LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6) **(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)**

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 ILQAD2 (7–8, 9–14)	0-0-0-0-0-0-0 (15–25)	4 1 1 1 1 (26–30)	0 1 (31–32)

CON'T	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 (7–8)	P Q (57–58)	T (59)	L (60)	0 5 0 - 0 2 6 5 (61–68)	1 0 1 6 7 5 (69–74)	1 0 2 6 7 5 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 Three of the four drywell high pressure (Scram) sensors were found to
03 exceed the Technical Specification setpoint of 2.0 psig max.
04 The switches were immediately recalibrated and functionally
05 tested. Nevertheless, the switches would have performed
06 their intended function but at a slightly higher pres. (AO-50-265/75-45)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07 I A (9–10)	F (11)	I N S T R U (12–17)	N (43)	S 3 8 2 (44–47)	N (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The exact cause of this occurrence is designated as instrument
09 drift of the sensor, model 12N-AA5-P2. The setpoints were
10 recalibrated at 1.95 ± 0.05 psig increasing.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11 G (9)	0 0 0 (10–12)	N/A (13–44)	B (45)	Scram surveillance (46–80)

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12 Z (9)	Z (10)	N/A (11–44)	N/A (45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13 0 0 0 (9–11)	Z (12)	N/A (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14 0 0 0 (9–11)	N/A (12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A (9–80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16 Z (9)	N/A (10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 N/A (9–80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 N/A (9–80)

8306170146 751024
PDR ADOCK 05000265
S PDR

19 (9–80)

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NJK-75-527

October 24, 1975

Director of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30, Unit 2
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.1.A, Table 3.1.1.c, 6.6.1.B.a

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO 50-265/75-40 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telephone on October 16, 1975 and to you and Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telecopy on October 16, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK/MPF/lk

cc: Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
G. A. Abrell

REPORT NUMBER: AO 60-265/75-40

REPORT DATE: October 24, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: October 16, 1975

FACILITY: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, Illinois 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

High drywell pressure switches PS-2-1001-88 A, B, and D out of calibration.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit Two was shutdown for a core maintenance outage with the mode switch in REFUEL.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

While performing routine surveillance on October 16, 1975 at approximately 1:00 p.m., three of the four high drywell pressure scram switches were found to exceed the Technical Specification setpoint limit of $\leq$ 2.0 psig. The as-found setpoints were as follows:

PS 2-1001-88A	2.35 psig
PS 2-1001-88B	2.15 psig
PS 2-1001-88D	2.20 psig

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment Failure

The apparent cause of this occurrence is designated as instrument drift. The switch involved is a static-o-ring, Model 12N-AA5-PP. The setpoints were calibrated at 1.95 ± 0.05 psig on September 9, 1975 for PS 2-1001-88A and B and on September 10, 1975 for PS 2-1001-88D.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressure switches PS-2-1001-88 A through D are part of the Reactor Protection System one-out-of-two-twice logic. They provide a scram signal during a loss of coolant accident to minimize the energy which must be accomodated by the emergency core cooling systems and to prevent the reactor from going critical following the accident.

Since PS-2-1001-88A and C are in Channel "A" and PS-2-1001-88 B and D are in Channel "B" the scram would have occurred at a drywell pressure of 2.15 psig rather that the desired 2.00 psig. The effect of this elevated trip

point on the functions described above is minimal because there are several other scram signals that would actuate prior to the drywell high-pressure signal and thus accomplish the desired scram. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The corrective action involved an immediate recalibration and functional test of the affected pressure switches. This recalibration resulted in the following acceptable setpoints:

2-1001-88A	1.93 psig
2-1001-88B	1.90 psig
2-1001-88D	1.90 psig

FAILURE DATA:

Instrument setpoint drifts of the drywell high pressure sensors have occurred in the past. Through continued surveillance recalibration and the existing setpoint margin for possible drift, occurrences of this nature are expected to be minimal in severity and frequency.