

REPORT NUMBER: AO 50-265/75-42

REPORT DATE: October 28, 1975

OCCURRENCE DATE: October 18, 1975

FACILITY: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Cordova, IL 61242

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The B Stand-By Gas Treatment (SBGT) System High Efficiency Prefilter differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification limit.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit Two was in the cold shut down condition for core maintenance.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 7:00PM on October 18, 1975, the B SBGT System was observed to be operating at a flow of less than 4000 SCFM. An operator was sent to check the differential pressure across the train, and found that it exceeded the Technical Specification limit. The A SBGT System was tested and found to be operable. Work Request 4093-75 was written to replace High Efficiency Prefilter 1/2 B-7502.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The apparent cause of this occurrence is designated as equipment failure. The High Efficiency Prefilter differential pressure had increased due to fouling. The SBGT system flow thus decreased proportionately.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Stand-By Gas Treatment System consists of two 100% capacity trains. Only one train is required to maintain secondary containment. Immediately after the "B" SBGT prefilter was found to exceed the Technical Specification limits, the A SBGT System was tested and found to be operable. Additionally, the "B" Train was still able to operate at approximately 3700 SCFM. Since one train was completely operable, and the second train was partially operable, and secondary containment was not compromised, the health and safety of the public was not affected as a result of this occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

At 10:15PM the B SBGT System was taken out of service to change the filter. On October 19, 1975, the train was returned to service and tested satisfactorily.

FAILURE DATA:

On one previous occasion, the "B" SBGT System was found to have low flow due to a high filter differential pressure. Surveillance testing and system operation are adequate to determine this type of failure. The system redundancy provides sufficient capacity to allow maintenance to be performed to correct failures that occur.

8306170130 751028
PDR ADOCK 05000265
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME		LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE								
01	Z	L	Q	A	D	Z	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	1	0	1	
7	8	9			14	15							25	26							30	31	32	
CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE				
01	CONT	D	I	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	6	5	1	0	1	8	7	5	1	0	5	7	5
7	8	57	58	59	60	61							68	69							74	75		80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	The B Standby Gas Treatment System was observed to be																						80
03	operating at a flow of <4000 CFM and differential pressure 2.57																						80
04	in. of water across the drain. Unit 2 was in the cold shutdown																						80
05	condition for some maintenance. The A SFGT train was																						80
06	operable at the time. The filter that was sealed thus																						80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				VIOLATION	
07	S	C	E	F	I	L	T	E	A	S	I	O	H	T	1
7	8	9	10	11	12			17	43	44			47		48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	The low flow and high differential pressure was caused																						80
09	by fouling the high efficiency pre filter. The																						80
10	filter was changed and system flow tested satisfactorily																						80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS				METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					
11	G	0	0	0	-	N	A	O	B	Operational Observation					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13			44	45	46		80		

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE					
12	G	G	1	1	2	1	2						
7	8	9	10	11			44	45				80	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION										
13	0	0	0	E										
7	8	9	11	12	13							80		

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION									
14	0	N/A									
7	8	9	11	12							80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																						80
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION									
16	D	N/A									
7	8	9	10								80

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																						80
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	(EVENT DESCRIPTION CONT'D) - restricting flow was replaced																						80
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19	and the system was returned to service. (AD 50-265/75-1)																						80
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NJK-75-536

October 28, 1975

Director of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket No. 50-265, DPR-30, Unit 2
Appendix A, Sections 1.0.A.2, 3.7.B.1, 6.6.B.2.a

Enclosed please find Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-265/75-42 for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station. This occurrence was previously reported to Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telephone on October 20, 1975 and to you and Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement by telecopy on October 20, 1975.

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.B.1.a.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION


N.J. Kalivianakis
Station Superintendent

NJK/TPJ/vmb

cc: Region III, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
G.A. Abrell

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