

**Consumers
Power
Company**

COPY

General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • Area Code 517 788-0550

September 16, 1971

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing
US Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, DC 20545

Re: Docket No 50-255
License No DPR-20

Dear Dr. Morris:

This letter is written to apprise you of a recent incident involving the primary coolant system at this facility.

At the time the incident occurred, the plant was in a hot shutdown condition with the primary coolant system at refueling boron concentration, 532° F and 2100 psia. Three of the four primary coolant pumps were in operation and preparations underway to bring the reactor critical for operator training.

At 1335 on September 8, 1971, a technician de-energized the breakers to the reactor protective system to install a minor modification. This act de-energized the feed to the electromechanical relief valve pilot valve solenoids allowing the valves to open.

The primary system pressure decreased to a low point of approximately 1280 psia over a period of 2 - 3 minutes until the blowdown was terminated by closure of the motor operated valves used to isolate the open relief valve.

The system pressure and temperature were back to normal in approximately one hour.

*IS/JMK/Staff 9/24/71
RAE*

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The rate of depressurization of the reactor vessel and the pressurizer approximated the design rate for a pressurizer safety valve operation. The number of occurrences allowed for in the design was 200. Therefore, we conclude that the integrity of the primary coolant system has not been compromised by this incident.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- 1335 Breaker #13 on panels Y10 and Y30 de-energized to allow for a minor modification to the reactor protective system. Refer to attached drawing E-8.
Relays K1 and K3 which feed the electrically operated pressurizer relief valve bi-stables (RV1042B and RV1043B) de-energized.
- 1335 RV1043B opened and released steam to the quench tank starting a decrease of primary system pressure. RV1042B had previously been isolated by means of the motor operated isolation valve and did not pass steam during the incident. Refer to attached drawing M-201.
- 1336 Safety injection signal (SIS) actuated on both channels, however the A channel was blocked by action of the operator upon realization of the cause of the pressure drop. Safety injection pumps started.
- 1336 Operator started MOV1043A closing.
- 1337 Charging pump P55C manually started.
- 1337 System pressure decay turned around at a low point of 1280 psia as MOV1043A closed stopping flow of steam to the quench tank via RV1043B.
- 1338 Stopped safety injection pumps.
- 1343 Breaker #13 on panels Y10 and Y30 closed and power restored to relief valve control circuits.
- 1344 Returned charging and letdown to normal.
- 1400 As the system pressure recovered to a point above 1700 psia, the operator reset the safety injection channel B and returned all equipment to normal.
- 1430 Primary coolant system pressure and temperature back to normal. The coolant temperature and pressurize level swings of 3° F

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and 4 percent respectively are considered insignificant.

CAUSE OF INCIDENT

The basic cause of this incident was the non-standard designation of contacts (as used by the architect engineer on the drawing) in the control circuit to the power operated relief valves. The technician was misled by the 'a' contact designation as shown on the drawing when in fact the circuit is wired using 'b' contact(s). This led him to believe the relief valves would not open when the power was removed by opening breaker #13 on the panels Y10 and Y30.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANNED

The drawing(s) will be corrected to indicate the "as built" condition using standard notations.

A review of the control scheme design will be conducted by Consumers and the Reactor Supplier personnel to determine if any changes are desirable in order to lessen the probability of a second incident.

The plant operators will be furnished with revised procedures indicating steps to be utilized to minimize the blowdown if it should occur in the future.


Yours very truly,


R. L. Haueter

LMH/ERC/mho

Robert L. Haueter
Electric Production
Superintendent - Nuclear


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USAEC Compliance, COO






1. DECREASES WITH THERMAL MAGNETIC TRIP.
2. DECREASES WITH ADJUSTABLE MAGNETIC TRIP ONLY.
3. DECREASES WITH ADJUSTABLE MAGNETIC TRIP ONLY. SHIMS WITH THERMAL CONTACT ELEMENTS USED FOR ALARM ONLY, SET AT 105° MOTOR FOLLOWED CURRENTLY.
4. ALL DECREASES ARE TWO POLE WITH THERMAL MAGNETIC TRIP AND 21° WIRE.
5. (1) INDICATES CURRENTS ROUTED TO LEFT HAND CHANNEL. (2) INDICATES CURRENTS ROUTED TO RIGHT HAND CHANNEL. SIGNALS ARE FROM EACH OTHER.
6. (1) CHANNEL 1. (2) CHANNEL 2. (3) CHANNEL 3. (4) CHANNEL 4. (5) CHANNEL 5. (6) CHANNEL 6. EACH OTHER.
7. CHASE SHIMUNT OR FORM AND, TIME 5 FUSE MAGNETIC TRIP.




METER AND RELAY TABLE				
DEVICE	DESCRIPTION	WIRING AND TYPE	FUNCTION	LOCATION
6-1-1	TEMP. AND HUMID. SENS.	A-11, A-12	ON-BOARD	ON-BOARD
6-1-2	DC BUS - OVER VOLTAGE	RELAY 7-1-3-2-2	ALARM	"
6-1-3	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-4	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-5	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-6	TEMP. AC BUS - OVER VOLT	ELECTRONIC DEVICE	ALARM	"
6-1-7	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-8	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-9	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-10	DC BUS - UNDER VOLT	ELECTRONIC DEVICE	ALARM	"
6-1-11	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-12	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
6-1-13	ANALYZER	WIRING/ANALYZER TR	MONITORING	"
6-1-14	VOLTMETER	" " " "	"	"
6-1-15	FREQUENCY METER	J. & P.	"	"
7-1-1	ANALYZER - UNDER VOLT	ELECTRONIC DEVICE	ALARM	"
7-1-2	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-3	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-4	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-5	TEMP. AC BUS - UNDER VOLT	ELECTRONIC DEVICE	ALARM	"
7-1-6	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-7	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-8	" " " "	" " " "	"	"
7-1-9	TEMP. AC BUS	" " " "	"	"



EMERGENCY LIGHTING
SCHEM 0027



SCHEME 1027

[illegible]

102-W-5665

