These modifications provide for the replacement of the existing selenium surge suppressors with a more reliable type.

FAILURE DATA:

There was a failure of the selenium surge suppressors on the Unit 2 Diesel Generator April 26, 1972. The modifications that have been initiated plus the testing of the existing selenium surge suppressors should preclude any similar failures in the future.