



Commonwealth Edison
Quad-Cities Generating Station
Post Office Box 216
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241



NJK-75-377

July 24, 1975

Director of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket No. 50-265, DPP-30, Unit 2
Appendix A, Sections 3.1, Table 3.1.1, 6.6.B.1.a

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/75-22 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on July 17, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on July 17, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


N.J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK/SRH/vmb

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations
J.S. Abel

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REPORT NUMBER: AO-50-265/75-22

REPORT DATE: July 25, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: July 16, 1975

FACILITY: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, IL 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Two of the four high drywell pressure switches exceeded the Technical Specification limit of 2.0 PSI.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

The Reactor mode switch was in RUN, with 1944 MW_t and 602 MW_e.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On July 16, 1975, while performing surveillance test number six, it was noted that PS-2-1001-88B and 2-1001-88C failed to meet the Technical Specification limit of ≤ 2 PSI. Both switches tripped at 2.05 PSI.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The two pressure switches not meeting the Technical Specification requirement was apparently caused by instrument drift.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The two pressure switches are located one in each logic system. Since the other two switches in each logic system tripped at the proper values, the Rx protection system would have performed its intended function within the limit of ≤ 2 PSI, therefore minimizing the safety implications. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

PS-2-1001-88B & C were recalibrated to trip at 1.90 PSI and tested satisfactory.

FAILURE DATA:

The involved pressure switches are static-O-ring model 12N-AA5-PP, which have generally been quite stable. The exact cause of the instrument drift is not known, but since the last setpoint drift involving these pressure switches reported was in January of 1974, the safety implication of this occurrence is considered to be minimal and no further corrective action is being considered.