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Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
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Morris, Illinois 60450

WPW Ltr. #407-73

May 25, 1973

Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

50-249



SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #3,  
SECTION 6.6.B.2 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit, in which, during routine calibration of the isolation condenser high condensate flow switch DPIS-3-1349-B the setpoint was found to exceed the value specified in Table 3.2.1 of the Technical Specifications.

#### PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

On May 15, 1973, during a routine calibration, the isolation condenser high condensate flow switch DPIS-3-1349-B was found to actuate at a differential pressure of 32.7 inches of water. The Technical Specification limit as set forth in Table 3.2.1 for the high condensate flow switches is  $\leq 32$  inches of water. The high condensate flow switches have a range of 0 to 60 inches of water and an accuracy specification of  $\pm 4\%$  of full scale.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

This switch last exhibited excessive drift on September 22, 1972. At that time the setpoint was lowered from  $30 \pm 1$  inches of water to  $28.5 \pm 1$  inches of water to increase the range to prevent the switch from drifting above the Technical Specification limit. On February 7, 1973, a locking device was installed to also help prevent the drifting situation. Since the switch is still drifting beyond allowable limits, further action is warranted. The station procedures will be changed to require calibration adjustment to  $27.5 \pm 1$  inches of water for both switches in the condensate return line. This action will further increase the range to prevent the switch from drifting above limits. Also, calibration of the switches will be performed monthly rather than once every three months as listed in Table 4.2.1 of the Technical Specifications. These corrective actions will remain in effect while an investigation is conducted to determine the cause of the problem. The investigation will take approximately six months. This corrective action only applies to unit 3 since unit 2 switches have not exhibited this problem.

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Two sensors (DPIS-3-1349 A & B) on the isolation condenser return line are provided to detect the failure of the isolation condenser line and actuate isolation action. The sensors are arranged in a 1 out of 2 logic to meet the single failure criteria. The trip setting and valve closure time are such as to prevent uncovering the core or exceeding site limits. There are no implications or effect on the safety or public health because the redundant switch (DPIS-3-1349-A) would have actuated within the Technical Specification limit. This switch actuated at 29.4 inches of water during the routine calibration.

Since the locking devices have been installed on similar switches on units 2 & 3, this has been the first failure. Therefore, it is believed to be an isolated occurrence. These changes should prevent future recurrence of drift beyond Technical Specification limits in the subject switch.

*W. P. Worden*  
W. P. Worden  
Superintendent  
Dresden Station

WPW:MST:jw

cc: WFW Ltr. File