



Commonwealth Edison  
Quad-Cities Generating Station  
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NJK-75-311

June 6, 1975



Director of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
Washington, D. C. 20555

REFERENCE: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station  
Docket No. 50-254, DPR-29, Unit 1  
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.1, 6.6.B.1.2

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-254/75-15 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telephone on May 29, 1975 and to you and Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations by telecopy on May 29, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY  
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis  
Station Superintendent

NJK:SH/dkp

cc: Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
J. S. Abel

*50-254  
Inquiry*

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REPORT NUMBER: AO-50-254/75-15

REPORT DATE: June 5, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: May 28, 1975

FACILITY: QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
Cordova, IL 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system fluid pressure sensor 1-5600-PS-3 setpoint exceeded its Technical Specification setting.

CONDITION PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

The unit one reactor mode switch was in "RUN", the unit was operating at 1604 MWt and 470 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 11:00 a.m. on May 28, 1975, while doing routine weekly surveillance, it was noted that pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 tripped below the Technical Specification limit of  $\geq 900$  PSIG by 10 PSIG.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment Failure - Instrument drift was the apparent cause of this occurrence.

ANALYSIS OF DEVIATION:

The safety implications are minimal since this is an anticipatory scram signal; the core would be protected by the APRM and high reactor pressure scrams if all switches would fail. In addition, the control valves would not start closing on loss of EHC fluid pressure until 600 PSIG; therefore the scram setpoint of  $\geq 900$  is in the conservative direction.

The reactor protection system would have received a trip on low EHC pressure because the other pressure switch in the same channel tripped at 933 PSIG; therefore had a low EHC pressure condition existed, the reactor would have scrammed. Since safe plant operation was not jeopardized, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 was immediately recalibrated to trip at 935 PSIG.

Action Item Record has previously been initiated to investigate this problem and find a suitable replacement switch or system to prevent continual recurrence of instrument drift.

FAILURE DATA:

So far this year there have been two previous instances where the Technical Specification limit has not been met by EHC pressure switches. This is the first failure involving 1-5600-PS-3.

This pressure switch, manufactured by Barkdale, is a model C9612-2 with an adjustable range of 135 to 1500 PSI.